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Abstract 
This research studies the accession of a transition country to the World Trade Organization on the 
case of Ukraine. Quantitative results are obtained by building a Computable General Equilibrium 
model in the mathematical programming language General Algebraic Modelling System 
(GAMS). Four scenarios are simulated: 1) import tariffs reform; 2) improvement of exports 
access; 3) improvement of investment climate and 4) the scenario that combines previous three, 
or a full WTO accession. The results of the model show that in all scenarios there is growth of 
both exports and imports. By contrast, output and household consumption levels vary from 
scenario to scenario. The first two simulations, tariff reform and improvement of export access, 
show no significant change in domestic production and consumption. Thus, with expanded trade 
and practically the same output and consumption, Ukraine merely becomes more open and shifts 
to foreign trade. In the third scenario, improvement of investment climate has the most favourable 
results. Owning to better allocation of resources, both domestic production and consumption 
expand and the welfare of households increases by nearly 10% of consumption or 2% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). The combined scenario shows a somewhat smaller but still significant 
improvement in welfare: over 8% of consumption or 1.8% of GDP. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Ukraine has a very open economy and the role of the foreign trade sector is extremely important. 
The ratio of exports to GDP in Ukraine is around 60%, much higher than in many other countries. 
Despite this, Ukraine was one of the last large economies in the world that became a World Trade 
Organization (WTO) member.  
The process of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO system started in 1993, when the official 
application was submitted; later in 1994 a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime of Ukraine 
was sent to the WTO Secretariat. Since that time until the end of 2007 sixteen Working Party 
meetings were held. Bilateral negotiations between Ukraine and WTO members started in 1997, 
fifty one countries had decided to conduct such negotiations; by the end of 2007 all protocols had 
been signed. In May 2008 Ukraine finally became a member of the WTO. 
One possible reason for the slow accession process of Ukraine is the lack of a quantitative 
assessment of gains and losses from WTO membership. This uncertainty only amplifies fears of 
domestic producers of increased competition from abroad and the potential decline of their 
market share. This study aims to contribute to quantifying consequences of WTO membership for 
Ukraine.  
WTO membership has an impact on all sectors of the economy and whilst modelling it, it is very 
important to capture inter-linkages between various economic agents. One of the most suitable 
approaches for this purpose is to build a Computable General Equilibrium model. This type of 
models is quite widely used for quantifying a variety of economic policy changes including 
international trade and WTO issues in particular and also called Applied General Equilibrium.  
The model employed in this study is based on a standard general equilibrium framework, written 
in General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) software; it includes 38 sectors of the Ukrainian 
economy and 5 trade regions. Four scenarios are simulated in the model: 1) Change of import 
tariffs according to schedule, agreed with the WTO. 2) Improvement of export access for some 
industries. Being a WTO member, Ukraine should have instruments to curb antidumping and 
countervailing investigations, thus it will be able to increase volume of some exports. 3) 
Improvement of investment climate, which comes from two main sources: First of all, investors 
face fewer risks and costs of investment, since Ukraine should accept more pro-market 
regulation. Second, cost of capital should diminish along with lower prices for imports. This 
scenario is modelled via the recursive dynamics method. 4) Combined effect. This scenario 
includes decrease of import tariffs, improvement of exports access and improvement of 
investment climate. Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 include 3 sub-scenarios (least favourable; core and 
optimistic) with different rates of market access expansion and investment growth.     
The results of the model show that in all scenarios there is growth of both exports and imports. 
By contrast, output and household consumption levels vary from scenario to scenario. The first 
two simulations, tariff reform and improvement of export access, show no significant change in 
domestic production and consumption. Thus, with expanded trade and practically the same output 
and consumption, Ukraine merely becomes more open and shifts to foreign trade. In the third 
scenario, improvement of investment climate has the most favourable results. Owning to better 
allocation of resources, both domestic production and consumption expand and the welfare of 
households increases by nearly 10% of consumption or 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
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the case of the core scenario. The combined scenario shows a somewhat smaller but still 
significant improvement in welfare: over 8% of consumption or 1.8% of GDP. 
This study contributes to existing research in several ways.  
First of all, there is a difference in the approach to modelling. 
The model used in this research is written in the mathematical programming language General 
Algebraic Modelling System as a system of non-linear equations with explicit specification of 
functions and calibration of parameters. At the same time, most Applied General Equilibrium 
models are written in a subsystem for GAMS called Mathematical Programming System for 
General Equilibrium analysis (MPSGE). MPSGE is a library of functions that provides a compact 
non-algebraic representation of a model's nonlinear equations. There is no need to write model-
specific functions and calibrate parameters; the modeller just has to specify the type of function.  
Although MPSGE makes modelling easier, it has one significant drawback: this method hides the 
theoretical background and economic intuition behind the model and turns it into a “black box”. 
Thus, employing MPSGE may be more suitable for not-so-experienced users (such as policy-
makers) or for building a model quickly, while explicit modelling of functions allows giving 
insight into the theory of the model and see its connection with its applied economic side. All 
CGE models known to the author that scrutinize accession of post-Soviet countries to the WTO 
(namely, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) use MPSGE; this model permits the opening of the 
“black box” of CGE analysis for these countries. 
Next, having a quantitative assessment of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO is useful for 
economists as scientists and for policy-makers in a more applied way.  
Economist may find this research helpful for studying CGE as a branch of economic modelling. 
There are wide concerns about the dependence of CGE models on the specification of parameters, 
choosing functional forms and closure rules. Comparing results of this model with results of other 
similar models and studying differences in model formulation will lead to the shedding of some 
light on this problem. 
Besides that, this model can be used as a basis for doing further CGE analysis. Scenarios can be 
changed and data rearranged to reflect other policy decisions either related to the WTO or going 
beyond this topic.              
This model uses real data for Ukraine and was built with the intention of reflecting the structure 
of the Ukrainian economy as realistically as possible. So, results of the model have practical 
importance for those people who deal with economic policy. For instance, policy-makers can use 
results to see who is gaining and who is loosing from WTO accession and to undertake measures 
to promote gains and diminish losses.   
Another contribution is a thorough review of existing literature on theoretical aspects of WTO 
related issues. Although there is a large number of empirical studies, theoretical examinations of 
the WTO are not so numerous and well known. To the best of author’s knowledge, there were no 
previous attempts to combine and review such theoretical papers.   
Finally, this research gives comprehensive description of the accession process to the WTO. It 
portrays not only the experience of some transition countries, but also gives deep insight into 
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accession using the example of one country - Ukraine. Thus, this research can be seen as a case 
study for those who are interested in the details of accession to the World Trade Organization. 
The study is organized as follows:  
A theoretical and empirical analysis of international trade agreements and GATT/WTO in 
particular is done in Chapter 2. This chapter commences with a general overview of history, main 
principles and agreements of GATT and WTO. Then, the theoretical part starts with explaining 
the reasons for entering an international trade agreement in general and refers to several 
theoretical studies of this issue. Next, specific features of GATT/WTO are scrutinized in 
theoretical light. It includes such GATT/WTO principles as reciprocity, non-discrimination, 
enforcement, safeguard measures, anti-dumping and countervailing measures and the potential 
impact of GATT/WTO on foreign direct investment. The chapter continues with an explanation 
of the accession process to this international organization and the accession experience of 
transition countries. Finally, the accession path of Ukraine is studied by reviewing the history of 
Working Party meetings, goods and services commitments. 
The methodology of the research is explained in Chapter 3. First, the origins and nature of 
Computable General Equilibrium models are studied; this is followed by an overview of the 
classification of Computable General Equilibrium models and their advantages and 
disadvantages. Computable General Equilibrium models were extensively used for studies of 
trade policy and GATT/WTO in particular. First, early studies are overviewed, which cover 
modelling the different aspects of the Uruguay Round and Doha Round. This part is finalized 
with an examination of the studies devoted to the experience of transition economies such as 
China and some post-USSR countries.     
Chapter 4 describes the Computable General Equilibrium model, which was built for Ukraine. It 
starts with a description of the macroeconomic state of affairs in Ukraine and also covers such 
areas as composition of industrial production, regional and sectoral breakdown of foreign trade 
and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This part will help the reader to understand why the model 
was built in a certain way and especially the reasoning behind the choice of scenarios. Next, a 
detailed algebraic formulation of the model is given with behavioural equations of all economic 
agents as well as equations showing calibration of certain parameters. This part also includes 
market clearance equations and the method of calculating the welfare of households through 
equivalent and compensating variation.  Social Accounting Matrix, a database for the model, is 
overviewed next. The meanings of database entries and their sources are given. The main 
assumptions of the model and closure rules are then described. A depiction of four scenarios for 
simulation policy changes in the case of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO concludes this chapter.  
The results of the model are discussed in Chapter 5. Key macroeconomic variables, changes of 
output and foreign trade at sectoral level as well as changes in direction of foreign trade are 
presented. The results of four scenarios of policy changes are analyzed one-by-one with the help 
of graphical illustration. Finally, the robustness of model is checked with the help of sensitivity 
analyses. This is done by varying key input parameters (elasticities of substitution and 
transformation) and comparing the resulting output values of households’ utility.  
The concluding remarks on the results of the model, along with a comparison of those results 
with results of other models and possible further developments are presented in Chapter 6.        
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Chapter 2 
Theory and Practice of GATT/WTO 
 
2.1. Main Features of the WTO 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international body which deals with the rules of 
trade between nations. Established on January 1, 1995, as a result of the Uruguay Round, the 
WTO replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a legal and institutional 
organization. The GATT was a multilateral agreement which has governed international trade 
since 1947 till creation of the WTO.  
The World Trade Organization follows the core principles of the GATT, which include (WTO, 
2005):  
 Non-discrimination in trade; 
 Free trade; 
 Transparency and predictability; 
 Assistance and trade concessions to developing countries. 
The WTO addresses several new important issues which were not covered by the GATT: 
 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); 
 Trade in Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs); 
 Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs); 
 Dispute Settlement; 
 Trade Policy Review Mechanism. 
As of the end of 2007 the WTO included 151 members, and 30 countries had the status of 
observers and were seeking membership. Its headquarters are situated in Geneva, Switzerland, 
there are over 600 secretariat staff, and the budget for 2007 was 182 million Swiss francs. 
 
History 
The idea of creating an organization to deal with international trade was dictated by desire to 
overcome the backlashes of the protectionist policy of the 1930s, which is believed to have been a 
significant cause of the Great Depression, and to boost world economy after World War II. 
Initially, it was driven forward predominantly by American and British efforts. Such an 
organization was expected to handle questions of international commerce and join the two 
“Bretton Woods” institutions: the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
In 1946 the United Nations Economic and Social Council called for the establishment of an 
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International Trade Organization (ITO) during the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 
Havana, Cuba, in 1947. The concept of the ITO was very ambitious and included issues of trade 
in goods, services, regulation of investment and employment. At the same time, 23 participating 
countries were working on tariff negotiations. In the autumn of 1947, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade was signed, containing 45 000 tariff concessions and covering one fifth of 
world trade. Plans for the ITO were abandoned, mainly because of the refusal of US Congress to 
ratify the Havana Charter. Thus, the GATT was a treaty without the intended administrative 
organization and covered only part of its original scope (Suranovic et al., 1998).    
The basic legal text of the GATT remained much the same as it was in 1947, but it was extended 
by plurilateral agreements, special arrangements, interpretations, and voluntary agreements to 
decrease tariffs. For the most part negotiations were conducted within the framework of so-called 
“trade rounds” – multilateral talks. Since 1947 there have been eight trade rounds their basic 
features are listed in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Trade Rounds of GATT/WTO 
Year Place/Name Subjects covered Countries 
1947 Geneva Tariffs 23 
1949 Annecy Tariffs 13 
1951 Torquay Tariffs 38 
1956 Geneva Tariffs 26 
1960-
1961 
Geneva  
(Dillon Round) 
Tariffs 26 
1964-
1967 
Geneva  
(Kennedy Round) 
Tariffs and anti-dumping measures 62 
1973-
1979 
Geneva  
(Tokyo Round) 
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, framework 
agreements 
102 
1986-
1994 
Geneva  
(Uruguay Round) 
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, 
intellectual property, dispute settlement, 
textiles, agriculture, creation of the WTO, etc 
123  
2001- Doha Launching of a new round of trade talks  
Source: WTO Secretariat 
Until the Kennedy Round in 1964-1967, the discussion was mostly around a further decrease of 
import tariffs in the form of bilateral negotiations. The Kennedy Round brought up approximately 
50 per cent decrease of tariffs by major industrialized countries, inclusion of new industries in 
liberalization and a new GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
In addition to a significant reduction of tariffs, the Tokyo Round produced new important 
agreements, including those on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Import Licensing Procedures, Custom Valuation, Government Procurement, Bovine Meat 
Arrangement and Trade in Civil Aircraft. 
The Uruguay Round was announced in September 1986 and lasted more than seven years. It was 
by far the most ambitious trade round and included virtually every aspect of trade policy. 
Traditionally, the GATT had dealt with trade in goods, but in the Uruguay Round it was proposed 
that it should extend to new areas, such as trade in services and intellectual property rights.  
By 1998 negotiations had reached the stage of the “Mid-Term-Review” at the Ministerial 
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Meeting in Montreal, Canada. Ministers had assessed a progress of trade talks and agreed on 
several issues, including market access for tropical products, a Dispute Settlement Body and 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism. During the next Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in 1990, 
disagreements on how to proceed with agriculture reform (especially between the USA and 
European Community) led to a decision to extend the Round. During the following two years, 
participants in the talks deepened the discussion of demanding topics, including creation of a new 
organization. In 1992, the USA and European Community settled their disagreements over 
agricultural policy.  
It took until the end of 1993 to resolve remaining issues and conclude negotiations on market 
access for goods and services. On April 15, 1994, most of the ministers from the 123 participating 
countries signed the draft charter of the WTO. On January 1, 1995, the WTO came into being. 
Whereas the GATT was a provisional multilateral agreement, covering trade in goods only, the 
WTO became a formal international organization and, besides GATT, included much broader 
issues, such as trade in services, intellectual property, Dispute Settlement, and a Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism. 
The WTO keeps advancing trade negotiations. The most significant agenda so far was launched 
at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. It concerns a wide range 
of issues, especially those of importance for developing countries, and is called the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA).  
 
Principles  
The WTO has several important principles, lying at the heart of a free trading system: non-
discrimination in trade, free trade, transparency and predictability, assistance and trade 
concessions for developing countries. 
Non-discrimination in trade takes the form of two principles: the Most Favoured Nation and the 
National Treatment 
Most Favoured Nation principle outlaws discrimination between goods, imported from different 
trade partners. According to it, “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of 
all other contracting parties”1. Thus, if a country grants someone special treatment, for instance 
lower import tariffs, it must do the same for all other members. Besides stating the MFN principle 
in Article I of GATT, it is also written in Article II of GATS and Article IV of TRIPS, but with 
some differences.  
National Treatment requires that once goods have entered the market, they must be treated no 
worse than domestically produced goods. Like the MFN principle, National Treatment applies to 
goods, services and intellectual property.  
Free trade. WTO regards the liberalization of trade and reduction of tariffs and other trade 
barriers as important conditions for promoting a sustainable development. Countries who wish to 
participate in the WTO framework should make a commitment, directed at providing greater 
                                                          
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article I 
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market access to other members.  
Transparency and predictability. The transparency principle obliges countries to inform the 
WTO and its members about policies and regulations within respective countries, especially 
about those concerning trade. Predictability implies that members should commit not to raise 
tariffs above the binding level, unless they are ready to compensate for such an increase.    
Assistance and trade concessions to developing countries. Developing countries comprise two 
thirds of all WTO members and usually assume the same obligations as developed economies. 
Nevertheless, WTO regulations foresee more flexibility for developing countries, called Special 
and Differential (S&D) treatment provisions. S&D includes more time for transition, concessions 
from developed countries, and technical assistance.  
 
Functions and organization 
As stated in Article III of Marrakesh Agreement, which established the WTO, the main functions 
of the World Trade Organization are the following (GATT (1), 1994): 
1. The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further 
the objectives of the WTO agreements.  
2. The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their 
multilateral trade relations.  
3. The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes.  
4. The WTO shall administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.  
5. With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making, the WTO 
shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and with the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies.  
Decisions in the WTO are taken by member governments, either by ministers or by their 
delegates. The WTO agreements are usually reached by consensus, but in some cases voting is 
allowed as well.  
The highest authority of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which takes place at least once 
every two years and can reach decisions on all matters. At the second level, day-to-day work is 
done by the General Council, which can meet as the General Council itself as the Dispute 
Settlement Body and as the Trade Policy Review Body. At the third level, three more councils 
report to the General Council: the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services 
and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.  Besides that, there are 
various committees, working parties, working groups, who report either to the General Council or 
to the Councils for Trade in Goods, Services or TRIPS.     
 
Agreements 
The legal texts of the WTO are a compound of more then 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and 
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understandings. The majority of these are the result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. Agreements can be classified into six categories: an umbrella agreement, 
establishing the WTO; agreements for trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights; 
dispute settlement; reviews of trade policies (see Table 2.2). Agreements on goods and services 
include basic principles, additional agreements and market access commitments made by 
individual countries. 
Table 2.2. Agreements of the WTO 
Umbrella Agreement Establishing WTO 
 
Goods Services 
Intellectual 
Property 
Basic 
principles 
GATT GATS TRIPS 
Additional 
agreements 
 Agriculture 
 Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures 
 Textiles and clothing 
 Technical Barriers to 
Trade 
 Trade-Related 
Investment Measures 
 Anti-dumping 
measures 
 Customs valuation 
methods 
 Preshipment 
inspection 
 Rules of Origin 
 Import Licensing 
Procedures 
 Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 
 Safeguards 
 Annex on Movement of 
Natural Persons Supplying 
Services 
 Annex on Air Transport 
services 
 Annexes on Financial 
Services 
 Annex on Negotiations 
on Maritime Transport 
Services 
 Annex on Negotiations 
on Basic 
Telecommunications 
 
Market access 
commitments 
Countries’ schedules of 
commitments 
Countries’ schedules of 
commitments; MFN 
exemptions 
Dispute 
settlement 
Dispute Settlement 
Transparency Trade Policy Review 
Source: WTO and Bacchetta, 2003  
A brief description of these agreements is as follows:  
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).    
The Uruguay Round resulted in new commitments to cut and bind tariffs in the framework of the 
GATT. Thus, developed countries increased the number of imports with “bound” tariffs to 99%, 
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and countries in transition to 98% (WTO, 2005).  
The Agriculture Agreement envisages changes in rules concerning market access, domestic 
support and export subsidies. Market access rules require transition from quotas to tariffs only. 
Domestic support to agriculture is divided into three categories. “Green box”: measures which 
can be freely used (for instance research, infrastructure development). “Blue box”: support on a 
small scale: no more than 5% of total agriculture production for developed countries and 10% for 
developing (measures to limit production, rural development in developing countries). “Amber 
box”: direct support of production and exports; these measures have to be cut. Export subsidies 
are prohibited, unless the subsidies are specified in a member’s list of commitments. 
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement sets out the basic rules for food, 
animal and plant safety and encourages countries to apply international standards. 
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) gradually takes textiles to the general regulations 
of GATT by removing quotas. 
The Antidumping Agreement and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement give the 
legal definition of dumping and subsidies, and allow countries to take actions against them. 
The Safeguards Agreement foresees cases when domestic industry is injured or threatened with 
injury caused by a surge of imports, and allows restriction of such imports for a certain period.  
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
The importance of services in international trade has grown enormously and accounts for one 
fifth of total international trade. The GATS is the first and only agreement regulating 
international trade in services. GATS functions according to the same principles as trade in 
goods: MFN treatment, national treatment and commitments on market access. The GATS 
annexes cover trade in four types of services: movement of natural persons, financial services, 
telecommunications and air transport services. 
 
Trade in Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
TRIPS cover five issues: 1) how to apply the basic principles of free trade to TRIPS; 2) how to 
protect intellectual property rights (copyrights, trademarks, geographical indicators, industrial 
designs, and patents); 3) how to enforce this protection; 4) how to settle disputes and 5) special 
transitional arrangements to adjust to TRIPS rules. 
 
Dispute Settlement. 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) includes rules and procedures that allow the 
handling of trade disputes between countries. It is managed by the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) consisting of all WTO members. DSU sets clear time frames for the dispute settlement 
process and establishes an appeal system. Dispute settlement includes a consultation phase, 
setting up the panel, delivering several reports on the case and possibly an appeal. The maximum 
time to view a dispute is equal to one year or one year and three months, in case of appeal.    
Over 47 years of the GATT, only 200 cases have been disputed, while during 1995-2006 more 
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than 350 cases were considered. The increased number of disputes is believed to be attributed to 
an expansion of the world trade and a growing faith in the WTO system (WTO, 2005). The 
majority of cases did not reach the full panel process, but were settled “out of court”. Agriculture 
was the most frequent industry to evoke a dispute, followed by textiles, alcoholic beverages, and 
chemical industries. The majority of cases were brought by developed countries against other 
developed countries; the next group is developed countries against developing countries (Horn et 
al., 2006).     
 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism. 
This mechanism is designed to increase the transparency of countries’ trade policy by regularly 
monitoring them. This is achieved in two ways: governments have to inform the WTO about its 
trade policies and regulations; and the WTO conducts regular trade policy reviews of individual 
countries. 
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2.2. Theory of Trade Agreements and GATT/WTO 
 
Reasons for entering international trade agreements 
This section will deal with the theoretical grounds of international trade agreements and 
GATT/WTO in particular. First, the motives for setting import tariffs will be considered. Second, 
the inefficiency of the unilateral trade policy will be discussed as well as how this inefficiency 
can be eliminated through trade agreement in its general form. Next, the debate will move 
specifically to GATT/WTO and how its core virtues can improve efficiency. The theoretical 
justification of such mechanisms as reciprocal tariff negotiations, Most Favoured Nations 
principle, enforcement through Dispute Settlement Procedure and safeguard, as well as 
antidumping and countervailing measures, will be reviewed. 
Although economic theory suggests that free trade maximizes welfare, countries do set import 
tariffs, being ruled by several reasons. One of them, widely discussed by trade economists, is a 
terms of trade argument. It states that large countries which can influence world prices can gain 
by setting an import tariff, thus lowering the price of imports. Although such policy also distorts 
production and consumption, benefits can outscore losses if an optimal import tariff is introduced. 
This theory was first analyzed by Torrens (1833) and Mill (1844) and developed further by 
Edgeworth (1894), Bickerdike (1907), Johnson (1953-1954). The concept is important for further 
analysis and will be discussed later in this chapter.  
Another set of arguments was formalized by Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster in 1957, and 
received the name “theory of the second best”. It shows what will happen if optimal conditions 
are not satisfied in an economic model. If a domestic economy has some market failures, the 
government may need to intervene. In the particular case of international trade, this means 
deviation from free trade. 
The influence of special interests groups on politics is yet another explanation for setting tariffs. 
As suggested by Mayer (1984) “political decisions on tariff rates are reflections of the selfish 
economic interests of voters, lobbying groups, politicians, or other decision makers in trade 
policy matters”. Magee (1989), Hillman and Ursprung (1988) model the process of tariff 
formation as a political competition among parties. Competing parties propose their tariffs and 
interests groups choose which party to support. Stigler (1971), Grossman and Helpman (1984) 
argue that parties set their policies in order to maximize their political support from different 
lobbies. Downs (1957), Mayer (1981) and others assume that parties try to meet the preferences 
of voters. They presume that different levels of tariffs favour different types of voters, depending 
on their occupation. Thus, political parties will set tariffs which will satisfy a median voter.  
The terms of trade arguments for imposing tariffs are considered below for the cases of small and 
large economies.  
Relatively easy and unambiguous is the case of a small open country. Imposition of import tariffs 
does not affect terms of trade, since the country is a price taker. Without tariffs, a country is able 
to trade more and improve its welfare. Thus, there is no advantage in setting an import tariffs. The 
intuition behind the effect of import tariffs is illustrated in Figure 2.1. There are two goods that 
are produced and consumed in every country: X  and Y . The production possibility frontier is 
''YX . WP  are relative world prices and TP  are relative domestic prices, including tariffs. In the 
absence of tariffs production occurs at point A  at the intersection of world prices and production 
   
 20 
possibility frontier. Consumption is at point C , where the consumers’ indifference curve is 
tangent to the world prices. Good X  is imported and good Y  is exported, resulting in foreign 
trade represented by triangle AEC . If an import tariff is imposed on good X , consumers and 
producers face relative prices TP . Production is moved to point B , consumption to D  and 
foreign trade diminishes to BFD , resulting in a lower welfare level. 
Figure 2.1. Impact of an Import Tariff, Small Country 
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Source: Whalley (1985) 
Analysis becomes more complicated if a country has influence on world prices – large country 
assumption. The theoretical backgrounds in this area were founded in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Torrens (1833) and Mill (1844) argued that although countries will loose from 
diminished trade if import tariffs are imposed, they can also win if foreign countries lower prices 
in an attempt to secure market presence. Edgeworth (1894) and Bickerdike (1907) developed this 
theory further at the edge of the twentieth century. Edgeworth (1894) used offer curves for his 
analysis, and argued that if the offer curve of foreign country is not perfectly elastic, the domestic 
country can improve its welfare. Bickerdike (1907) developed a formula, relating an optimal 
tariff that maximizes welfare with export supply elasticity. The concept, stating that it is possible 
to conduct trade on more favourable terms by introducing an optimal tariff – the level of 
protection that maximizes domestic welfare taking into account the foreign offer curve - has 
acquired the name “optimal tariff theory”. 
The offer curves diagram, developed by Edgeworth, is a useful tool to demonstrate the logic of 
optimal tariff theory and is widely used in trade agreements analysis. There are two countries and 
two goods. In Figure 2.2 (adopted from Whalley, 1985) X  are home country exports (foreign 
country imports) and Y  are home country imports (foreign country exports). Offer curves are 
determined by tangencies between relative price lines and trade indifference curves (a 
combination of imports and exports between which consumers are indifferent). In the absence of 
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a tariff, the initial relative price line is denoted as 
W
NTP  ; offer curves of home and foreign 
countries are 
H
NTOC  and 
FO  respectively2. Trade initially occurs at point A , where relative 
world prices and offer curves of both countries intersect. The graph also shows the initial trade 
indifference curve of the home country 
H
NTIC .  
The introduction of a tariff will change relative world prices and price line, and the home country 
offer curve will rotate leftward to 
W
WTP  and 
H
WTOC  respectively. Now trade will take place at 
point B  and a higher domestic indifference curve HWTIC  will be achieved.  
Figure 2.2. Impact of an Import Tariff, Large Country 
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Source: Whalley (1985) 
The analysis above assumed that the foreign country will not retaliate in response to the 
introduction of a tariff. Kaldor (1940) brought into discussion the possibility of retaliation from 
the exploited country. He argued that a country which can change terms of trade is acting like a 
monopoly, and the magnitude of possible change depends on the monopoly power of such a 
country, i.e. the elasticity of foreign demand. As he puts it: “Provided that the elasticity of foreign 
demand is less than infinite there is always some rate of duty which it is advantageous to 
introduce in the absence of retaliation; and if the elasticity of the country’s own demand for 
foreign products is markedly higher than the elasticity of foreign demand for its own products – 
an unusual case – this policy may be advantageous even if the “optimum degree of retaliation” of 
                                                          
2 Here lower subscript NT denotes “No Tariff”, WT ”With Tariff”; upper subscripts are W for “World”, 
H  for “Home” and F  for “Foreign”. 
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foreign countries is allowed for.”   
Johnson (1953-1954) in his now classical work “Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation” significantly 
developed the optimal tariff theory scrutinizing a two-good two-country general equilibrium 
model. He criticized Kaldor’s study for being “imprecise and almost meaningless” and proposed 
relating the optimal tariff to the elasticity of the foreign offer curve. The author shows that 
optimal home country tariff 
t  should be set at the level 1 ft  , where f  is the elasticity 
of the foreign offer curve. As was argued by Whalley (1985), since trade elasticities tend to be 
low, a high optimal tariff is implied.  
More recent examinations of trade agreements going in line with the optimal tariff argument 
include those of Mayer (1981), Dixit (1987), Staiger(1994), Grossman and Helpman (2002). 
Etheir (2006) criticizes such studies for their incompleteness. According to him, trade agreements 
do not prevent countries from influencing terms of trade; phenomena, which he denotes as the 
Terms-of-Trade Puzzle. Although countries have bound import tariffs, they have not bound 
export taxes and still have some market power. The model he uses is two countries, two factors 
and three traded goods and includes political economy, which allows lobbies to support the trade 
policy they prefer. Ethier concludes that trade agreements do not prevent countries from changing 
their terms of trade on the export side and should also address export taxes.    
Thus, if the optimal tariff theory holds true, certain countries can get better-off by imposing 
import tariffs and changing terms of trade. However, to realize their trade policy, countries have 
to interrelate between each other. The next section will examine the interactions between different 
countries and unilateral versus multilateral trade policy.  
In the case of both countries imposing tariffs, equilibrium is set at point C , shown in Figure 2.3. 
If countries decide to move to free trade, new equilibrium is reached at point A  with higher 
indifference curves 
H
NTIC  for the home country and 
F
NTIC  for the foreign one. If one country 
decides to abolish the tariffs, then, as was shown above, another country has incentives to keep 
the tariff effective and improve its terms of trade. In this case equilibrium is reached at point D , 
where the home country is worse off and the foreign country is better off. Likewise, if the foreign 
country cancels the tariffs, the home country will keep them, and at equilibrium point B  the 
foreign country will be worse off and the home country better off.  
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Figure 2.3. Unilateral Versus Multilateral Trade Policy 
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Source: Whalley (1985) 
Thus, countries are trapped in a “Prisoners Dilemma”, illustrated in Table 2.3. Both countries 
would be better off by choosing free trade (shown by payoffs 10 and 10). But knowing that 
unilateral abolishment of import tariffs will damage the home country (payoff -10) and make the 
foreign country better off (payoff 20), both countries move to protection, which brings losses to 
everyone (payoffs -5 and -5).   
Table 2.3. Prisoners Dilemma of Unilateral Trade Policy  
Country 1 / Country 2 Free Trade Protection 
Free Trade (10; 10) (-10; 20) 
Protection (20; -10) (-5; -5) 
Source: Bacchetta (2003) 
As was argued in many studies, and discussed below, if unilateral trade policy does not allow the 
establishment of free trade while protection policy is not optimal, trade agreements between 
countries can foster free trade and make the participants better off. Before proceeding with a 
discussion, a definition of “trade agreement” is necessary. Staiger (1994) defines an “international 
trade agreement as a collection of rules regarding the conduct of trade policy to which 
compliance requires some form of enforcement mechanism, that is, where unilateral incentives to 
violate the rules of the agreement are kept in check by the desire to avoid punishments that are 
themselves specified in the agreement”. 
Bagwell and Staiger in a number of studies (Bagwell and Staiger (1990), (1996), (1999), (2003)) 
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developed a theoretical framework for the investigation of international trade agreements, 
specifically in the context of the GATT/WTO framework. A review of the trade agreement theory 
will be concentrated around their work.   
To illuminate the inefficiency of a unilateral trade policy and possible remedies given by a trade 
agreement, Bagwell and Staiger (2003) developed a standard general equilibrium model with two 
countries and two sectors. Home and foreign countries (the latter is denoted with an asterisk) 
trade by goods x  and y . Goods are normal and there is a perfect competition. Imports of home 
(foreign) country are respectively )(yx ; then yx ppp   (
  yx ppp ) are local relative 
prices, faced by home (foreign) producers and consumers. The home (foreign) add valorem 
import tariff is defined as )( tt . Letting )1( t  and )1(   t , the relation between prices 
becomes:   ww pppp ,   and  ww pppp ,   , where  yxw ppp   is the 
“world” relative price. Terms of trade for the home (foreign) country are given by )1( ww pp . 
Production is determined at a point on the production possibilities frontier where the marginal 
rate of transformation between x  and y  is equal to the local relative price. Domestic and foreign 
production functions are determined as  pQQ ii   and    pQQ ii  for  yxi , . 
Consumption is also a function of local relative prices as well as of tariff revenue  RR , which 
is distributed to domestic (foreign) consumers. Thus, domestic and foreign consumption is 
 RpDD ii ,  and    RpDD ii ,  for  yxi ,  respectively. Tariff revenue can be 
expressed as the amount of imports times difference between domestic and world prices: 
      wxx pppQRpDR  ,   for home country and 
      wyy pppQRpDR 11,    for foreign country, alternately  wppRR ,  and 
 wppRR ,  . Now, consumption in each country can be written as 
    wiwi ppRpDppC ,,,    and     wiwi ppRpDppC ,,,    for  yxi , . 
Imports of home country are represented as      pQppCppM xwxwx  ,, , and exports as 
     wyywy ppCpQppE ,,  . For foreign countries these trade flows are denoted as 
 wy ppM ,  and  wx ppE , . 
Home and foreign country budget constraints require balanced trade and correspond to the 
following two equations:  
   wywxw ppEppMp ,,                          (2.1) 
   wxwwy ppEpppM ,,            (2.2) 
The local price depends upon the tariff and world price; the equilibrium world price    ,~wp  is 
determined by the market-clearing condition for good y :  
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     wwywwy pppMpppE ~,~,~,~,           (2.3) 
To sum up, the tariffs and market equilibrium condition (2.3) determine the world price. Next, the 
equilibrium world price and tariffs determine local prices. Finally, world and local prices 
determine production, consumption, trade volumes and tariff revenues. 
There are two major approaches to represent the government welfare function. The traditional one 
states that the government maximizes national income and, thus, welfare is improved when terms 
of trade are improved. This approach was formalized by Edgeworth (1894), Bickerdike (1907), 
Johnson (1953-1954), Dixit (1987), Mayer (1981). A political-economy approach takes into 
account distribution of welfare and was analyzed by Feenstra and Bhagwatti (1982) and Mayer 
(1984). The last formulated a model in which the government defends the interests of a medium 
voter. 
In their work, Bagwell and Staiger (2003) encompass both traditional and political economy 
methods. In order to do so, they do not represent payoffs directly in terms of tariffs, but rather in 
terms of local and world prices, induced by tariffs. Thus, the welfare functions of home and 
foreign government are  wppW ~,  and  wppW ~, . 
Bagwell and Staiger (2003) do not impose restrictions on government preferences over local 
prices in order to allow different sets of political motivation. Indeed, an important assumption 
they make is that the government will increase welfare if terms of trade improve:  
  0~/~,  ww pppW  and   0~/~,   ww pppW        (2.4) 
This point can be demonstrated using Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4. The World and Local Price Effect of a Tariff Change 
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Source: Bagwell and Staiger (2003) 
Initial tariff pair is represented as point    ,A , which is formed at the intersection of the 
domestic iso-local-price locus    ApAp   and an iso-world-price locus    ApAp ww ~~  . 
Following an increase in domestic tariff, a new point    ,1C  is achieved. This point is 
associated with a second pair of prices, corresponding to domestic iso-local-price locus 
   CpCp   and an iso-world-price locus    CpCp ww ~~  . At point C  the world price is 
lower than at point A , reflecting improved market access for the home country. 
Next, Bagwell and Staiger (2003) determine the unilateral trade policies of governments and 
show what kind of problem arises in the absence of a trade agreement. Each government sets its 
tariff policy in order to maximize its welfare, and taking the tariff policy of trade partners as 
given. Thus, reaction functions are implicitly defined as:          
    0/~/ ~   wpp pWddpW w          (2.5) 
    0/~/ ~     wpp pWddpW         (2.6) 
Let     0///~   ddppw  and     0///~    ddppw . Than, (2.5) and (2.6) can 
be rewritten as  
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0~  wpp WW             (2.7) 
0~  

 pp
WW           (2.8) 
As can be seen, the best-response tariff of each government includes induced local and world 
price movements. Figure 2.4 gives further insight. Suppose the home government unilaterally 
increases the tariff, moving from point    ,A  to    ,1C . The new tariff pair 1 and   
results in higher local and lower world prices, compared with point A . This move can be broken 
into two stages: movement from A  to B  shows the effect of change in the world price and the 
corresponding change in welfare is represented in (2.7) by wpW~ . Movement from B  to C  
holds the world price fixed and isolates change in local price; welfare is given by term pW .  
The authors argue that change from B  to C  is domestic in nature and reflects the balance 
between the cost of economic distortions in production and consumption and benefit of political 
support. The change from A  to B  has indeed international character: it captures the 
improvement of domestic terms of trade and the corresponding deterioration of foreign terms of 
trade, thus shifting costs of trade policy to the foreign government. In a Nash equilibrium, both 
governments are on their reaction curves and the Nash equilibrium pair of tariffs  NN  ,  
satisfies (2.7) and (2.8). 
Next, the authors make several observations; formal proof is given in their previous work on the 
theory of GATT (Bagwell and Staiger (1999)). 
1. The Nash equilibrium is inefficient. If a government sets its trade policy unilaterally, it 
has incentives to shift the costs of such a policy to a foreign government. This results in 
too high tariffs and too low trade. 
2. Both governments can achieve efficiency improvements relative to the Nash equilibrium 
only if they both agree to lower tariffs below the Nash equilibrium level. Otherwise they 
get stuck in the Prisoners Dilemma.  
3. If governments do not try to shift costs to foreign partners and rather consider domestic 
costs and benefits, the resulting politically optimal tariffs are efficient.  
These observations are illustrated in Figure 2.5. First, non-cooperative governments set their 
tariffs at point N . As was originally shown by Johnson (1953-1954), this is a non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium of a tariff retaliation and counter-retaliation game. This point is inefficient, 
since the home and foreign iso-welfare contours are not tangent. As Johnson (1953-1954) argues, 
neither country could improve its welfare with a unilateral process, but both countries can be 
better off if they pursue a mutual tariff reduction. 
Mayer (1981) points out that efficient tariffs would have to satisfy condition 
  1 . Such 
tariffs make local prices across countries equal and achieve world-wide economic efficiency. 
Besides free trade between the countries ( 1  ), there is an entire set of efficient tariff pairs, 
which lies on the efficiency locus (curve EE  ). The portion of this locus, denoted ee , is a 
contract curve: a combination of tariffs that are efficient and bring welfare, greater than Nash 
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welfare. Second, the Nash iso-welfare curves imply that greater than Nash equilibrium welfare 
can be achieved only if both governments can agree on a reduction of tariffs. Finally, politically 
optimal tariffs are at point PO , which lies on the efficiency locus.   
 
Figure 2.5. The Purpose of Trade Agreement 
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Source: Bagwell and Staiger (2003) 
 
Next, a discussion of how such an international trade agreement as GATT/WTO can eliminate the 
inefficiency of a unilateral trade policy follows. The review will start from the main pillars of 
GATT/WTO, namely reciprocity of negotiations and non-discrimination; next, it will move to 
enforcement, safeguard mechanisms, and antidumping and countervailing measures. 
 
Reciprocity 
Using the model discussed above and developing their previous work (Bagwell and Staiger 
(1999)), Bagwell and Staiger (2003) argue that trade agreement, in particular in context of 
GATT/WTO framework can give remedy to inefficiency of unilateral trade policy through 
mechanism of reciprocity. According to the Preamble of GATT, “reciprocal and mutually 
advantage arrangements directed to the substantial reduction in tariffs and other barriers to trade” 
should serve the main goals of GATT/WTO. This rule is confirmed in practice, as governments 
try to achieve a balance of concessions during negotiations.  
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First, concept of reciprocity is formalized. Let’s suppose that initial tariffs  00 ,   are changed 
to a newly negotiated pair  11,  . Initial world and domestic prices are denoted as  
 000 ,~~  ww pp  and  000 ~, wppp  ; succeeding prices are  111 ,~~  ww pp  and 
 111 ~, wppp  . Principle of reciprocity holds if tariff changes allow following:  
         001100110 ~,~,~,~,~ wywywxwxw ppEppEppMppMp       (2.9) 
Next, using trade balance condition (3.1) authors characterize reciprocity. Given balanced trade at 
initial tariffs, equation    00000 ~,~,~ wywxw ppEppMp   should be true; thus, (2.9) may be 
rewritten as  
   11110 ~,~,~ wywxw ppEppMp    
Consequently, balanced trade implies    11111 ~,~,~ wywxw ppEppMp  . Taking this into account, 
(2.9) may be further rewritten as 
    0~,~~ 1101  wxww ppMpp                            (2.10) 
This equation states that mutual changes in trade policy obey the rule of reciprocity if and only if 
world prices are unchanged. As was stated previously, governments can increase welfare by 
changing tariffs and passing costs to foreign state. This policy is inefficient and requires change 
of world price. Next, authors show how obeying reciprocity principle can increase mutual welfare 
without changing world price. At the Nash equilibrium point from equations (2.4), (2.7) and (2.8) 
follows that 

 pp WW 0 . If governments decide to reduce tariffs in reciprocal way, than local 
price p  would fall and foreign price p  would rise; thus, domestic welfare would rise (since 
0pW ) together with foreign welfare (since 0

p
W ). In other words, at the Nash equilibrium 
governments would like to increase trade if it does not require loss of terms of trade. Unilateral 
policy does not allow for this, so neither government would lower tariffs. But if tariffs are 
decreased reciprocally and decrease of tariffs in one country is balanced by decrease in other, 
terms of trade remain constant. Each government can increase welfare by expanding trade 
without terms of trade loss. 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the central idea of Bagwell and Staiger (2003) arguments.  
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Figure 2.6. Reciprocal Trade Negotiations  
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 Source: Bagwell and Staiger (2003) 
The iso-world-price locus runs through the Nash point N as well as politically optimal point 
PO . If governments start trade negotiations, which result in reciprocal tariff decrease, they can 
move down the iso-world-price locus and experience welfare gains. Reaching politically 
optimum, they have no incentives for further negotiations. 
 
Non-discrimination  
The other pillar of GATT/WTO is the rule of non-discrimination, which takes the form of the 
Most Favoured Nation principle.  
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) use a model similar to the one described above for reciprocity, but in 
multi-country settings. They show that politically optimal tariffs will be efficient if and only if 
they conform to the principle of non-discrimination. Otherwise countries will be seeking for 
imports which come from the country on which the higher import tariffs are placed. But, as was 
shown earlier, this policy leads to shifting costs abroad and is not efficient. 
Another important feature of the MFN principle is giving more equal opportunities in trade 
negotiations to small economies vis-à-vis rich countries. Caplin and Krishna (1988) developed a 
three-country dynamic bargaining model and suggest that MFN has an important effect on equal 
distribution of bargaining power across countries. Ludema (1991) also investigates the three-
country bargaining game and reaches the conclusion that bargaining under MFN will result in a 
Pareto efficient trade agreement. Moreover, he finds that all countries gain from negotiations 
under the MFN principle, but not necessarily in its absence.       
Negative processes associated with the MFN principle are also studied. Rubinstein (1982) and 
Caplin and Krishna (1988) point out that the “free riding” of one country on the reciprocal 
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agreements of others may bring some costs. The latter two authors employ a static model of 
simultaneous bargaining, and argue that the MFN principle requires the lowering of tariffs to all 
countries, not only those involved in bargaining. In this situation, a simultaneous round of 
bargains under the MFN rule may result in higher tariffs, compared with the scenario when MFN 
is not applied. Ludema (1991), who uses the three-country non-cooperative dynamic bargaining 
model, arrives at a different conclusion. In his model, one country makes a proposal to the other 
two and they are free to accept or reject it. If both countries accept the offer, bargaining is over 
and an agreement is concluded; if both reject, then the negotiations are repeated. If one country 
accepts and the other rejects, the accepting country can reconsider its decision. Ludema argues 
that, in the latter case, the accepting country has incentives to change its decision and continue 
bargaining. Under this dynamic set of bargaining games countries will be bargaining until Pareto-
efficient MFN tariffs are achieved and the “free rider” problem does not bring substantial costs.      
 
Enforcement 
Even if trade agreement has been achieved, individual countries have incentives to cheat on such 
agreements by raising tariffs and shifting costs to trade partners. Therefore, an enforcement 
mechanism should be established and should support existing international trade agreements, thus 
allowing escape from the Prisoners Dilemma. GATT/WTO established the Dispute Settlement 
System for this purpose. 
Bagwell and Staiger (2000) model mechanism of Dispute Settlement System through infinitely-
repeated tariff game of tariff formation. If deviation from the common tariff occurs, a retaliatory 
trade war starts. They conclude that enforcement should achieve and maintain a balance between 
short-term temptation to deviate from the agreed tariffs and enjoy a term of trade benefits from 
one side, and the long-term costs of future loss of cooperation from the other.    
Maggi (1999) examined the role of the GATT/WTO in international trade cooperation and built a 
multi-country model in which governments repeatedly select import barriers. The author 
recognizes the further benefit of a dispute settlement mechanism, which occurs from aggregation 
of enforcement power. If governments join a multilateral enforcement mechanism, the combined 
punishment for deviating from a trade agreement will be much more serious and will prevent 
cheating.     
Besides that, a dispute settlement may play an important role in gathering and disseminating 
information. Hungerford (1991) built a two-country model, and argued that although information 
gathering is costly, it allows the avoiding of even more costly trade wars. He argued that the 
“after” information on a certain case shows if there was a deviation from the agreement or not. 
Countries have incentives to start retaliation only if departure from an agreement is detected.  
Kovenoch and Thursby (1992) showed that countries directly affected by deviation from a trade 
agreement facilitate monitoring and strengthen cooperation. They also argued that the very 
existence of a reliable dispute settlement system helps countries feel the obligations of a trade 
agreement and reduce incentives to step away from it. 
Bown (2002) compared the dispute settlement process with safeguard measures. He argued that if 
countries need to deviate from a trade agreement, they may choose either a “legal” path – 
safeguard measures or an “illegal” one by unilaterally breaking an agreement and facing dispute 
settlement. The author showed that the WTO has high incentives to keep to “legal” behaviour, 
and only countries with a high potential to benefit from terms of trade change will choose an 
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“illegal” option. Also, Bown (2002) noted more efficient dispute settlement rules under the WTO 
than under GATT.    
 
Safeguard measures 
Although being a part of an international trade agreement, countries may need to step away from 
free trade and apply higher protection to avoid domestic industry being seriously injured. The 
GATT/WTO envisaged such occasions and put in Safeguard measures, providing set of rules to 
avoid maltreatment of higher protection. Several studies concerned areas where laws regulating 
safeguard measures may be of hand: application of special protection too frequently and for too 
long a time. 
Bagwell and Staiger (1990) followed the work of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and showed that 
a weak international enforcement mechanism can lead to special protection when trade volumes 
decrease and governments have incentives to violate tariff bindings. Matsuyama (1990) and 
Mayer (1994) point out that if rules are not strong enough, special protection is likely to be over-
utilized compared with a government’s optimal plan. Both authors argue that GATT rules can 
enforce commitment to adhere to the optimal plan.  
Matsuyama (1990) investigated the possibility of transferring a temporary protection to a 
prolonged one. In his model, the structure of the game between government and firms is as 
follows: in the first period the government chooses between liberalization of the pre-existent tariff 
and keeping it. If it decides to extend protection, the game continues. Then, firms choose whether 
to prepare for trade liberalization in the next period or not. If the government lacks credibility, 
firms will believe that temporary protection will be applied in the next period as well and will 
never choose to prepare for liberalization. If international safeguard rules have enough 
enforcement power, they can reduce the length of temporary protection.       
 
Antidumping and countervailing measures 
 GATT/WTO includes Antidumping Agreement and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement that define dumping and subsidies, and provide a set of rules for dealing with them 
and placing restrictions on excessive use of such actions.  Below is a review of the literature 
dedicated to the need for regulation of antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CV) measures, and 
the negative consequences if such regulation is absent. 
Staiger (1994) noted that, broadly, there are three adverse effects which can potentially arise from 
AD and CV misuse: measurement bias, unintended effect of “legitimate” use and abuse. 
Measurement bias may occur from the way dumping and subsidy margins are calculated. Boltuck 
and Litan (1991) among others came to the consistent conclusion that there tends to be a strong 
bias in the methodology of dumping and subsidy calculations that allow authorities to find a 
positive margin or subsidy. Thus, international rules concerning the procedures of calculating 
dumping and subsidies should avoid this problem. 
An unintended effect of AD and CV may arise, even if there is no measurement bias and laws 
seem to serve their purposes. One such case was studied by Gruenspecht (1988). He built a two-
country two-period duopoly model and scrutinized the implications of mutual antidumping 
enforcement. He reached the conclusion that mutual antidumping enforcement may limit output 
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and push prices and costs of firms in both first and second periods, leading to a situation similar 
to the Prisoners Dilemma. Bagwell and Staiger (1989) showed that the threat of antidumping 
investigation may induce foreign governments to rely on export subsidies, even though CV 
measures may be applied. Staiger and Wolak (1992) pointed out that non-transparent AD laws 
can lead to lower output and trade, even if these laws are not utilized.      
The consequences of abusing AD and CV measures is similar to one identified by Staiger and 
Wolak (1992) and which occur as a result of loose antidumping laws, allowing too frequent use 
of them. Pusa(1992) argued that the fact that domestic firms may demand an investigation and 
withdraw before a decision is made can threaten foreign firms and give home producers more 
bargaining power in the limiting presence of foreigners. Finally, Staiger and Wolak (1992) stated 
that domestic firms may initiate an antidumping investigation even if they do not count on 
success in order to limit foreign competition. Once again, a clear set of international rules on AD 
and CV measures would help to combat unnecessary use of these mechanisms. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Membership in the WTO potentially affects flows of capital through several channels. Below is a 
discussion of theoretical studies in this area.     
 
Volume of FDI 
Trade theory links FDI and volume of trade, but has two opposing points of view in this relation. 
Thus there are studies which state that trade and FDI are complementary, as well as those 
pointing out that trade and FDI are substitutes: i.e. an increase in trade is coupled by an increase 
(former) or decrease (latter) in FDI or vice versa. Before proceeding, it is worth noting that FDI is 
distinguished between horizontal and vertical. Horizontal Foreign Direct Investment goes to the 
production of the same goods and services abroad. Vertical FDI is directed at foreign production 
of goods and services at certain stages of making.  
Studies in favour of substitution between trade and FDI can be classified into internalization 
theory, eclectic paradigm and horizontal investment theory. Internalization theory origins from 
the Coase theory of the firm (the fundamental article is Coase, 1937), which introduces the 
concept of transaction costs to explain the size of firms, and was elaborated further by 
Williamson. Buckley and Casson (1976) formulated internalization theory as follows: firms will 
prefer FDI if costs of internalization, consisting of such overheads as communication, 
administrative and other internal organization costs are less than expenses implied by exports.  
Dunning (1980) developed a theory of eclectic paradigm, also known as the OLI framework. 
According to it, firms prefer FDI to trade if three advantages exist: Ownership, Location and 
Internalization. In case location advantage does not exist, firms prefer trade, so FDI and trade are 
two alternative strategies here.       
The theory of horizontal investment goes back to the 1950s and was pioneered by Robert 
Mundell and his “tariff jump” notion (Mundell, 1957). Developed further by Hortsmann and 
Markusen (1992) and Brainard (1993), it assumes the existence of scale economies at firm and 
plant level and trade costs. Thus, firms face a trade-off between concentration of production and 
proximity to consumers. If economies of scale are high and trade costs are relatively low, it is 
worth concentrating production at one location and supplying foreign markets with exports. On 
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the contrary, if trade costs are higher than the pay-off from economies of scale, it is better to 
supply foreign markets from plants located there. Thus, FDI and trade are substitutes and become 
more so if trade costs rise. 
The theory of vertical investment makes use of differences in relative factor costs and was 
developed by Helpman (1984). According to this theory, firms split the production process to 
different groups which are relatively intensive in certain factors of production. FDI takes the form 
of separating headquarters and plants and placing each production segment in a country with 
relative abundance in the required factors. FDI creates trade since plants have to trade their output 
as intermediate input to other plants. In this case trade and FDI are complementary.         
More recent models tried to combine vertical and horizontal FDI and were named Knowledge-
capital models. Most known studies in this field are by Markusen et al. (1996), developed further 
by Markusen (1997), Markusen (2000) and Carr et al.(2001). According to Forte (2004), these 
models are based on three assumptions: first of all, headquarters activities such as research and 
development can be done in a separate location from production; second, headquarters activities 
require more qualified labour input relative to production; third, headquarters activities have a 
“public good” properties and can be used by several facilities. The first two assumptions imply 
vertical investment: headquarters are located where qualified labour is and production where non-
qualified labour is cheap. The third assumption creates economies of scale and horizontal 
investment. Depending on such variables as trade costs, differences in factor endowments across 
countries, etc., combinations of vertical and horizontal investment are created, and FDI and trade 
can be complementary or substitutes. 
 
“Quality” of FDI 
Not only the volume of capital flows may change as a result of WTO accession, but “quality” of 
FDI as well. Bhagwati was the first to study theoretical connections between trade regime and 
gains from FDI (Bhagwati, 1978). This subject was also studied by Bhagwati (1985, 1994), 
Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977), and Brecher and Findlay (1983). The main idea is that 
benefits from investment depend on whether the trade regime is import-restrictive or export-
promoting. If a country pursues an import restrictive policy, then investment will go to industries 
with no comparative advantage. In this case, FDI will not bring much benefit or can even be 
counterproductive by keeping inefficient industries working and diverting resources from 
efficient ones. Moreover, under the import-restrictive policy FDI may be affected by rent-seeking 
activities. An export-promoting regime, on the other hand, creates incentives for investment in 
competitive industries and does not bring distortions. On top of this, in that case production is not 
limited by the domestic market, and investment may promote production for foreign markets, 
which can result in additional benefits from economies of scale. WTO membership makes the 
trade regime more open with less import restrictiveness and more export development, hence 
increasing benefits from foreign direct investment.      
 
FDI and Intellectual Property Rights    
Most researchers agree that a country with stronger Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) protection 
will attract more foreign investment. The reason is that a smaller risk of imitation increases 
demand for protected products and investing firms will enjoy longer periods of profitability. 
Thus, Mansfield (1994) argues that if a developing country has weak IPR protection, 
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multinational companies will be less eager to invest in such a country, and, if they do so, they 
would prefer to invest in a fully owned subsidiary or transfer outdated technology. 
Maskus (2000) reviewed the theoretical studies of how intellectual property rights influence 
foreign direct investment. He concluded that stronger IPR protection should be positively 
connected to the inflow of capital, but this relationship varies across different industries. The 
author argues that investment in low-technology products (such as textiles, assembly of products, 
distribution) does not depend much on strong IPRs. Neither does investment in products, which 
are costly to imitate illegally. In contrast, firms that manufacture products which can be easily 
copied (such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, software) are highly interested in an efficient IPRs 
system and would pay particular attention to protection for patents and trade secrets. 
Conversely, Braga et al. (1998) identified two cases in which IPRs may have a negative effect on 
FDI inflow. First of all, strong IPR protection may give title holders excessive market power 
which can theoretically lead to a reduction of supply and higher prices. Second, being sure in a 
high level of protection, foreign producers might switch from foreign direct investment to 
licensing; the latter is less favourable for economic development in a recipient country, compared 
with inflow of capital.   
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2.3. Accession Process and Experience of Transition Countries 
 
Accession Process 
WTO accession is a complex and lengthy process and is becoming even more complicated as new 
WTO agreements and regulations come in force. Since the birth of the WTO in 1995 till the end 
of 2006, 21 countries have become members and 30 more are seeking membership (WTO, 2005).  
Article XII of the WTO Agreement states: “Any state or customs territory having full autonomy 
in the conduct of its trade policies is eligible to accede to the WTO on terms agreed between it 
and WTO Members”.  
To initiate the process of accession, a country should submit an official request for accession to 
the WTO Director General. This request is considered during the next General Council meeting, 
and, in the case of a positive decision, the applicant country receives observer status and a 
Working Party opens to all WTO members. In the case of a large accessing country, many 
members participate in the Working Party, if the candidate is small, usually only the “Quad” 
countries (Canada, the EU, Japan and United States) as well as neighbouring countries take part. 
Next, the applicant should present a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime. The 
Memorandum explains the policies and institutions of the acceding country and forms the basis 
for further negotiations. This document includes a description of economic policies and foreign 
trade in goods and services, the trade-related intellectual property regime, investment, economic 
integration agreements with third countries, the decision-making process as well as the statistical 
appendix. After the Memorandum has been circulated among the WTO members, the “question-
answer” stage starts. Members ask questions in order to clarify indistinct points and wait for a 
reply from the applicant. This process is usually repeated several times until members are 
satisfied with the Memorandum. By the end of this stage, the Working Party issues a draft report, 
containing the Memorandum, the questions and answers and discussions of the Working Party.  
At some point during the “question-answer” process, the acceding country should submit an 
initial offer on goods and services which consists of a tariff schedule with an indication of the 
“bound” level of tariffs and a commitment on market access for services.      
Having completed the initial offer, the countries start bilateral negotiations. Members of the 
Working Party assess the initial offer and generally ask for further concessions and commitments. 
Negotiations continue until all sides are satisfied with the offer and result in signing a bilateral 
agreement. When the process of bilateral negotiations concludes, all commitments and 
concessions are combined in the Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods and the 
Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services. 
After that, the WTO Secretariat prepares the Accession Package, which consists of the following 
documents: 
 The Working Party Report; 
 The Protocol of Accession; 
 The Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods; 
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 The Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services. 
This Accession Package should be adopted at the final Working Party meeting and passed for 
approval to the General Council or the Ministerial Conference. The Decision of the General 
Council or the Ministerial Conference should be adopted by consensus, or by two thirds in a case 
in which at least one country has objections. The applicant country signs the Protocol of 
Accession and 30 days after becomes a member of the WTO.    
Overall, the policy and regulations of the acceding country should be consistent with 15 
mandatory agreements of the WTO (USAID, 2004): 
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
2. The Agreement on Agriculture 
3. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
4. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
5. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
6. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
7. The Agreement on Antidumping (AD)  
8. The Agreement on Customs Valuation  
9. The Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (PSI) 
10. The Agreement on Rules of Origin 
11. The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 
12. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (CVD) 
13. The Agreement on Safeguards (SG) 
14. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and 
15. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
 
Accession experience of transition countries 
The experience of transition countries in gaining membership in the WTO is discussed below. 
Table 2.4 presents the timeline of accession of the selected transition economies in Europe and 
Asia.   
The oldest members are several former socialist countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. They joined the GATT system prior to the 
WTO creation, and in order to become WTO members they just had to sign a draft charter on the 
WTO when it was established.    
Bulgaria and China both applied in 1986, but the process of accession was quite lengthy, 10 and 
15 years respectively. In fact, the accession of China is so far the longest one in the history of the 
WTO. The Baltic States applied in 1993-94 and it took them 5-6 years to gain membership.    
Out of the 12 CIS countries, only 4 have completed the application process: Armenia, Georgia, 
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Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. Contrary to China, Kyrgyzstan has set another record: the shortest 
accession in the history of the WTO, less than 3 years. Other countries are at different stages of 
progress. Turkmenistan has yet failed to submit its official application in accordance with WTO 
rules. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have made modest progress so far: Uzbekistan had only 3 
Working Party meetings during its 12 years of accession. Kazakhstan has made substantial 
progress recently, but according to United Nations Economic and Social Commission, the course 
was practically stagnant for some time. This happened because Kazakhstan made an initial offer 
with rates much higher than the applied ones: for some sectors there was no binding. It also made 
few commitments to open the services sector. Thus, when Kazakhstan made a tariff offer on 
goods in 1997, the Working Party members did not accept it as a basis for further negotiations 
(ESCAP 2001).       
Table 2.4. WTO Accession of Selected Transition Countries. 
Country Application Membership Country Application  Membership 
EU 
accession 
countries 
Bulgaria 
Czech 
Republic 
Hungary  
 
Poland 
 
Romania 
 
Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia 
 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Other CEC 
Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Croatia 
FYR 
Macedonia 
 
 
 
11/1986 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
03/1994 
11/1993 
01/1994 
 
11/1992 
05/1999 
 
09/1993 
12/1994 
 
 
 
12/1996 
04/1993 
(GATT) 
09/1973 
(GATT) 
10/1967 
(GATT) 
11/1971 
(GATT) 
04/1993 
(GATT) 
10/1994 
(GATT) 
11/1999 
02/1999 
05/2001 
 
09/2000 
 
 
11/2000 
04/2003 
Commonwealth 
of Independent 
States 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Moldova 
Russia 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
 
Asia 
Cambodia 
China 
Mongolia 
The Lao PDR 
Viet Nam 
 
 
 
11/1993 
07/1997 
09/1993 
07/1996 
01/1996 
01/1996 
11/1993 
06/1993 
05/2001 
 
11/1993 
12/1994 
 
 
12/1994 
07/1986 
07/1991 
07/1997 
01/1995 
 
 
 
05/2003 
 
 
06/2000 
 
12/1998 
07/2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10/2004 
12/2001 
01/1997 
 
01/2007 
Source: WTO secretariat 
In 1992, the Russian Federation inherited from the USSR the status of observer in GATT and 
applied for accession in the middle of 1993. In February 1994, Russia submitted a Memorandum 
of the Foreign Trade Regime in the Russian Federation. Two years were needed to proceed 
sufficiently to establish a Working Party consisting of 58 members. At the start, the Working 
Party concentrated on a multilateral discussion of economic regulations and trade policy in 
Russia. In 1998, Russia submitted its initial tariff offer on goods and offers on government 
support of agriculture. In 1999, it submitted the first draft of specific commitments on services 
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and a list of exemptions from MFN principle. Submission of these documents allowed bilateral 
negotiations to start. According to the Russian Ministry for Economic Development and Trade 
(www.wto.ru), over 50 countries are involved in trade negotiations on goods and over 30 
countries in negotiations on services.  
There are several issues which have provoked serious discussion between Russia and members of 
its Working Party: energy pricing, intellectual property rights, agriculture, sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations, trade in services, civil aircraft, and other issues. 
Russian-exported energy resources are sold at world prices, while domestic sales are regulated by 
the government, which has resulted in considerably lower domestic prices. Several WTO 
members have expressed concerns that such dual pricing gives Russian producers an unfair 
competitive advantage and disagrees with the WTO regulation on subsidies. In return, the 
Russian side argued that lower domestic prices reflect comparative advantage in the production of 
energy and do not contradict WTO stipulations on subsidies, since they are provided to all 
economy, and not just to selected enterprises or industries (Cooper, 2006). 
Intellectual property rights in Russia are also raising concerns among WTO members, especially 
the USA. Although Russia has passed laws protecting intellectual property rights, and has 
become a member of major international conventions in this sphere, its enforcement of the laws is 
not sufficient. As estimated by the International Intellectual Property Rights Alliance, as a result 
of the violation of intellectual property rights in Russia losses of U.S. companies amounted to 
USD 1.7 billion in 2005 (IIPRA, 2006). At the end of 2005, Congress even threatened to call 
back its programme of Generalized System of Preferences for Russia if the latter did not enforce 
respective laws (Cooper, 2006). 
Agriculture has evoked some controversy as well. First of all, WTO members are not satisfied 
with the high level of support envisaged for the Russian agricultural sector, and claim that it is not 
in line with the current round of negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda. Second, the 
decision taken in 2003 to restrict imports of meat to Russia is argued as contradicting the 
“standstill” principle that requires countries to abstain from imposing new trade barriers while 
negotiating accession. 
Other significant disputed issues are the reluctance of Russia to allow the opening of branches of 
foreign banks and to sign the plurilateral WTO Civil Aircraft Agreement, which is approved by 
only 26 WTO members and requires elimination of the tariffs on trade in aircrafts, and some 
equipment (Cooper, 2006). 
The Russian Federation has chosen to follow a protectionist strategy in negotiating tariff rates. As 
shown in Table 2.5, the weighted average rates of import tariffs on agricultural products was 
14.7% in 2001, but Russian authorities planned to agree initial bound tariff rates at a level of 
34.7%: it is intended that even the final bound rate after the transition period will stay at the level 
of 25%, which is even higher than prior to the WTO membership. The same picture is for 
industrial goods: the initial tariff rate is 14%, the final one almost 10%. Industries which are 
projected to receive a high level of protection are textiles, metallurgy, and machinery.  
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Table 2.5. Weighted Average of Applied and Bound Rate of Tariffs in Russia. 
 Applied import 
tariff rate, % 
(as of Jan. 2001) 
Initial bound rate 
of import tariff, 
% 
Final bound rate 
of import tariff, 
% 
Agricultural goods 14.70 34.71 25.11 
Industrial goods 9.73 14.32 9.84 
Including: 
Mineral products 5.43 11.06 5.43 
Chemicals 8.48 10.22 6.09 
Forestry, paper industry 8.73 14.62 7.85 
Textiles 11.69 18.31 12.37 
Metallurgy 11.35 19.29 11.70 
Machinery 9.48 14.83 8.75 
Source: www.wto.ru 
The next table (Table A.1 in appendix) summarizes the commitments made by some of the new 
WTO members. Bound import tariff rates vary quite considerably among countries: from 10% to 
35% for agricultural products and from 5% to 20% for industrial goods.  
Bulgaria has the highest level of protection for agricultural products: the average import tariff rate 
is almost 35%, followed by that of Latvia, with 33.6%. Two other Baltic States, Estonia and 
Lithuania have also set high tariffs for agricultural imports: 17.7% and 15.6% respectively. Other 
countries, excluding Mongolia, are committed to an average 10-12% of import tariffs on 
agricultural goods. Mongolia negotiated on an 18.4% import tariff rate for agricultural products 
and 20% for industrial goods. Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania follow with 12.6%, 9.3% and 8.2% 
import tariffs rates for industrial products respectively. Other countries have agreed to set import 
tariffs for industrial goods at the 5-6% level. All countries are committed to cease export 
subsidies for agriculture and have agreed to keep the limit of the total aggregated measurement of 
support to agriculture at a level of agricultural production of either 5% or 10% depending on their 
income. 
Several studies have concentrated on the peculiarities of accession to the WTO by transition 
countries. Thus, Michalopoulos (1998) pointed that transition countries have specific 
impediments on the way to the WTO membership. Michalopoulos (1998) has drawn attention to 
the fact that “(a) there are extensive legislative requirements that need to be met prior to accession 
and, legislative processes are inherently time consuming; (b) acceding countries have weak 
institutional capacities and sometimes even lack familiarity with the economic and legal issues 
that need to be addressed; (c) WTO members have been placing greater demands on acceding 
countries than the disciplines required from existing members; (d) … compared with the IMF and 
the World Bank, the WTO provides much less technical assistance in support of accession; (e) 
accession requires that the specific commercial interests of all members are addressed, which 
requires extensive and time consuming negotiations.” The United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission (ESCAP, 2001) also point to the lack of analytical and policy-making experience of 
transition countries, especially during preparation of the Memorandum on the Foreign Trade 
Regime as well as the question and answer stage. Another significant barrier is constantly raising 
requirements to the new members, as WTO rules become more sophisticated.   
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2.4. Ukraine and World Trade Organization 
The process of Ukraine’s accession to WTO system started in 1993, when the official application 
was submitted; later in 1994 a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime of Ukraine was sent to 
the WTO Secretariat. Altogether, 17 Working Party meetings have been held. The chronology of 
these meetings, agenda and decision of the Working Party are given below.  
First meeting of the Working Party 
February 27-28, 1995 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Monitoring of economic policies and import 
regulations and their compliance with 
GATT/WTO requirements 
In particular: 
 Privatization; 
 Subsidies to goods manufacturers; 
 Tariff and non-tariff regulation; 
 Budget and monetary policy; 
 Standards; 
 Trade-related intellectual property 
regime; 
WP requested additional information  on 
trade regime 
Reform of agricultural sector Ukraine should set reform of agricultural 
sector as a main goal for preparation for the 
second WP meeting 
 
Second meeting of the Working Party 
December 11-12, 1995 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services  
Since Ukraine’s economy is in transition, 
negotiations on market access should be 
based not on applied import tariff rates, but 
on Concept of Custom Rates Transformation 
Reform of agricultural sector, in particular: 
 Brining protection rules on 
accordance with the GATT/WTO system; 
 SPS measures, privatization; 
 Agricultural trade enterprises. 
Conduct tariffication of non-tariff barriers 
State of services market, degree of its 
compliance with the GATS 
WP requested additional information  on 
trade in services 
State of intellectual property rights system, 
degree of its compliance with the TRIPS 
Legislation should be changed to comply 
with the TRIPS requirements 
Improvement of state trading system Changes in legislature are required 
Bilateral trade agreements of Ukraine More information is needed. 
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Third meeting of the Working Party 
December 11-12, 1995 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Harmonization of foreign trade legislation in 
accordance with WTO requirements 
WP expressed concerns about official 
position of Ukraine’s government to improve 
trade balance through decrease of imports 
Study of schedule of commitments on 
services 
More work is needed, especially concerning 
banking sector, telecommunications and sea 
transport 
Analysis of standards, certification and 
licensing system  
System of non tariff regulation does not 
correspond to the WTO requirements and 
aims at decrease of imports. This concerns a 
system of indicative prices, registration of 
contracts, certification. 
WP points at import-prohibitive nature of 
such barriers. 
Analysis of Ukraine’s trade preferential 
agreements 
Ukraine should revise an agreement on 
industrial cooperation within the CIS 
countries, since it disagrees with 
nondiscrimination WTO requirements 
 
Fourth meeting of the Working Party 
May 6-7, 1997 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Discussion of first round of negotiations on 
market access for goods 
WP pointed at negative consequences of 
specific import tariff, established at 1996 
Discussion of first round of negotiations on 
market access for services 
WP positively evaluated commitments made 
by Ukraine and proposed concentrating on 
financial and insurance markets  
Analysis of standards, certification and 
licensing system  
WP once again drew attention to non 
transparency of non-tariff barriers in Ukraine 
Analysis of Custom Code project Custom Code project is a good starting point, 
but more work is needed on customs 
valuation and rules of origin 
Discussion of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector 
WP does not agree to set base period of 
agriculture support as in years 1986-1990 
 
Fifth meeting of the Working Party 
November 24-25, 1997 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services  
WP pointed to following positive 
developments intentions of Ukraine to: 
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 Join Reference Paper on 
telecommunications; 
 Decrease import tariffs for IT goods 
to zero; 
 Do not apply export subsidies for 
agricultural products.   
Review of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector  
Following problems were noticed: 
 Law “On State Regulation of 
agricultural imports”; 
 Excess requirements concerning 
certification of goods; 
 Minimal prices on agricultural 
import.   
Review of Memorandum on taxation regime 
in Ukraine 
WP expressed concerns about the Law “On 
support of car production in Ukraine” 
Review of Memorandum on technical 
barriers to trade 
There is a need to establish an information 
centre on standardization and certification; 
reciprocally recognize certificates.  
Review of Memorandum on sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures 
There is a need to establish an information 
centre on sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures; reciprocally recognize certificates. 
Additional questions Ukraine gave answers on additional questions 
of the WP concerning foreign trade regime 
 
Sixth meeting of the Working Party 
July 10, 1998 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Developments in the foreign policy of 
Ukraine 
Worries were expressed concerning 
significant deterioration of trade and 
investment climate in Ukraine; discrimination 
during collection of VAT and excise tax; 
appliance of minimal prices.      
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services  
Considerable progress was noticed, some 
countries stated that they are close to signing 
bilateral agreement with Ukraine 
Technical barriers to trade, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures 
WP again stressed the discrimination 
character of import control system, for 
instance requirements to obtain several 
certificates on one good, etc. Without 
significant improvement in technical barriers 
no further progress in accession is possible 
Intellectual property rights Ukraine disseminated Memorandum on 
intellectual property rights and requested 3 
years transition period.   
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Seventh meeting of the Working Party 
July 12, 2000 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of legislation WP were interested in studying following 
laws: 
 Custom Code; 
 Law on custom valuation; 
 Law on state trade. 
Also, questions were raised concerning 
import quotas, TBT, SPS and preferential 
excise tax payment for domestic goods.   
Privatization Ukraine informed about privatization of its 
enterprises and clarified requirements to 
investment and its sources. 
Agriculture European Union stated that its companies had 
difficulties accessing Ukrainian agricultural 
market. 
TBT WP noticed positive changes in TBT and 
requested additional information about 
goods, subject to compulsory certification. 
SPS WP requested Ukraine to provide full 
information of adjusting legislature according 
to WTO requirements. 
Support of domestic enterprises Ukraine has a number of subsidies: support 
of domestic car production, free economic 
zones with tax privileges. Request was made 
concerning adjustment of legislature and state 
enterprises, functioning in free economic 
zones.   
TRIPS WP requested Ukraine to provide full 
information of adjusting legislature according 
to WTO requirements. 
Trade with CIS countries WP asked for information concerning trade 
benefits to CIS countries which constrain 
trade with other countries 
 
Eighth meeting of the Working Party 
June 13-14, 2001 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services 
WP noted that first bilateral protocols were 
signed with Mexico, Uruguay and New 
Zealand and several other countries are close 
to signing it.  
Review of legislation WP concentrated on legislation concerning 
import licensing, import taxes, custom 
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valuation. 
Further agenda of the WP Adjustment of legislature according to WTO 
requirements is a prerequisite of further 
progress in accession 
 
Ninth meeting of the Working Party 
July 25-26, 2002 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services 
More bilateral protocols were signed. 
Ukraine provided revised tariff concession 
schedule. 
Review of legislature  Ukraine provided WP with new schedule of 
adopting WTO-related legislature. It 
consisted of 20 laws, which were planned to 
be approved by March 2003.   
Discussion of documents provided prior to 
WP meeting concerning TBT, SPS, 
intellectual property rights, tax regime. 
WP acknowledged that Ukraine fulfilled its 
obligations, made during last meeting.  More 
detailed study of legislation is needed, 
especially Custom Code, import licensing, 
and intellectual property rights.  
Further agenda of the WP WP made decision to prepare check-list of 
questions concerning trade regime of 
Ukraine. Answers to these questions will 
become a basis for draft Report of the WP 
Multilateral meeting of WP members 
concerning agriculture 
Ukraine disseminated document describing 
strategy of agricultural sector developments 
and grounds for defining level of domestic 
support 
 
Tenth meeting of the Working Party 
February 25-26, 2003 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services 
Considerable progress was made during 
bilateral negotiations; relatively few 
questions are left undecided. 
Review of legislature  Ukraine approved 15 out of 20 laws, planned 
as a phase of adjustment. Such questions as 
sanitary and veterinary legislation have to be 
studied additionally.  
Review of Ukraine’s replies to a check-list of 
questions 
During review of consolidated check-list of 
questions and answers main attention was 
drawn to following topics: 
 Privatization; 
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 Licensing of imports; 
 Custom valuation, custom clearance 
(in particular rational for financial backing of 
transit goods); 
 Sanitary requirements (in particular 
necessity of sanitary control of transit goods, 
doubling of sanitary requirements by 
different branches of authorities); 
 Agriculture, rational for setting 2000-
2003 as a base for calculation of total 
measurement of support.  
Further agenda of the WP WP and Ukraine should: 
 Continue bilateral negotiations; 
 Monthly monitor schedule of 
adopting legislature; 
 Prepare revised answers to 
Consolidated check-list of questions and 
answers; 
 Hold multilateral negotiations 
concerning state support of agriculture; 
 Start preparing first draft of WP 
Report.   
 
Eleventh meeting of the Working Party 
October 27-28, 2003 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services 
There are several unsettled questions in 
bilateral negotiations. The concern is import 
tariffs for sensitive sectors of economy, like 
agriculture, fishery, food processing. 
Review of legislature  WP was informed about newly adopted 
legislature in spheres of technical regulations, 
intellectual property rights, and dissemination 
of audio and video records, software. WP 
requested additional work on laws 
concerning TBT and SPS. 
Review of Ukraine’s replies to a check-list of 
questions 
WP noted that more work is needed in 
following spheres: 
 Foreign currency regulation; 
 Price regulation; 
 Privatization; 
 Licensing; 
 SPS. 
Further agenda of the WP Ukraine should: 
 Proceed with legislative reforms; 
 Prepare answers to additional 
   
 47 
questions concerning market access. 
 
Twelfth meeting of the Working Party 
April 26-30, 2004 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services 
WP noticed progress in bilateral negotiations 
and admitted that Ukraine faces additional 
requirements that emerge from current 
multilateral trade round of the WTO 
Review of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector 
WP requested additional information 
concerning proposition of applying tariff 
quotas on sugar  
Review of foreign trade regime WP requested additional information 
concerning export restrictions of some 
products, i.e.: cattle, leather, scrap of ferrous 
steel, sunflower seeds 
 
Thirteenth meeting of the Working Party 
September 20-21, 2004 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Foreign exchange regulations Regulation, requiring obligatory sale of 50% 
of foreign exchange revenues should be 
ceased   
Support of domestic enterprises Subsidies to automobile sector should be 
eliminated without transition period; 
Minimum and maximum prices for imports 
and exports should be abolished; 
No quantitative restrictions on fish and fish 
products trade should be applied 
Review of legislature Concerns were raised resulting from VAT 
exemptions on certain imports from Russia, 
including crude oil and some agricultural 
products 
Fourteenth meeting of the Working Party 
March 22-23, 2005 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Support of domestic enterprises Ukraine should abolish privileged VAT tax 
rate for domestic producers of automobiles; 
No discrimination should be practiced in Free 
Economic Zones. 
Review of legislature Custom Code should not violate geographical 
indications requirements; 
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Export tax for steel scrap should be canceled 
Review of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector 
Problems arise due to application of minimal 
prices for sugar 
 
Fifteenth meeting of the Working Party 
November 23-24, 2005 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Support of domestic enterprises Ukraine should cancel: 
 Restrictions on automobile imports 
with regard of their age; 
 Subsidies for natural gas purchase to 
selected enterprises; 
 Restrictions on export of non-ferrous 
steel scrap; 
Export tax for ferrous steel should be 5% at 
the end of transition period  
Review of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector 
Abolish minimal prices for sugar 
Review of legislature Laws in following spheres need additional 
work: 
 Import licensing of alcoholic 
beverages; 
 Veterinary regulations   
 
Sixteenth meeting of the Working Party 
June 15-16, 2006 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services 
WP was pleased that bilateral negotiations 
were concluded with all countries, besides 
Kyrgyzstan. The issues which were raised by 
Kyrgyzstan may be politically motivated  
Review of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector 
Ukraine should eliminate price control over 
agricultural commodities; 
Import quotas on sugar should be cancelled 
and transparent procedures for tariff quotas 
should be set; 
Review of legislature Changes should be made to: 
 The law on banking activities to 
allow establishment of foreign banks 
branches; 
 The Value Added Tax law remaining 
national treatment violations; 
 The Law on Government 
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procurement 
Seventeenth meeting of the Working Party 
January 25, 2008 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of Ukraine’s progress with regard to 
becoming a WTO member 
Progress of Ukraine was acknowledge as 
sufficient to become a WTO member 
Review of commitments in goods and 
services 
Final commitments of Ukraine with regard to 
trade in goods and services were agreed  
Draft decision concerning accession of 
Ukraine to the WTO 
Ukraine may accede to the WTO Agreement 
on the terms and conditions agreed during 
this Working Party 
 
Bilateral negotiations between Ukraine and WTO members started in 1997. There are 51 
countries which decided to conduct such negotiations; by the end of 2007, all 51 protocols had 
been signed (Table 2.6).   
Table 2.6. Signature of Bilateral Protocols between Ukraine and WTO Members 
2001 
 
Mexico  
Uruguay  
New Zealand  
2004 Switzerland  
Argentina  
Malaysia  
Paraguay  
Lithuania  
Turkey  
Mongolia  
Sri Lanka 
2002 Canada  
Republic of Korea  
Slovenia  
Georgia  
Latvia  
India 
2005 El Salvador  
Japan  
Norway  
Indonesia  
Moldova  
Croatia  
Iceland  
Peru  
Ecuador  
China  
Honduras  
Dominican  
Republic  
Morocco  
Romania 
2003 Hungary  
European Union  
Czech Republic  
Slovakia  
Bulgaria  
Cuba  
2006 USA  
Armenia  
Panama  
Australia  
Egypt  
Columbia  
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Israel  
Poland  
Brazil  
Estonia  
Thailand 
Chinese Taipei 
Source: Ministry of Economy of Ukraine 
During bilateral negotiations, WTO members raised the following issues: 
Lithuania  Goods: machinery, import duty on mineral oil products. 
Argentina  Goods: geographical indications, in particular wine and cheese. Domestic support 
of agriculture  
Turkey   Goods: metal scrap 
El Salvador  Goods: market access of cane sugar 
Japan   Goods: certification of electronic goods;  
Services: enforcement of intellectual property rights protection; market access of 
foreign banks’ branches and insurance companies. 
Norway  Goods: Norway required larger concessions on fish, canned fish, and navigation 
equipment.  
Services: market access for sea transport and telecommunications. 
Moldova  Goods: questions concerning Ukraine’s trade regime, i.e.: transit, licensing;  
Services: presence of natural persons   
Croatia  Goods: agricultural products. 
Iceland  Goods: fish, food processing machinery 
China   Goods: textiles  
Services: sea transport 
USA   Goods: agricultural products (poultry, fish);  
Services: enforcement of intellectual property rights protection; market access of 
foreign banks’ branches and insurance companies. 
Australia  Goods: market access for cane sugar; increase of quota for cane sugar; 
abolishment of minimal prices for sugar; commitments concerning reforms in 
sugar industry; geographical indications 
Chinese Taipei  Goods: fish;  
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Services: sea transport, financial services  
Kyrgyz Republic        Goods: agricultural products, textile, machinery; (signed in late 2007)                
Other: dispute over state debt 
There are five types of WTO commitments which Ukraine had to make: goods commitments, 
services commitments, legal, rules, and notification ones. 
 
Goods commitments 
This type of commitment refers to binding import tariff rates and agricultural subsidies 
commitments.   
As mentioned earlier, prior to WTO accession, Ukraine applied Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
tariffs (applicable to 45% of imports in 2002), full import tariffs (relevant to only 3% of imports), 
as well as Free Trade Agreements with a number of significant trade partners (53% of imports 
came from them in 2002).  
The first consolidated tariff offer was submitted to the WTO in 1999 and was revised for several 
times afterwards. Table 2.7 presents the MFN, full tariffs, as well as the WTO tariff commitment 
of Ukraine for key sectors. In general, bound tariffs under WTO are quite low: around 11.1% for 
agricultural products and 4.6% for industrial goods.  
Table 2.7. Import Tariff Commitments of Ukraine  
 MFN Tariff Full Tariff Post-WTO 
Agriculture 26.7 78.7 19.4 
Fishery 21.2 57.2 10.0 
Mining of coal and peat 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Production of non-energy 
materials 
1.1 7.2 1.1 
Food-processing 50.5 68.2 18.9 
Textiles and leather 8.2 20.2 4.0 
Forestry, wood working, paper 
industry 
8.1 24.0 4.9 
Petroleum refinement 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Chemicals 7.9 17.4 5.8 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
11.1 23.0 10.0 
Metallurgy 3.8 9.8 1.5 
Machinery 7.3 19.8 3.5 
Miscellaneous 9.8 30.6 8.5 
Source: WTO, IER (2006) calculations Dutch Grant # TF 050270 
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To define the bound level of domestic support, Ukraine proposed to choose the base period of 
1994 – 1996. The Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) constitutes 5% of agricultural 
production, or roughly USD 1.4 bn.    
 
Services commitments 
There are four modes of transactions identified by GATS classification depending on the 
territorial presence of supplier and consumer at the time of the transaction (WT/ACC/10, 2001): 
 Mode 1 refers to cross-border trade (the supply of a service from the territory of one 
member into the territory of any other member); 
 Mode 2 to consumption of services abroad (the supply of a service in the territory of one 
member to the service consumer of any other member); 
 Mode 3 to commercial presence (the supply of a service by a service supplier of one 
member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other member);  and 
 Mode 4 to the presence of natural persons (the supply of a service by a service supplier of 
one member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any 
other member). 
Limitations based on these classifications are:   
 limitations on the number of service suppliers;  
 limitations on the total value of service transactions and assets;  
 limitations on the total number of service operations as the total quantity of service 
output;  
 limitations on the total number of natural persons employed; restrictions on specific types 
of legal entity as joint venture;  
 ceilings on foreign equity participation. 
Partial commitments of Ukraine, i.e. those which have some limitations, are presented in Table 
2.8 below.  
Table 2.8. Partial Services Commitments of Ukraine. 
Sectors  Limitations on market access Limitations on national 
treatment 
Horizontal commitments 
Land ownership No limitations 3), 4) Foreigners cannot 
acquire agricultural purposes 
land. No limitations on 
renting land.  
Subsidies No limitations Only citizens of Ukraine have 
the right to obtain subsidies.   
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Movement of natural 
persons 
4) Foreigners should obtain work 
permits.  
No limitations 
   
Sectoral commitments 
Notary services 1), 3), 4) Only citizens of Ukraine 
are permitted to supply notary 
services 
No limitations 
Auditing services 1) Requirement of a compulsory 
confirmation by an auditing firm 
of Ukraine of a foreign auditor's 
conclusion 
No limitations 
Medical and dental 
services 
3) Professional qualification 
requirements according to 
Ukrainian legislation 
3) Foreigners must speak 
Ukrainian. 
Services provided by 
midwives, nurses, 
physiotherapists and 
paramedics 
3) Professional qualification 
requirements according to 
Ukrainian legislation 
3) Foreigners must speak 
Ukrainian. 
Postal services 1), 2), 3) Licensing systems may 
be established for some sub-
sectors. 
 
No limitations 
Education services 
 
3) Only a citizen of Ukraine may 
be the head of an educational 
institution. 
 
No limitations 
Insurance services 3) Five years transition period is 
required 
No limitations 
Reinsurance and 
retrocession services 
1)  Foreign re-insurer should 
have a continuous experience in 
the insurance activity not less than 
three years. 
No limitations 
Money market 
instruments  
3) Requirement to register as 
a legal entity 
No limitations 
Services related to 
derivative products 
3) Requirement to register as 
a legal entity 
No limitations 
Other negotiable 
instruments, including 
gold bars 
3) Requirement to register as 
a legal entity 
No limitations 
Securities emission 3) Only legal persons engaged 
exclusively in issuance of 
securities, and banks; 
No limitations 
Asset management  3)  Requirement to register as 
a legal entity 
No limitations 
Hospital services 3) Professional qualification 
requirements according to 
Ukrainian legislation 
4) Foreigners must speak 
Ukrainian 
Other human health 
services 
3) Professional qualification 
requirements according to 
Ukrainian legislation 
4) Foreigners must speak 
Ukrainian 
News agency services 3) Foreign investment is No limitations 
   
 54 
limited to 30% 
International transport  4) Unbound, except as  provided 
in the horizontal section 
No limitations 
Source: Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, WTO Secretariat 
 
Legal commitments 
Legal commitments concern laws, regulations, etc. which have to be adopted prior to accession to 
the WTO. Some important laws which had to be implemented or changed are:   
Law on cancellation of export ban for metal scrap to replace export ban for metal scrap with 
export duty for these products and to reduce such duties gradually. 
Law on tariff rate quota for raw cane sugar to eliminate quotas on imports of cane sugar and 
replace it with tariff rate quotas in order to meet bilateral commitments of Ukraine. 
Law on banks and banking activities to allow for establishing of foreign banks’ subsidiaries in 
Ukraine according to a WTO member’s request. 
Law on state support of agriculture in Ukraine to eliminate minimum import prices and other 
WTO-inconsistent provisions. 
Law on alcohol and tobacco and some articles of Law on the taxation system to bring import 
licence fees in line with GATT 1994 and eliminate discriminatory fees for spirits, alcohol and 
tobacco products. 
Law on procurement of goods, services, and works to indicate that state enterprises are subject to 
the Law on government procurement only when procuring for governmental use. 
Law on some issues of imports of vehicles into Ukraine - to eliminate age limit on import of used 
vehicles. 
 
Rules commitments 
The main aim of the rules commitments is to establish whether Ukraine’s policy conforms to 
WTO rules and, in particular, how it should be changed if necessary. State bodies should confer 
with these commitments before making decisions, which would affect foreign trade regime.   
There are different types of rules commitments (WT/ACC/10, 2001):  
 Statements of fact rather than commitments;  
 Obligations to stand by existing WTO rules, sometimes specifying national measures to 
be amended to bring them into conformity with WTO provisions on the subject in 
question, sometimes elaborating on the WTO provisions on the subject in question;   
 Obligations not to have recourse to specific WTO provisions, e.g. those relating to 
transitional periods. These most often relate to customs valuation and TRIPS; 
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 Specific identification of transitional periods that may be used, e.g. customs valuation. 
These relate to right of appeal, other duties and charges, subsidiaries and trade-related 
investment measures; 
 Authorisation to depart temporarily from WTO rules or from commitments in the Goods 
Schedule. These are related to internal taxes, import licensing, technical barriers to trade 
and agricultural support; 
 Obligations to abide by rules created by the commitment paragraph and not contained in 
WTO Multilateral Agreements. These relate to an obligation to comply with "WTO 
obligations and other international obligations", privatisation, sub-central governments, 
government procurement, trade in civil aircraft and publication. 
The selected rules commitments of Ukraine are listed below. 
 
State ownership and privatization 
Ukraine would provide periodic reports to WTO Members on developments in its programme of 
privatization. 
 
Pricing policies 
Ukraine introduced changes to the Law "On State Support of Agriculture in Ukraine" which 
would cancel the provisions on minimum purchase prices applied to imports, as well as the 
provisions on the introduction of quotas on imports or exports. 
 
Customs duties 
Ukraine committed not to change the staging of the tariff reductions, as indicated in its tariff 
offer. Ukraine would not list any "other duties and charges" in its Schedule of Concessions and 
Commitments on Goods, binding such charges at zero from the date of accession. 
 
Tariff rate quotas, tariff exemptions 
From the date of accession, Ukraine would allocate its only tariff rate quota on raw cane sugar in 
conformity with the WTO requirements. Allocation methods would not have trade-restrictive or 
distortive effects on imports. Ukraine would introduce a process of consultation with trading 
partners, importers and exporters prior to the amendment of the tariff quota. 
 
Application of Internal Taxes on Imports 
Ukraine would apply its domestic taxes, including the excise taxes and value added taxes, in full 
compliance with provisions of the WTO, including the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. Ukraine would amend the Laws on VAT and taxation of agricultural 
producers to ensure full conformity with the provisions of WTO upon accession. 
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Import licensing systems 
Ukraine will eliminate the ban on imports of buses, trucks and cars older than eight years.  From 
the date of accession, Ukraine would eliminate and would not apply quantitative restrictions on 
imports such as licensing, quotas, bans, etc., that cannot be justified under the WTO provisions. 
 
Anti-dumping, countervailing duties, safeguard regimes 
Ukraine would not apply any anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard measures until it had 
implemented appropriate laws in conformity with the provisions of the WTO Agreements on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and on Safeguards.   
 
Export restrictions 
Ukraine is committed to eliminate the export ban on non-ferrous scrap by the date of accession, 
and to substitute it by export duties. 
 
Export subsidies 
From the date of accession Ukraine will not maintain export subsidies. 
 
TBT 
Ukraine would ensure that only technical regulations meeting WTO requirements would be 
mandatory. Ukraine would not use standards and technical regulations in a manner that would be 
restrictive to international trade, prohibitive to imports, and discriminatory of individual exporters 
and suppliers.   
 
SPS measures 
The Enquiry point on SPS measures would be in operation from the date of Ukraine’s accession 
to the WTO. Ukraine would apply all its SPS measures consistently with the requirements of the 
corresponding WTO Agreements without any transitional arrangements.   
 
State-trading entities 
State owned enterprises would make purchases of goods and services, which were not intended 
for governmental use and sales in international trade in accordance with commercial 
considerations, and would give enterprises of other WTO members adequate opportunities. 
 
Transparency 
From the date of accession, all legislation related to trade would be published promptly in a 
manner that fulfils WTO requirements.  Therefore, no law or regulation related to international 
trade would become effective prior to such publication in an official source of information. 
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Notification commitments 
Ukraine, along with other members, agreed to comply with notification commitments. The 
purpose of such commitments is to prevent WTO member states from creating obstacles to 
international trade through national measures, which sometimes may be non transparent for other 
members. Under these commitments, Ukraine is obliged to report all proposed changes in 
regulations which affect the operation of the WTO system.    
Ukraine is committed to notify changes in all major fields which fall under WTO agreements: 
trade in goods and services, agriculture, SPS and TBT, TRIMS, antidumping, subsidies, 
safeguard measures, etc. Notification commitments state in what cases Ukraine should notify 
WTO; to whom exactly it should send notification; terms, during which notification should be 
made; what kind of information should be provided; and the proposed format of notification.   
Hence, in the case of safeguard measures, Ukraine should inform about: (a) initiating an 
investigatory process relating to serious injury or threat to domestic industry and the reasons for 
it; (b) finding a case of serious injury or threat caused by increased imports; (c) taking a decision 
to apply or extend a safeguard measure.  
Notification should be made to the Committee on Safeguards. Information has to be sent as soon 
as Ukraine arrives at any of the three cases pointed above. In the case of a provisional safeguard 
measure Ukraine should notify before taking this measure. Notification should contain evidence 
of serious injury or threat caused by increased imports, a precise description of the product 
involved and the proposed measure, the proposed date of introduction, the expected duration and 
timetable for progressive liberalization. In case of an extension of a measure - evidence that the 
industry concerned is adjusting shall also be provided. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology of Research 
 
3.1. Computable General Equilibrium Models 
A Computable General Equilibrium model is a model of fundamental economic links between 
incomes of various groups, demand pattern, multisector production structure, and foreign 
economies. The model incorporates behavioural equations describing the economic actions of 
agents, and the technological and institutional constraints facing them (Thissen, 1998). In line 
with Dixon (2006), it is useful to give further insight into the definition of Computable General 
Equilibrium models by looking at each word that forms its name. 
CGE models include explicit specification of the behaviour of several economic agents and 
captures inter-linkages between those agents, thus these models are general. Households 
maximize utility, while producers either maximize profits or minimize costs and make decisions 
on consumption and production based on optimizing assumptions. There are also behavioural 
equations for other agents, such as government, foreign sector participants, etc. 
Demand and supply decisions of economic agents define the level of prices and production such 
that demand is equal to supply for all commodities and factors; markets are in equilibrium. 
CGE models are solved using special software and produce numerical results, so they are 
computable. 
CGE models can be used for real-world applications with actual input data and relevant output. 
This feature makes the CGE method extremely useful for policy analysis of many issues, 
including changes in trade regime, tax reform, agricultural policy, regional development, etc. 
Because of this, such a model is also called an Applied General Equilibrium model.     
 
CGE models have their roots in the Walrasian general equilibrium theory, which was re-
formalized in the 1950s. The study of Arrow and Debreu (1954) is one of the fundamental studies 
which states that the situation exists when all markets are in equilibrium and demand does not 
exceed supply. In the applied sense, CGE modelling starts with the Leontief input-output analysis 
described in Leontief (1936, 1941). The central idea of this approach is to consider inter-linkages 
between different industries and economic agents. The output of each industry is used as an input 
for other industries or goes to final consumption, making all agents dependent on each other. 
The first empirical CGE models were built by Johansen (1960) and Harberger (1962). Johansen 
used a model with 20 cost-minimizing production sectors and utility-maximizing consumer to 
identify sources of economic growth in Norway. Harberger built a two-sector model to 
investigate tax policy issues in the USA. Neither author has checked for the presence of multiple 
equilibrium and the existence of a unique equilibrium near the benchmark equilibrium. A 
breakthrough in solving a general equilibrium model was reached by Scarf in 1967. He developed 
an algorithm for the solution of general equilibrium problem which was quite general in its 
nature. This algorithm assured finding an equilibrium set of prices under the most general 
conditions and did not require special constraints on specification of the model. Although the 
algorithm has been substantially augmented since that time, it was a breakthrough in the sense of 
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giving researchers the opportunity to build more detailed and complex models than before.          
According to Iqbal et al. (2001), for several years following Scarf’s advance CGE modelling did 
not receive much attention. Then, one of the earliest policy-oriented general equilibrium models 
was devised by Shoven and Whalley (1972), Whalley (1975, 1977), Shoven (1976) who studied 
different aspects of fiscal reform and Miller and Spencer (1977) with the model of the UK joining 
the European Economic Community.  
As mentioned earlier, CGE models are being applied to a wide variety of issues and there are 
several literature surveys on this topic. Thus, Shoven and Whalley (1984) reviewed two issues: 
applied general equilibrium tax models and models of international trade. de Melo (1988) 
discussed models for trade policy analysis in developing countries. Nielsen (2003) covered the 
literature on CGE models of regional and preferential trade agreements. Piermartini and Teh 
(2005) discussed applications of general equilibrium to trade policy, placing accent on 
GATT/WTO issues. Decaluwe and Martens (1988) reviewed the peculiarities of modelling 
developing economies and included 73 applications to 26 countries. Bandara (1991) surveyed 
CGE modelling of development policies in Least Developed Countries. Pereira and Shoven 
(1988) surveyed studies of dynamic CGE models of tax policy evaluation. Devarajan (1988) 
discussed the application of general equilibrium models to energy issues. Bhattacharyya (1996) 
reviewed CGE studies of energy and environmental issues. Robinson (1991) surveyed “micro-
macro” CGE models with financial variables. Kraybill (1993) as well as Partridge and Rickman 
(1998) reviewed CGE models of regional economies and their application to regional policy 
issues. In 2004, Partridge updated his review of regional modelling. Kraev (2003) reviewed 
literature on general equilibrium models of stabilization and adjustment packages. Some other 
general reviews on CGE literature are by Shoven and Whalley (1992), Dixon and Parmenter 
(1996), and Ginsburg and Keyzer (1997).  
 
A fundamental principle of Computable General Equilibrium modelling is captured by a circular 
flow of income in economy; a typical one is presented in Figure 3.1. Households are owners of 
factors of production (in this case, labour and capital) and receive income from them; additional 
income is the form of transfers from the government. Households spend their revenues on 
consumption and taxes and save the rest. The government redistributes income from taxes to 
transfers, consumption and savings. Domestic savings coupled with foreign savings form the 
capital market. Household consumption, government consumption and investment all go to the 
product market, which is made from domestic goods and imports. Producers receive income from 
domestic sales and exports and spend it on domestic and foreign intermediate consumption as 
well as factor payments.  
Circular flow of income implies three conditions of equilibrium. First of all, for a given 
commodity a quantity produced is equal to quantity demanded and there is a market clearance. 
Second, revenues from production of goods are allocated to households as payment for factors of 
production, to intermediate demand and to government as taxes, thus a condition of zero profit 
holds. Finally, returns of households from factor endowments are spent on purchases of goods, 
taxes and savings and there is an income balance.  
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Figure 3.1. Circular Flow of Income 
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Source: adopted from Piermartini et al. (2005)  
In practice, circular flow of income is captured by organizing data in the Social Accounting 
Matrix. Data are represented in a form of matrix where columns show the expenditure of each 
agent and rows show costs of output; each entry is an income for some agent and expenditure for 
another. Given that there is a market clearance, income balance and zero profit, the sum of the 
entries in i
th
 row must be equal to a sum of entries in i
th
 column. Figure A.2 shows an example of 
Social Accounting Matrix (given in Appendix). Rows and columns contain the same title entries: 
activities, commodities (one activity can produce more than one commodity), factors of 
production, enterprises, households, government, capital account and foreign sector. Thus, in the 
commodities’ row intermediate demand, household consumption, government consumption, 
investment and exports sum up to aggregate demand on a given commodity. In the commodities’ 
column, gross domestic output and imports constitute the aggregate supply of a commodity. 
Aggregate demand is equal to aggregated supply for each commodity. Household income is the 
sum of income from factors of production, transfers from government and foreign remittances. 
Expenditure is directed at consumption, taxes, savings and transfers abroad. The same logic is 
applied to receipts and expenditure in other rows and columns.         
 
Building a CGE model usually requires undertaking several steps:  
1. Clearly define the topic of the model. This stage is very important, since other steps, such 
as data aggregation or choice of functional forms, may be subordinated to the issue of 
investigation. 
2. Build analytically consistent mathematical model.  
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3. Chose functional forms for production, transformation, and utility functions; specify 
constraints. 
4. Collect data and construct consistent Social Accounting Matrix. Missing data have to be 
calibrated. 
5. Write a code in software. This usually involves software for optimizing systems of non-
linear equations. The most widely used are GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling 
System), GEMPACK (General Equilibrium Modelling PACKage), HERCULES.   
6. Benchmark simulation. The model should be consistent and reproduce the input data. 
7. Counter-factual experiments. 
 
There are several classifications of CGE models, based on their theoretical background, historical 
development and modelling technique.  
First, a distinction is made according to the theoretical schools of general equilibrium modelling 
between neoclassical and structuralist models. Neoclassical models, also called “Walrasian” by 
Thissen (1998) and “fundamental” by Robinson (2003), have their roots in the Walrasian model 
of competitive economy and Solow’s model of economic growth. The purpose of these models is 
to analyze the effect of exogenous shocks on optimal allocation of resources, efficiency and 
welfare. A distinguishing feature of these models is sound theoretical foundations; any attempt to 
step aside from the theoretical background or to add macro features is considered to be corrupting 
the model. As was argued by Willenbockel (1994) and Bergman (1990), neoclassical models do 
not try to represent actual economy, but instead try to construct logical framework for analyzing 
policy changes. In practice, neoclassical models assume full capacity utilization, full employment 
and prices determined by marginal productivity. As a result of full employment, adjustment is 
made through the reallocation of labour from unproductive sectors to productive ones without 
considerable change in output. According to Robinson (2003), during the last decade neoclassical 
models have tended to shift away from strict theoretical regulations and include macro features.    
Another type of CGE models, is the structuralist model, originating from the work of Keynes 
(1936), Kaldor (1957), Kalecki (1971) and lately analyzed by Taylor(1990, 1991). The prime idea 
of these models is to capture institutional specifics of the economy under consideration. In 
contrast to neoclassical models which focus on resource allocation, structuralist models aim to 
study income distribution, sectoral growth, trade balance changes, etc. This branch of models 
may use ad-hoc estimates and trade off theoretical strictness for empirical relevance. According 
to Taylor (1991), structuralist models share some common features: Economic actors, such as 
state, enterprises, and workers are not price takers and can influence prices or quantity changes. 
There is no assumption of full employment or full capital utilization. The money supply is often 
endogenous and adjusts to the level of output.  
Second, models vary depending on closure rule – the decision on which variables are endogenous 
and which are exogenous (this concept was first introduced by Sen (1963)). Some of the most 
widespread closures, listed by Kraev (2003) are the following: 
Neoclassical closure assumes that investment is equalized with savings at a level that guarantees 
   
 62 
full employment. This rule is fundamental for neoclassical models, but rarely used in structuralist 
models.  
In neo-Keynesian closure nominal wages are fixed. This closure is based on the forced saving 
model by Kaldor. The price level adjusts to bring a balance between savings and investment 
through a change in income distribution.  
The Kaleckian closure keeps returns to labour constant, and share of wages in output is fixed. If 
the economy reaches full capacity, closure is switched to a forced savings one. 
Loanable funds closure proposes that investment is negatively related to the interest rate, whilst 
savings are positively related; the interest rate is a balancing variable here. 
Pigou/real balance closure assumes that the savings ratio depends on real money supply (the ratio 
of money supply to the price level). Money supply is exogenous and price level adjusts to bring 
equilibrium. 
Thissen (1998) suggests one more classification according to the determination of the parameters 
of the model: by calibration or by econometric technique. The vast majority of CGE models use 
calibration in order to determine parameters. The econometric method was initiated by Jorgenson 
(1984); in his study he built a general equilibrium model with stochastically specified submodels. 
Among the advantages of calibration is the relative simplicity of finding the parameters’ values. 
Few data are needed and one set of observations can be used. Calibration uses data for only one 
period of time, which can be both, an advantage and a disadvantage. In case the economy 
experiences significant changes in its structure, the calibration method is superior to the 
econometric one. Econometrics use data for several years, which may not be similar to the year of 
consideration, while calibration is done with the same data as used in the model. At the same 
time, if no considerable structural changes have taken place, econometrics can give better 
estimates. Besides that, econometric models incorporate stochastic disturbances in order to 
capture the effect of omitted variables and errors, while calibration assumes that this stochastic 
disturbances term is zero and does not include this information. Finally, econometric models give 
indicators of accuracy of determined variables, while calibration does not give information on 
reliability of parameters. 
 
Like any modelling method, General Equilibrium has its advantages and disadvantages; a 
discussion of the main ones following the study of Borges (1986) is given below. 
Probably the most prominent advantage of CGE models is their solid microeconomic foundation. 
General Equilibrium models specify the behaviour of agents using standard theoretical 
approaches to optimization and choice, hence receiving the name “theory with numbers”.  
Another strength related to theoretical foundation, is the internal consistency of CGE models. 
These models capture circular income flow in the economy and include all key agents. Then, the 
behaviour of all agents is systematized and should reach equilibrium in a benchmark scenario. 
Missing information or inconsistency would be instantly detected. 
The possibility of keeping complex interrelations transparent allows having a high degree of data 
disaggregation and takes into account linkages between different economic agents and sub-
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agents. Such a feature makes CGE models extremely useful for analysis of complicated policy 
issues and, as mentioned above, the tool is widely applied for this purpose. CGE models are 
particularly helpful for studies of structural changes in a given economy: although the total effect 
of external shock could be relatively small, structural changes can be significant. 
A major weakness of CGE methodology is its dependence on choice of model type, functional 
forms, and parameter specifications. The results of the model can vary: if for example the Cobb-
Douglas function is used instead of Constant Elasticity of Substitution, calibration is made with 
data, which are not inherent to the economy under consideration, or the modeller makes a wrong 
guess about closure rule.  
The assumption of general equilibrium, which is rarely observed in the real world, has its 
drawbacks as well. First of all, this implies that CGE models do not actually forecast reality, but 
rather show long-term tendencies in the economy. This limits the usage of CGE models and 
excludes the possibility of checking the historical development and validity of the model. Second, 
it does not allow the simulation of some policy decisions. In certain cases, the economy is not in 
equilibrium and problems such as a stabilization policy can not be modelled by CGE. 
CGE models show the long-term consequences of external shock and demonstrate results as if an 
economy immediately adjusts to it. Thus, CGE methodology is not useful for studying the 
adjustment process and costs associated with it, although for some policy decisions transition is 
very crucial and even may be more important than long-term equilibrium.           
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3.2. Modelling GATT/WTO with CGE 
The first widespread application of CGE models for studying GATT/WTO issues was modelling 
different aspects of the Uruguay Round. This Round was launched in 1986, lasted more than 
seven years and resulted in the creation of the WTO. Beyond the traditional GATT topic of trade 
in goods, the WTO included much broader issues, such as trade in services, intellectual property, 
Dispute Settlement, Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Some of the CGE studies of the Uruguay 
Round are described in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1. CGE Studies of Uruguay Round 
Publications Data/ 
Evaluation 
Model Structure Sectors 
Liberalized 
Results 
Brown, 
Deardoff, 
Fox and 
Stern (1996)  
Data and 
evaluation 
at 1990 
 Michigan model  
 29 sectors  
 8 regions 
 Perfect 
competition, CRS, 
Armington 
elasticities in 
agriculture  
 Monopolistic 
competition and IRS 
in manufacturing 
 Static 
 Industrial 
tariffs cut 
according to 
schedule. Multi-
Fibre Agreement 
(MFA) not 
covered. 
 Agriculture 
tariffs including 
NTB-equivalents 
cut according to 
commitments 
 Services: 
NTBs cut by 25 
per cent  
  GDP growth: 
USA 0.9%, EU 
0.9%, Japan 1.4%, 
Australia and New 
Zealand 3.6%, 
Mexico 2.8%, 
emerging Asian 
countries 3.6%, 
ROW 1% 
Francois, Mc 
Donald and 
Nordstrom 
(1996) 
Data 
version 
1992 
 GTAP model 
 19 sectors 
 13 regions 
 Model 1: CRS, 
perfect competition 
 Model 2: IRS, 
monopolistic 
competition 
 Dynamic model 
  Industrial 
tariffs cut 
according to 
schedules, MFA 
quotas lifted  
 Agriculture 
tariff cuts 
according to 
commitment, 
subsidies cut by 
36% and 24% in 
developed and 
developing 
countries 
respectively 
  GDP growth: 
World 0.45% 
(Model 1) 0.9% 
(Model 2) USA 
0.6%, EU 0.5%, 
Japan 0.4%, 
Australia and New 
Zealand 0.9%, 
Latin America 
1.9%, East-South 
Asia 1.8%  
  
Decomposition of 
welfare effect: 
10% from 
agriculture, 50% 
textile and 
clothing, 40% 
other 
manufacturing 
  Trade growth: 
increase by 6% 
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(Model 1), 
approximately 
15% (Model 2) 
Goldin and 
van der 
Mensbrugghe 
(1996)  
Data 1985-
93 
Projections 
are made 
for the 
period 
1993-2002 
 RUNS model 
 20 sectors (15 
of which 
agricultural sectors)  
 22 countries  
 Perfect 
competition 
 Static 
 Industrial 
tariffs cut 
according to 
schedules 
 Agricultural 
reforms: tariffs 
including NTBs 
cut according to 
schedules. 
Subsidies cut by 
36% in OECD and 
24% in other 
countries 
  GDP growth: 
USA 0.1%, EU 
0.6%, Japan 0.4%, 
Australia and New 
Zealand 0.1%, 
Upper Income 
Asia 1.3% 
 Decomposition 
of welfare effect: 
85% per cent from 
agriculture 
Hertel, 
Martin, 
Yanagishima 
and 
Dimaranan 
(1996) 
Data 1992, 
Evaluation 
2005 
 
 GTAP model 
 10 sectors 
 15 regions 
 CRS, perfect 
competition, 
Armington trade 
elasticities 
  Industrial and 
agricultural tariffs 
cut according to 
schedules. MFA 
quotas are lifted. 
  GDP growth: 
World 0.89%, 
USA and Canada 
0.4%, EU 0.7%, 
Japan 1.04%, Latin 
America 3.8% 
 Trade growth: 
World 59%, USA 
and Canada 48%, 
EU 42%, Japan 
22% 
 Decomposition 
of welfare effect: 
agriculture 5%, 
industrial tariff 
81%, MFA 14% 
Harrison, 
Rutherford 
and Tarr 
(1995) 
1992 data 
and 
evaluation 
 GTAP model 
 22 sectors 
 24 regions 
 Model 1: CRT, 
perfect competition, 
Armington 
 Model 2: IRT, 
monopolistic 
competition 
intraregional, 
Armington-based 
trade 
 Model 1 both 
static and dynamic 
 Industrial and 
Agriculture tariff 
cut according to 
schedule 
 Export 
(domestic) 
subsidies cut by 
36% (20%) and 
24% (13%) in 
developed and 
developing 
countries 
respectively  
 GDP growth: 
World 0.4% 
(Model 1 static), 
0.7% (Model 1 
dynamic), 0.42% 
(Model 2 static)  
 Model 1 
regional results: 
US 0.4%, EU 
0.7%, Japan 0.7%, 
Latin America 
1.7%, South-East 
Asia 2.5%  
 Decomposition 
of welfare effect: 
Model 1 static: 
agriculture 68%, 
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industrial tariff 
18%, MFA 15%  
 Model 1 
dynamic: 
agriculture 38%, 
industrial tariff 
49%, MFA 12%  
 Model 2 static: 
agriculture 61%, 
industrial tariff 
23%, MFA 17% 
There are differences in the simulation results of different models, and Piermartini and Teh 
(2005) proposed the following explanation for such discrepancies: first of all, different models 
studied different aspects of the Uruguay Round. Some scrutinized general issues, while some 
focused on specific parts of the Uruguay Round. Hence, the Rural Urban North South (RUNS) 
model looked at agriculture, and 15 out of 20 sectors included in this model were agricultural 
ones. Another factor is the degree of regional aggregation. For instance, results differ, depending 
on whether sub-Saharan Africa was included in the simulation of agricultural reform or not. 
Model specifications had an important influence on results as well. A key difference across the 
models is the assumption about market structure. Some models assume perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale, while others assume imperfect competition and increasing returns to 
scale. Finally, models have different results owing to the assumption about dynamics. Models 
with fixed capital have lower estimates than those which allow for capital accumulation. 
The second large wave of modelling GATT/WTO issues was directed at the Doha Round. It was 
launched at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in 2001 and concerns a wide range 
of issues, especially those of importance for developing countries thus it is called the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA). Table A.3 presents some of the studies. Welfare gains differ across 
models as well and range from USD 170 bn in the OECD model to over USD 2000 bn in the 
outlying model of Brown, Deardoff and Stern, but tend to predict approximately USD 250 bn 
gains on average. According to Piermartini and Teh (2005), there are five factors influencing 
results: baseline data and level of protection; assumption about nature of the models (whether 
they assume perfect or imperfect competition); assumption about dynamics; the depth of 
liberalization (full or partial); and scope of liberalization (whether services and trade facilitation 
are included or not).       
A large number of CGE studies was devoted to examining individual countries in the context of 
GATT/WTO, in particular accession to this organization. Probably the greatest efforts of the 
modellers were directed at examining China’s accession to the WTO. Studies were carried out 
with the help of global trade models, such as GTAP, by Yang (1996) and Hertel (1997), G-
CUBED World Model by McKibbin and Tang (1998), PRCGEM by Fan and Zheng (2000), Mai 
et al. (2003), Mayes and Wang (2003) as well as other purpose-built models, such as those of 
Wang and Li (1998), Zhai and Li (2000), Walsmley et al. (2006). Results differ significantly from 
0.5% of GDP growth to more than 10% of GDP growth. This is explained by a wide variety of 
scenarios and assumptions. 
Several models have studied WTO accession of post-USSR transition countries, a description of 
these is given below. 
   
 67 
Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004a) studied the economy-wide and sector-specific effects of 
Russia’s accession to the WTO.  
There are 35 sectors in the model. The underlying input-output table is for 1995 and originally 
had 22 sectors but was disaggregated. Primary factors of production in all sectors are: unskilled 
labour, skilled labour and capital. There are three types of sectors: competitive, imperfectly 
competitive goods sectors and imperfectly competitive business services sectors. 
The authors argue that there are four major sources of gains of Russia’s membership in the WTO: 
1. Improved market access. For metallurgy and chemicals it is assumed to be 1.5% increase 
in market access, for light and food industry 0.5%.   
2. Import tariff reduction. Tariffs are reduced by 50%. 
3. Liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment in services. The authors estimate 
that ad valorem equivalence of barriers to foreign direct investment is 90% for air 
transportation, 95% for maritime transportation and 33% for other sectors.  
4. Improvement of the investment climate, which is modelled by an increase of capital 
stock. 
Estimated total gains from WTO accession are 7.2% of consumption or 3.3% of GDP in the 
medium run; liberalization of FDI is the most important source of gains. 
This model served as a basis for several more specific applications studying Russia’s accession to 
the WTO, namely: detailed model of liberalization of barriers against FDI in Jensen, Rutherford 
and Tarr (2004b); telecommunications reform within Russia’s accession in Jensen, Rutherford 
and Tarr (2004c); the poverty effect of accession with very detailed decomposition of households 
in Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo (2005); the regional impact of accession in Rutherford and 
Tarr (2006).  
Jensen and Tarr (2007) have built a model for Kazakhstan. The model has 56 sectors, uses 2003 
input-output table and is similar to that of Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004a). Sectors are either 
competitive or subject to increasing returns to scale. 
Scenarios are as follows: 
1. Improved market access. Market access is improved by 1.5% for basic metals and 1% for 
metals. 
2. Import tariff reduction. This is modelled by decreasing tariffs by 50%. 
3. Reduction in barriers against multinational service providers. Discriminatory tax for 
multinationals is decreased by 50%. 
4. Elimination of local content policies in the oil sector and simultaneous exemption of the 
VAT for multinational oil company purchases of Kazakhstan inputs. Multinationals are 
obliged to buy some inputs locally. To model elimination of this policy, local input prices 
are increased by 20%.  
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5. Improvement of investment climate. This is modelled by an increase of capital stock. 
Total welfare gains to Kazakhstan are equal to 6.7% of Kazakhstan consumption or 3.7% of 
GDP. The largest gains come from a reduction in barriers against multinational service providers. 
Pavel, Burakovsky, Selitska and Movchan (2004) constructed a model for Ukraine. It has 20 
sectors; the input-output table is for 2001. Households are disaggregated into unskilled, skilled 
and highly skilled; there are seven trading regions: EU15, 10 new members (by 2004), Russia, 
other CIS, Asia, North America and Rest of the World. The model is static and has a perfect 
equilibrium structure. 
The policy experiments are as follows: 
1. Tariff reduction. New tariffs are taken from Ukraine’s official proposal to reduce tariffs 
according to the results of negotiations. 
2. Improved market access. Agricultural products will receive a 10% increase in market 
access to the EU and North America markets; steel products 5% to the same markets and 
chemicals 1% to all markets. 
3. Adjustment of domestic taxation. All direct subsidies are eliminated; direct taxes are set 
at 5%.     
Total gains from Ukraine’s accession to the WTO are a 3% increase of consumption, GDP 
increases by 1.9%, exports and imports growing by approximately 14% each. 
Pavel and Tochitskaya (2004) analyzed the economic impact of Belarus’ accession to the WTO. 
They built a CGE model with 23 sectors based on the 2001 input-output table. It has constant 
return to scale and perfect competition. The external sector is divided into CIS countries and all 
others. 
The authors take into account the dependence of Belarus’ economy on imported gas and model 
four sets of policy simulations: 
1. Increased price for gas imports by 25%. 
2. Tariff reduction. Tariffs are assumed to decrease by 60% (there is no specific information 
about Belarus’ WTO commitments). 
3. Improved market access. Exports of chemical products obtain a 10% increase of access to 
non-CIS markets. 
4. Domestic tax reform. The direct taxes on all activities were set to 5%. For agriculture, a 
5% direct subsidy was maintained. A VAT at equal tax rates without any privileges was 
set as the only indirect tax on commodities. All export taxes were reduced by 50%. 
The authors estimate that increased prices for imported gas will have a negative effect: welfare 
will drop by 1.5% of consumption and GDP will decrease by 1.2%. Nevertheless, if all scenarios 
of WTO accession are taken into account, the Belarusian economy will benefit and consumer 
welfare will rise by about 1.6% after WTO accession, and GDP will rise by 3.4%.  
   
 69 
   
 70 
Chapter 4 
CGE Model for Ukraine 
This part will start with a description of Ukraine’s economy; it is followed by formal outline of 
the model; next, data will be described; this will be concluded by key assumptions of the model 
and an outline of policy simulation scenarios. 
 
4.1. Economic Situation in Ukraine3. 
By the end of the 1980’s, the economy of Ukraine was the second largest after that of Russia 
among all USSR republics, producing three times the output of the next-ranking republic. 
Ukraine occupied only 3% of USSR territory and was inhabited by 18% of its population, but 
produced around 17% of total USSR industrial output and 25% of agricultural output (Ukraine 
has the most fertile land in Europe and is in possession of 30% of world’s black soils). Such 
factors, as well as a relatively well developed infrastructure, close to 100% literacy and skilled 
labour force could have led to a quick transition to a market economy, but instead Ukraine 
experienced a 10-year lingering drop into recession, showing first positive signs only in 2000. 
Key economic indicators of Ukraine for 2001-2008 are presented in Table 4.1 below.      
Table 4.1. Key Economic Indicators of Ukraine 
Key Economic Indicators 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Nominal GDP UAH bn 204.20 225.80 264.20 345.90 441.45 544.15 720.73 948.06 
Nominal GDP USD bn 37.80 42.60 49.50 65.10 86.10 107.80 142.70 180.30 
GDP growth 
(real) 
% yoy 9.20 5.20 9.40 12.10 2.60 7.30 7.90 2.30 
Industrial 
production 
% yoy 14.20 7.00 15.80 12.50 3.10 6.20 10.20 -3.10 
Agricultural 
production 
% yoy 10.20 1.20 -11.00 19.10 0.00 2.50 -6.50 17.10 
CPI % yoy eop 6.10 -0.60 8.20 12.30 10.30 11.60 16.60 22.30 
PPI % yoy eop 0.90 5.70 11.20 24.10 9.60 14.10 23.30 23.00 
Exports (gs, 
USD) 
% yoy 9.50 10.70 24.00 42.60 7.50 13.20 27.40 33.80 
Imports (gs, 
USD) 
% yoy 14.10 4.90 28.70 31.30 20.40 21.90 35.40 38.50 
Current 
account 
USD bn 1.40 3.10 2.90 6.90 2.50 -1.60 -5.30 -12.70 
Current 
account 
% GDP 3.70 7.60 5.90 10.60 2.90 -1.50 -3.70 -7.00 
FDI (total) USD bn 3.88 5.47 6.79 9.04 16.89 21.61 29.54 35.72 
International 
reserves  
USD bn 3.09 4.42 6.94 9.52 19.39 22.36 32.48 31.54 
                                                          
3
 The data will be given mostly for 2008, a year when Ukraine accessed the WTO 
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Fiscal balance % GDP -1.90 0.80 -0.20 -3.40 -1.90 -0.70 -1.10 -1.80 
Exchange rate USD eop 5.30 5.33 5.33 5.31 5.12 5.05 5.05 7.70 
Source: State Statistical Committee of Ukraine  
Value added is dominated by industry: it contributes almost one-third of all value added. The next 
important sectors are trade – around 15% of value added, and transport – more than 10%. 
Agriculture accounts approximately for 10% of value added, but employs 25% of the total labour 
force, which is a legacy of the Soviet Union total employment policy and should indicate 
inefficiency.  
Figure 4.1 presents composition of industrial production in Ukraine as of 2008.  
Figure 4.1. Distribution of Industrial Output in Ukraine by Sectors, 2008 
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Source: State Statistical Committee of Ukraine  
As can be seen, metallurgy is the major contributor to the aggregate industrial production. 
Ukraine is one of the largest steel producers in the world; it is ranked as the 7th steel producer 
after China, Japan, USA, Russia, Germany and South Korea. During USSR times the lion share 
of steel was supplied to former Soviet Republics. After obtaining independence, Ukraine was left 
with a high-capacity metallurgical sector well exceeding the internal demand of the country. Such 
factors have led to the significant export orientation of the metallurgy: over 80 % of production is 
supplied to foreign markets.  
Next important sector is generation of electricity. Ukraine's power sector is the twelfth largest in 
the world in terms of installed capacity, with 54 gigawatts (GW). It means that Ukraine has more 
than enough generating capacity to produce twice its electricity needs. 
The food industry is one of the most vibrant sectors in Ukraine’s economy. Its share in total 
industrial production is around 15%. While domestic sources played an important role in 
increasing the output of food products, foreign direct investment (FDI) played a crucial role as 
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well. The most important products are beverages – 20% of total food industry output, milk 
products – 17%, meat – 11%, tobacco products – 9%, vegetable oils – 6%, grain mill products – 
5%.  
In machine building leading sub-sectors include production of equipment for the food industry, 
agriculture and construction (especially tractors, excavators), auto plants (cars, buses and trucks), 
electronic equipment, air plants, and space equipment. Ukraine’s machinery managed to maintain 
highly competitive production in some sectors: for instance most of the equipment for the Sea 
Launch project is produced in Ukraine.   
Ukraine is quite an open economy and role of the foreign trade sector is extremely important. 
The regional distribution of Ukraine’s foreign trade in goods is roughly the same for exports and 
for imports. Russia remains a strategic partner for Ukraine and accounts for more than 20% of 
both, exports and imports. European Union continuously reinforces its importance in Ukraine’s 
foreign trade. Exports to the EU accounted for 17% of total Ukraine’s exports in 2008, while 
imports from the EU constituted 26%. Asian countries are important market for Ukrainian 
metallurgy. This region amounted to roughly 15% of both, exports and imports. Trade with ex-
USSR countries, other than Russia made around 10% of exports and imports.  
Goods structure of Ukraine’s exports is skewed to primary goods (see Figure 4.2). A major item 
of exports are steel products, which accounted for more than 40% of total exports of goods in 
2008. The next largest group is machinery and equipment (16%), food (16%), fuel and energy 
products (10%) and chemicals (almost 8%).  
Figure 4.2. Commodity Composition of Ukraine’s Exports of Goods, 2008  
Food
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Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit 
In imports, energy resources accounted for around one third of total imports (see Figure 4.3.). It is 
worth noting that although dependence on imported energy is still high, it has gradually been 
reducing; for example in 1996 energy imports accounted for half of all imports of goods. 
Machinery and equipment made another third of total imports. Food industry as well as chemicals 
are also important items of imports.  
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Figure 4.3. Commodity Composition of Ukraine’s Imports of Goods, 2008  
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Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit 
Volume of trade in services is significantly lower than that of trade in goods: turnover of services 
is roughly 5 times less than turnover of goods. Ukraine is conveniently situated in the centre of 
Europe, which creates opportunities for the transport sector: three quarters of total exports of 
services is transportation. More than one third of total exports of services is a pipeline transit of 
energy products between Russia and Turkmenistan and Western Europe. Rail and sea transport 
account for around 10% each. Imports of services are quite diverse; tourism is the biggest sector, 
accounting for 15% of total imports of services.       
Concerning sectors, which received the most FDI inflow, the major was banking sector, around 
20% of total FDI in 2008. This figure should be taken with caution, since it is connected to the 
sale of several large banks to foreign investors. For instance, in 2005, metallurgy received one 
third of total FDI. It was due to privatisation of the Krivorozhstal steel plant and resulting USD 
4.8 bn FDI inflow. On the contrary, trade and production of food are stable recipients of the FDI 
over many years.  
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Figure 4.4. FDI in Ukraine by sectors, 2008  
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Source: National Bank of Ukraine 
In 2008, the countries which invested the most to Ukraine were Cyprus (21% of total FDI), 
Germany (18%), and the Netherlands (9%). It is worth mentioning that such regions as Cyprus 
and Virgin Islands are off-shore zones, and this capital should probably not be counted as 
“foreign” but rather as a repatriated domestic one.     
Figure 4.5. FDI in Ukraine by country, 2008  
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Source: National Bank of Ukraine 
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4.2. Algebraic Formulation of the Model 
This section outlines the basic structure of the CGE model in algebraic formulation. Full list of 
variables is given in appendix in Table A.4.  
 
Production 
Producers maximise their profits subject to the technology available and taking prices as given, 
acting in perfectly competitive conditions. Equation (4.1) shows this profit-maximisation task as 
maximising the difference between revenues from activities (net of taxes) and costs of 
intermediate inputs and primary factors.    
Profit-maximisation: 
 
i
iiiiji TRIDLKIOQD                           (4.1) 
where 
iQD    gross domestic output 
iIO    intermediate commodity demand 
iK    capital demand 
iL    labour demand 
iTRID    taxes on commodities 
The production technology tree has several levels, presented in Figure 4.6.  
At the top producers choose the optimal bundle between value added and aggregate intermediate 
inputs, which is modelled by the Leontief function. In this case the level of value added and 
intermediate inputs are defined by equations (4.2) and (4.3) correspondingly.  
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Figure 4.6. Production and Allocation Tree 
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Leontief technology: demand for aggregate value-added 
iii QDbVA                           (4.2) 
where 
iVA   value added demand 
ib   share coefficient of value added in output 
Leontief technology: demand for aggregate intermediate input  
iii QDbIO  )1(                                    (4.3) 
where 
)1( ib   share coefficient of intermediates in output 
At the next level of the production tree, further disaggregation of demand inside value added and 
intermediate inputs branches are defined. 
For each activity the quantity of value-added is a CES function of disaggregated factors, as shown 
in equation (4.4).  
CES technology, demand for aggregated value added, exponent 
F
i
F
i
F
i
i
F
ii
F
i
F
ii LKQD
  /1))1((                                     (4.4) 
where 
F
i   CES efficiency parameter in the production function of firms 
F
i   CES share parameter in the production function of firms 
F
i    CES function exponent 
 
The optimal mix of value added factors is determined by their relative prices, also known as 
tangency condition (equation (4.5)). 
Tangency condition, exponent 
PL
PK
L
K
F
i
i
i
F
i
F
i 







 )1(
1



                          (4.5) 
where 
PK   return to capital 
PL    return to labour 
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The CES function exponent 
F
i  is the transformed elasticity of substitution between different 
factors: 
F
i
F
i




1
1
. The higher the elasticity of substitution, the smaller the value of the 
exponent and the larger the necessary shift between demand for different factors in response to 
their price change. Using the expression for elasticity of substitution of the CES production 
function, equations (4.4) and (4.5) may be rewritten as follows: 
CES technology, demand for aggregated value added, elasticity of substitution 
)1/(/)1(/)1(
))1((
F
i
F
i
F
i
F
i
F
i
F
i
i
F
ii
F
i
F
ii LKQD
                                   (4.6) 
where 
F
i   CES capital-labour substitution elasticities  
Tangency condition, elasticity of substitution 
PL
PK
L
K
F
i
i
i
F
i
F
i 







 


/1
1
                                    (4.7) 
Finally, demand equations for capital and labour take the following form: 
Capital demand 
)/()1(
)1/(
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F
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
               (4.8) 
Labour demand 
)/()1()1(
)1/(
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ii QDPLPKPLL
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F
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

 




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

         (4.9) 
Demand for disaggregated intermediate inputs is defined by the Leontief function as a product of 
intermediate input use and the fixed intermediate input coefficient (equation (4.10)). 
Leontief technology: demand for intermediate input  
jijij QDioQD                               (4.10) 
where 
ijio   technical coefficients 
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Calibration 
First, using equation (4.2), it is possible to calibrate ib , the fixed coefficient of value added in 
output: 
Fixed coefficient of value added 
i
i
i
QD
VA
b                                        (4.11) 
In a similar manner, input-output coefficients are defined using equation (5.10) 
Input-output coefficients 
j
ij
ij
QD
QD
io                             (4.12) 
It is necessary to determine values of 
F
i , 
F
i  and 
F
i in order to proceed with the CES function. 
Elasticity of substitution 
F
i  is assumed to be known and will be used for calibration of 
F
i  and 
F
i . From the tangency condition, equation (4.7), it is possible to derive the CES share parameter 
in the production function of firms:  
CES share parameter 
F
i
i
i
F
i
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K
PK
PL
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
/1
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1
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






                                     (4.13) 
Having values of 
F
i and 
F
i  , 
F
i  is calibrated using equation (4.6) 
CES efficiency parameter 
)1/(/)1(/)1(
))1(/(
F
i
F
i
F
i
F
i
F
i
F
i
i
F
ii
F
ii
F
i LKQD
                       (4.14) 
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External Sector 
 
Exports 
Firms allocate their output to domestic and foreign markets and try to maximise revenues, this is 
represented by equation (4.15).  
Maximisation of revenues 
 
r
iririi EPEQDPD                       (4.15) 
where 
iPD    domestic producer price of commodities in sector i  
irE    exports 
irPE     export price of commodities in sector i  delivered to region r in national currency 
The optimal distribution between domestic and foreign markets is defined through the Constant 
Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function, presented in equation (4.16).  
Output transformation (CET) function 
  TiTiTi iTiiTiTii QDDEQD  
1
)1(                                  (4.16) 
where 
irQDD   domestic output delivered to home market 
T
i    CET share parameter regarding destination of domestic output 
T
i   shift parameter in the CET function of firm 
T
i    a CET function exponent 
Here 
T
i  is transformed elasticity of transformation. The latter is defined as in equation (4.17). 
The CET function repeats the CES function, except for the signs at function exponent 
T
i .   
Elasticity of transformation in the CET function 
T
i
T
i




1
1
                                                                      (4.17) 
where 
T
i   elasticities of transformation in CET function 
The optimal mix between domestic sales and exports is defined by the ratio of corresponding 
prices at equation (4.18). The export price is defined in equation (4.19).  
   
 81 
Export-domestic supply ratio 
1
1
1 





 

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i
T
i
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i
i
i
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PDD
PE
QDD
E 


                    (4.18) 
where 
iPDD    price of domestic output delivered to home market 
Export price 
ERPWEPE irir                         (4.19) 
where 
irPWE   world export price 
ER   exchange rate 
Equation (4.20), also known as the zero profit CET function equation, specifies the quantity of 
domestic output as sold on the domestic market and abroad and allows the solving of the producer 
maximisation problem, given export and domestic prices and subject to the CET function and 
fixed quantity of domestic output. 
Zero profit CET 
 
r
iiiririi QDDPDDEPEQDPD                      (4.20) 
Thus, domestic sales and exports are defined by equations (4.21) and (4.22) respectively. 
Domestic sales                                        
)/()1()1(
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                                                                                                                                           (4.21)  
Exports                                                  
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           (4.22) 
The destination of exports is differentiated by regions and represented by the CES function: 
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Exports by region 
T
iT
i
r
iri EE


1



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
                        (4.23) 
 
Imports 
According to Armington’s assumption, imports and domestic output are not perfect substitutes 
and both enter the production of certain commodities as inputs. Producers try to minimise costs 
by combining domestic and imported inputs 
Minimisation of costs 
irir
r
ii MPMQDDPDD                                     (4.24) 
where 
irM    imports of commodities to sector i  from region r  
irPM   import price of commodities in sector i  delivered from region r in national currency 
Equation (4.25) presents the Armington function of producing a commodity using domestic and 
imported inputs, while equation (4.26) shows the ratio of domestic and imported goods. The price 
of imports is defined in equation (4.27).   
Composite supply (Armington) function 
  AiAiAi iAiiAiAii QDDMQ  
1
)1(


                   (4.25) 
where 
A
i  Armington share parameter in the production function of commodities 
A
i   Armington efficiency parameter in the production function of commodities 
A
i   Armington function exponent 
iQ  domestic sales composite commodity 
Import-domestic demand ratio 
A
i
A
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
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
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                            (4.26) 
Import price 
ERtmPWMPM iririr  )1(                                             (4.27) 
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where 
irPWM   world import price 
irtm   tariff rate on imports 
Here 
A
i  is an Armington function exponent, while elasticity of substitution is given by 
following equation: 
Elasticity of substitution in the Armington function 
A
i
A
i




1
1
                                (4.28) 
where 
A
i   Armington substitution elasticities 
 
Total absorption, or zero profit Armington function equation (4.29), is given as the sum of 
domestic sales of goods and imported commodities and. 
Zero profit Armington 
 
r
iiiririi QDDPDDMPMQP                            (4.29) 
These equations allow the solving of the cost minimisation problem of producers given domestic 
and imports prices and subject to the Armington function and fixed quantity of the composite 
commodity. 
Domestic sales and imports are defined as follows: 
Domestic sales                          
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(4.30) 
Imports                        
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Sources of import are also differentiated by regions shown by the following CES function: 
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Imports by region 
T
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r
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                                   (4.32) 
Finally, trade balance is represented by equation (4.33). 
Trade Balance 
ERFRERTRFGERTRFHERSFPWEEPWMM
ir ir
iriririr           (4.33) 
where 
SF    foreign savings 
TRFH   foreign transfers to household in foreign currency 
TRFG   foreign transfers to government in foreign currency 
FR    foreign remittances in foreign currency 
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Calibration 
Calibration for CET and Armington functions is done in a manner similar to that for the CES 
function.  
First, if estimates for elasticity of transformation 
T
i  in CET function are given, it is possible to 
determine 
T
i , the CET share parameter regarding destination of domestic output and 
T
i , the 
shift parameter in the CET function of firm. 
Using equation (4.17), it is necessary to substitute elasticity of transformation, 
T
i  for 
T
i  and 
solve equation (4.18) to find the CET share parameter:  
 CET share parameter 
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                                    (4.34) 
Then the known parameter should be plugged into equation (4.22) to find the shift parameter. 
CET shift parameter 
)1/(/)1(/)1(
))1(/(
T
ir
T
ir
T
ir
T
ir
T
ir
T
ir
i
T
irir
A
iri
T
ir QDDEQD
                                   (4.35) 
Calibration for the Armington function is quite the same. Substituting elasticity of substitution for 
the exponent in equation (4.26) allows the finding of the Armington share parameter. 
Armington share parameter 
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Using equation (4.31), the Armington Function shift parameter is found 
Armington shift parameter 
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Households 
Each household maximises a “Stone-Geary” utility function, namely maximising consumption of 
commodities above their minimal subsistence consumption:   
Households’ Stone-Geary utility function 
HLES
iH
ii
i
H CU
 )(                                        (4.38) 
where 
HU    utility level of households 
iC    consumer demand for commodities 
HLES
i   power in nested LES household utility function  
H
i   subsistence household consumption level 
The maximisation task is subject to expenditure constraints. Equation (4.39) shows that 
consumption spending for households is the income net of savings and taxes. 
Subject to: 
Household consumption expenditures 
SHTRYYCE                                                                                   (4.39) 
where 
CE    consumer expenditures 
Y    household income 
TRY    income tax revenues 
SH    household savings 
Spending on individual commodities is a Linear Expenditure System (LES) since it is a linear 
function of total household consumption expenditure. 
Household LES (linear expenditure system) function 






 
i
HLES
ii
HLES
i
HLES
iiii PCEPCP                    (4.40) 
where 
iP    price of composite commodities in sector i  
Next, a more detailed description of income, taxes, savings and unemployment is given. 
Households’ income is equal to revenues from capital, labour, transfers from government and 
from abroad as well as foreign remittances.  
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Income 
ERFRERTRFHTRGHUNEMPLSPLKSPKY  )(                           (4.41) 
where 
KS   capital supply 
LS   labour supply 
UNEMP   involuntary unemployment 
TRGH   transfers from government to households 
Savings are determined by marginal propensity to save as a fraction of disposable income. 
Savings 
)( YtyYmpsSH                                (4.42) 
where 
mps   household’s marginal propensity to save 
ty   tax rate on income 
Consumer Price Index is defined as follows: 
CPI 





i
ii
i
i
t
i
t
CPD
CPD
CPI
00
0
                                             (4.43) 
where 
CPI   consumer price index 
0
iPD   “benchmark” domestic producer price of commodities 
t
iPD            domestic producer price of commodities after change 
0
iC    “benchmark” consumer demand for commodities 
In order to make unemployment endogenous, a Phillips curve is employed which shows the 
relationship between the rate of change in real wage rate and the rate of change in unemployment 
rate. 
The real wage rate is defined as follows: 
00 /CPIPL    real wage in the benchmark 
tt CPIPL /    real wage after the shock 
While unemployment rate is: 
tt LSUNEMP /   unemployment rate in the benchmark 
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00 / LSUNEMP   unemployment rate after the shock 
Then, the Phillips curve equation takes following form: 
Unemployment 


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                        (4.44) 
where 
phillips  Phillips parameter 
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Calibration 
First, 
HLES
i , power in the nested LES household utility function should be calibrated. 
Assuming that estimates for income elasticity are known, it is possible to derive 
HLES
i  from 
equation (4.40). Dividing it by price iP , : 
Consumption 
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1
                    (4.45) 
Next, income elasticity is equal to: 
Income elasticity 
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where 
Y
i   income elasticity of demand for commodity 
From this equation 
HLES
i  can be defined: 
Power in LES household utility function 
CECP ii
Y
i
HLES
i /                                                                                                   (4.47) 
In order to calibrate the subsistence household consumption level it is necessary to refer to a 
concept of marginal utility of expenditure.  
One of the first-order conditions in maximizing the Stone-Geary utility function takes the 
following form: 
First-order condition 
i
HLESHH
ii
HLES
i PUC 
  1)(                                                                               (4.48) 
where 
HLES   Lagrange multiplier 
The Lagrange multiplier in this equation can be transformed into marginal utility of expenditure 
by substituting equation (4.45) into equation (4.48) and solving for 
HLES :  
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Marginal utility of expenditure 
 
i
HLES
ii
HHLES PDYU 1)(                                                                      (4.49) 
where 
HLES   marginal utility of household expenditures 
From equation (4.49) the Frisch parameter is derived, which is expenditure elasticity of the 
marginal utility of expenditure. 
Frisch parameter 
 




i
i
HLES
i
HLES
HLES
PY
YY
Y )( 

                                                                         (4.50) 
where 
   Frisch parameter in nested HLES utility function 
If the value of the Frisch parameter is known, it is possible to calibrate the subsistence household 
consumption level. 
Subsistence household consumption level 
)/(   i
HLES
ii
HLES
i PCEC                                                                                     (4.51) 
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Investment 
Investment is modelled through the representative financial institution agent, which maximises a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
Cobb-Douglas utility function of representative banks 

i
i
I
I
iIU

                         (4.52) 
where 
IU    utility level of financial institutions 
iI    investment demand for commodities 
I
i   Cobb-Douglas power in investment institution utility function 
It is constrained by total savings equal to the sum of household, government and foreign savings. 
Subject to 
ERSFSGSHS                                                                                                        (4.53) 
where 
S    total savings 
SG    government savings 
Maximising the utility function, the demand equation for investment commodities is obtained. 
This equation says that investment demand is a fixed fraction of total savings. 
Demand equation for investment commodities 
SIP Iiii                                                                                                                   (4.54) 
Calibration 
To calibrate the Cobb-Douglas power in an investment institution utility function, equation (4.54) 
should be inverted. 
Cobb-Douglas power in investment institution utility function 
SIP ii
I
i /                                                                                             (4.55)
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Government 
Government consumption demand is similar to investment demand: it is defined through the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function.  
Government Cobb-Douglas utility function 

i
i
G
G
iGU

                           (4.56) 
where 
GU    utility level of government 
iG    public demand for commodities 
G
i   Cobb-Douglas power in government utility function 
 Subject to 
SGTRGHGOVR                                                                   (4.57) 
where 
GOVR   government revenues 
By maximising the utility function, government demand for commodities is derived, given in 
equation (4.58). 
Government demand for commodities 
)( SGTRGHGOVRGP Giii                              (4.58) 
Government revenue is a sum of households’ income tax, indirect tax on commodities, import 
tariff revenues, capital revenues of the government as well as transfers from abroad. 
Government revenues                     
  
i ir
iriririii ERTRFGKRGERPWMMtmQDPDtidYtyGOVR   (4.59) 
where 
itid   indirect tax rate 
KRG    government capital revenues 
Government balance has government revenues on one side and government expenditure on 
commodities, transfers to households and government savings on the other. Government savings 
may be negative. 
Government balance 
 
i
ii SGTRGHGPGOVR                                                                                  (4.60) 
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Calibration 
To calibrate Cobb-Douglas power in the government utility function, equation (4.58) should be 
solved for 
G
i . 
)/( SGTRGHGOVRGP ii
G
i                                                                               (4.61) 
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Market Clearance 
Next, the market clearance equations are summarised. First two equations impose equality 
between the total quantity demanded and supplied for capital and labour net of unemployment. 
Factor market balance 
Labour 
 
i
i UNEMPLSL                                  (4.62) 
Capital 
 
i
i KSK                                                                                                                       (4.63) 
Equation (4.64) imposes equality between commodity supplied and demanded. Quantity supplied 
(left-hand side) is equal to intermediate demand, household, government and investment 
consumption (right-hand side).  
Composite commodity market balance 
 
i
iijiiii QDioGICQ                                                          (4.64) 
The current account balance (equation (4.65)) imposes a balance on inflow and spending of 
foreign currency. Import spending is equal to export revenue, foreign savings, transfers from the 
rest of the world to households and government and foreign remittances.  
Current account balance for ROW                                                             
ERFRERTRFGERTRFHERSFPWEEPWMM
ir ir
iriririr           (4.65) 
Government balance has government revenues on the left-hand side and government 
commodities expenditures, transfers to households and savings on the right.  
Government balance 
 
i
ii SGTRGHGPGOVR                            (4.66) 
The next equation balances savings and investment in the economy. Savings are equal to non-
government savings, government savings and foreign savings. Investment is a sum of fixed 
investment over different production sectors. 
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Saving-investment balance 
 
i
ii ERSFSGSHIP                                                        (4.67) 
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Welfare  
Welfare change caused by economic shock is calculated through two monetary measures: 
Equivalent Variation (EV) and Compensating Variation (CV). Equivalent variation measures the 
income change in current prices (i.e. before the economic shock takes place) that would be 
equivalent to the income after the economic shock. The compensating variation measures the 
income change in prices after the economic shock that would be necessary to compensate to the 
consumer for the price change.  
There is a distinction between cases of “benchmark equilibrium” and equilibrium after change. In 
the first case the consumer faces income 
0Y  and prices 0iPD . In the second case, income and 
prices are 
tY  and tiPD  respectively. 
Then, price indices for these two cases and change in price level will take following form: 
“Benchmark equilibrium” price index 

i
i
HLES
i
PDPLES
00
                                  (4.68) 
Price index after change 

i
t
i
t
HLES
i
PDPLES

                                                                                                          (4.69) 
Change in price level  
0PLES
PLES
PLES
t
                             (4.70) 
In the equations above 
0PLES   and tPLES are the geometric average of the prices of the 
commodities. 
Next, the supernumerary income should be defined, i.e. income net of subsistence households’ 
consumption level for the “benchmark equilibrium case (
0SI ) and the case after changes take 
place (
tSI ).   
“Benchmark equilibrium” supernumerary income 
 
i
H
iiPDYSI 
000
                                       (4.71) 
Supernumerary income after change 
 
i
H
i
t
i
tt PDYSI                          (4.72) 
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Finally, it is possible to determine the measures of change in welfare 
The equivalent variation is the difference between the supernumerary income after the change has 
been deflated by the change in price level and the supernumerary income of the “benchmark 
equilibrium”.  
Equivalent variation 
0SI
PLES
SI
EV
t


                                          (4.73) 
The compensating variation is the difference between the supernumerary income after the change 
and the supernumerary income of the “benchmark equilibrium” multiplied by the change in the 
price level. 
Compensating variation 
PLESSISICV t  0                             (4.74) 
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4.3. Data, Key Assumptions and Scenarios 
 
Data 
The basis for the model is the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Ukraine. SAM is a composite 
of the Input-Output table and National Accounts for 2002. The Input-Output table gives 
disaggregation into 38 sectors of the economy (the full list is in the attached table A.5.). Foreign 
trade is disaggregated into 5 trade regions; mechanism of division is described below. Table A.6. 
shows the Social Accounting Matrix for Ukraine which is used in the model, but aggregated to 3 
sectors and one foreign trade region.  
In order to explain meaning of entries, a description of those entries is given by the row (income) 
basis
4
:  
Production 
Commodities-Commodities: Intermediate demand 
Commodities-Households: Households consumption 
Commodities-Government: Government consumption 
Commodities-Investment: Investment demand 
Commodities-ROW: Exports. Total exports are disaggregated into exports to five trade regions: 
Russia, rest of CIS, EU25, Asia and Rest of the World. This is done by calculating the export 
shares of corresponding regions and multiplying total exports by these shares. 
Factors of production 
Capital-Commodities: Valued added of capital   
Labour-Commodities: Value added of labour 
Labour-ROW: Foreign remittances of Ukrainian workers, employed abroad 
Institutions  
Households-Capital: Income received by households from owning capital  
Households-Labour: Income of households from wages 
Households-Government: Transfers to households from government  
Households-ROW: Transfers to households from abroad 
                                                          
4
 Sometimes production is divided into activities and commodities, since one activity can produce several 
commodities. This is not the case for Ukrainian data and production entries will be denoted as 
“Commodities”.  
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Government-Commodities: Taxes on production and imports. These taxes are calculated in three 
steps: first, taxes on production and imports are summed with subsidies, given to corresponding 
industries (subsidies have a negative sign). Second, import taxes are calculated by multiplication 
of applied import tax rates by value of imports, sector by sector. Import tax rates are taken from 
the “Law on Custom Tariffs of Ukraine”. Third, taxes on production are determined by 
subtracting import taxes from total taxes on production and imports.  
Government-Capital: Income from state enterprises 
Government-Households: Income tax received from households. Income tax rate is found by 
dividing the amount of income tax receipts by the income of households   
Government-ROW: Transfers to government from abroad 
Savings-Households: Savings of households 
Savings-Government: Savings of government 
Savings-ROW: Current Account balance 
ROW 
ROW-Commodities: Imports. As well as exports, imports are disaggregated into imports to five 
trade regions: Russia, rest of CIS, EU25, Asia and Rest of the World. This is done by calculating 
the import shares of corresponding regions and multiplying total imports by these shares. 
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Assumptions 
Key assumptions of the model are as follows: 
 The model is static and uses data for one year only (2002) 
 There are Constant Returns to Scale in production structure 
 It is assumed that WTO accession should not have an explicit impact on the Current 
Account: for instance, a larger amount of imports/exports should be compensated by a 
corresponding increase in exports/imports. Thus, the Current Account is fixed, and the 
exchange rate fluctuates instead to balance foreign trade. 
 Since in CGE models all prices are relative, the initial wage rate is used as numeraire and 
other prices change relative to this variable.   
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Scenarios 
There are four scenarios simulated in the model; scenarios 2, 3 and 4 have 3 sub-scenarios each 
with different export expansion and investment growth rates.  
 Scenario 1. Tariff reform according to schedule, agreed with the WTO 
This is done by lowering import tariffs to the level negotiated with the WTO members. The 
Ukrainian proposal for import tariffs is outlined in Decree #255/96 of the President of Ukraine 
“About the Conception of Transformation of the Custom Tariff of Ukraine for 1996-2005 
According to the GATT/WTO”.   
Ukraine has a Free Trade Agreement with CIS countries, which will remain after WTO accession 
as well, thus there are no changes in the trade regime with these countries. Ukraine applies MFN 
and full tariffs for other trade partners. Since full tariffs affect only 3% of imports, EU25, Asia 
and ROW are all assumed to have an MFN regime. Post-WTO import tariffs for EU25, Asian and 
ROW countries are shown in the last column of Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2. Ukraine’s Import Tariffs Prior and Post WTO Accession, % 
  Russia  CIS EU25 Asia  ROW Post-WTO 
Agriculture 0 0 26.7 26.7 26.7 19.4 
Forestry 0 0 8.1 8.1 8.1 4.9 
Fishery 0 0 21.2 21.2 21.2 10.0 
Coal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hydrocarbons 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non-energy materials 0 0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Food-processing 0 0 50.5 50.5 50.5 18.9 
Textile 0 0 8.2 8.2 8.2 4.0 
Wood working 0 0 8.1 8.1 8.1 4.9 
Coke products 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Petroleum refinement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chemicals 0 0 7.9 7.9 7.9 5.8 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
0 0 11.1 11.1 11.1 10.0 
Metallurgy 0 0 3.8 3.8 3.8 1.5 
Machinery 0 0 7.3 7.3 7.3 3.5 
Other 0 0 9.8 9.8 9.8 8.5 
Source: WTO 
 Scenario 2. Improvement of export access 
Being a WTO member, Ukraine will have instruments to curb antidumping and countervailing 
investigations, thus it will be able to increase its volume of exports. Figures for market access 
expansion are chosen in accordance with the frequency of AD and CV investigations in 
corresponding industry and region, reported by the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. Thus, 
between 1997 and 2001 there were 5 AD cases from the Russian side concerning the food-
processing industry and 2 cases relating to the machine building sector; 7 cases were filed by the 
EU in relation to chemical products; 5 and 7 investigations regarding metallurgy started by EU 
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and Asia region respectively. Besides that, Ukraine faced quotas on exports of light industry 
products to the EU.  
Core, least favourable and optimistic sub-scenarios respectively propose the following export 
expansion rates:  
By 5% (3% and 7%) for food processing to Russia 
By 5% (3% and 7%) for light industry to EU25 region 
By 5% (3% and 7%) for chemicals to EU25  
By 5% (3% and 7%) for metallurgy to EU25 and Asia 
By 5% (3% and 7%) for machinery to Russia 
 Scenario 3. Improvement of investment climate 
This will come from two main sources: first of all, investors will face fewer risks and costs of 
investment, since Ukraine will accept more pro-market regulation. Second, the cost of capital will 
diminish along with lower prices for imports.   
Annual 3% growth of investment for the core sub-scenario, 1% for least favourable sub-scenario 
and 5% for an optimistic one during 5 years is assumed. This is modelled through the recursive 
dynamics method: after calculating the first increase in investment and finding new equilibrium 
changes in the next period are calculated on the basis of this new equilibrium and so on.    
 Scenario 4. Combined effect 
This scenario includes decrease of import tariffs, improvement of exports access and 
improvement of investment climate. The three sub-scenarios have the following combination of 
growth rates: 5% export expansion and 3% yearly investment growth in the core sub-scenario 
case, 3% export expansion and 1% yearly investment growth in the least favourable case and 7% 
export expansion and 5% yearly investment growth in the optimistic sub-scenario option. 
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Chapter 5 
Results of the Model 
Table 5.1 presents the results of simulating four scenarios with the core development assumption 
on key macroeconomic variables
5
. As can be seen, the results for simulating tariff reform and the 
improvement of export access do increase foreign trade, but there are no dramatic changes in 
output and household consumption. Scenario 3, improvement in investment climate, is the most 
favourable and brings significant gains for households. The combined scenario mixes the results 
of the previous three policy simulations.       
Table 5.1. Results of the Model, Key Macro Variables, % change from benchmark  
  Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 Scenario4 
  Tariff reform 
Improvement of 
export access 
Increase of 
investment Combined 
Welfare, % of GDP 0.17 0.09 2.01 1.83 
Welfare, % of consumption 0.82 0.43 9.57 8.77 
Gross domestic production 0.55 1.20 6.11 6.57 
Consumer demand 0.50 0.23 5.33 4.86 
Investment demand 2.48 2.01 2.47 4.11 
Government demand -5.62 0.29 3.72 0.17 
Exports demand 2.82 4.95 3.40 5.63 
Imports demand 3.06 5.38 3.69 6.12 
Unemployment -0.34 -0.12 -4.88 -3.60 
Real wage 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 
A detailed analysis of policy simulations is given below.  
The results of the model can be interpreted with the help of the graphical illustration developed 
by Devarajan et al. (1994).  
Figure 5.1 presents a stylized economy with one representative producer and consumer and three 
types of goods: produced locally and supplied domestically (
SD ), exports ( E ) and imports 
( M ).  
Quadrant I shows the balance of trade. Under a simplifying assumption, prices of imports and 
exports are equal to one, so the slope of balance of trade constraint is a straight line going through 
the origin under 45
0
. Quadrant II represents consumption with choice between domestically 
produced and consumed goods (
DD ) and imports ( M ). It shows the consumption possibility 
frontier as well as relative import and domestic prices and indifference curve. As a result of 
balanced trade and equal world prices, the consumption possibility frontier is a mirror image of 
production possibility frontier, depicted at Quadrant IV. The production quadrant includes the 
production transformation curve and line depicting relative domestic and foreign prices, and 
                                                          
5
 Scenarios 1 and 2 show that GDP and household consumption fluctuate very slightly. CGE models show 
general directions of changes and numbers should not be taken too literally. Thus, further analysis will 
assume “no change” as the most likely outcome, although what happens if alterations do take place will 
also be shown.       
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shows division of total domestic production to domestic sales (
SD ) and exports ( E ). Finally, 
Quadrant III presents the domestic market and balance between goods supplied (
SD ) and 
demanded (
DD ) at the domestic market. The dotted square shows the balance on all markets. 
Figure 5.1. Benchmark State of Economy  
 
I Balance of Trade 
0P  
0C  
E  
M  
DD  
SD  
III Domestic Market 
II Consumption 
IV Production 
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Scenario 1. Import tariff reform 
In this scenario Ukraine faces lower import tariffs, thus prices of imports become lower and the 
volume of imported goods increases. The model predicts that imports will grow by approximately 
3%. In order to balance increased imports, exports rise as well and demonstrate 2.8% growth. 
Domestic production and household consumption do not change significantly: the model predicts 
GDP growth of 0.55%, and consumption increases by virtually the same amount. Thus, without 
dramatic changes in production and consumption but quite a considerable increase in foreign 
trade, Ukraine’s economy merely becomes more open and shifts towards the external sector. 
Producers will supply more of their goods to foreign markets and less to the domestic one, whilst 
households will shift to the consumption of imported products at the expense of local ones.  
Table 5.2. Results of the Model, Scenario 1; % change from benchmark 
Key Macro Variables Breakdown by Sectors 
    Output Exports Imports 
Welfare, % of GDP 0.17 Agriculture -0.19 3.19 9.46 
Welfare, % of consumption 0.82 Coal mining 2.33 3.70 1.66 
Gross domestic production 0.55 Food-processing -0.62 3.24 40.38 
Consumer demand 0.50 Textile and leather 1.29 2.77 5.76 
Investment demand 2.48 Chemical industry 0.02 1.90 1.30 
Government demand -5.62 Metallurgy 2.74 3.09 4.15 
Exports demand 2.82 Machinery 1.01 2.99 4.80 
Imports demand 3.06 Construction 2.63 3.90 2.00 
Unemployment -0.34 Transport 0.73 3.06 -1.05 
Real wage 0.00 
Post and 
telecommunications -0.61 3.03 -2.44 
  Financial 
intermediation 5.70 5.89 5.61 
The square which shows market balance shifts up and to the right from benchmark graphically to 
reflect the increase in foreign trade. Under the assumption that there are no considerable changes 
in production and consumption, the square moves along the original production transformation 
curve and consumption possibility frontier. If there is a small increase in production and 
consumption, the corresponding curves (shown by dotted arcs) will shift outwards. The new 
equilibrium is reached at points 
C  for consumption and 
P  for production. From quadrant I, it 
can be seen that more foreign trade is occurring, while quadrant III shows a decline in demand for 
and supply of domestically produced goods.  
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Figure 5.2. Scenario 1 
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The model predicts some increase of household welfare: 0.17% of GDP or 0.8% of consumption. 
This occurs as a result of the rise in consumption and decrease in unemployment.  
From breaking down the results by sectors of economy, it can be seen that sectors with high 
initial protection are likely to suffer from a decrease of import tariffs. It can be agriculture: the 
model shows a small decrease of output by almost 0.2%, and there is a slightly more significant 
decline of 0.6% in food processing. The latter will drastically increase imports by 40%. By 
contrast, other sectors will increase their production: metallurgy is a leader with a 2.7% boost in 
output, followed by coal-mining with 2.3% growth and textile products with a 1.3% output 
increase. On the services side, financial intermediation is expected to gain and expand by 5.7% to 
support greater foreign trade activity. 
Exports will increase fairly uniformly for all trade regions, but imports will grow for regions 
which faced import tariffs previously; namely imports from ROW countries will grow by roughly 
9%, from Asia by 6.5% and EU by almost 6%. At the same time imports from CIS countries will 
show a decrease.  
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Table 5.3. Changes in Foreign Trade by Regions, Scenario 1; % change from benchmark 
Region Exports Imports 
Russia 2.77 -0.98 
CIS 2.93 -1.54 
EU25 2.73 5.98 
Asia 2.94 6.56 
ROW 2.89 8.92 
A sensitivity analysis is done by changing the elasticities of substitution and transformation to 
lower and upper levels, and comparing the values of key variables. The initial values for 
elasticities are taken from the CGE studies of Russia’s accession to the WTO, discussed earlier in 
the text. Key variables which are traced are GDP, exports, imports and welfare. In this scenario, 
the changing substitution elasticity of the Armington function has the highest effect on predicted 
exports and imports.  
Table 5.4. Sensitivity Analyses, Scenario 1 
  
Parameter value 
Variable value, % change 
from benchmark 
Parameter Lower Level Upper Lower Level Upper 
  GDP 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 0.45 0.55 0.65 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 0.51 0.55 0.58 
  Exports 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 2.23 2.82 3.65 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 2.62 2.82 2.97 
  Imports 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 2.42 3.06 3.97 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 2.85 3.06 3.23 
  Welfare, % of consumption 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 0.85 0.82 0.53 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 0.79 0.82 0.82 
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Scenario 2. Improvement of exports access 
In this case, exports enjoy greater access to the foreign markets, and the final effect is almost the 
same as in Scenario 1, but now comes from the exports side, not from imports.  
With better tools to fight antidumping and countervailing investigations, Ukraine will be able to 
increase the exports of some goods. In the case of central sub-scenario, the model shows that total 
exports will grow by 4.95%. Since the trade balance should be restored, imports will increase by 
more than 5%. Again, changes of production and consumption are relatively small, but changes in 
output are larger than in Scenario 1: GDP grows by 1.2%, while consumption expands less, by 
0.2%.  
Thus, as the model shows, it becomes more profitable to export goods compared with selling 
them on the domestic market, and the economy is shifting away from the domestic market to the 
foreign sector.  
Table 5.5. Results of the Model, Scenario 2; % change from benchmark 
  
Improved market 
access, 5% 
Improved market 
access, 3% 
Improved market 
access, 7% 
Welfare, % of GDP 0.09 0.19 0.14 
Welfare, % of consumption 0.43 0.91 0.68 
Gross domestic production 1.20 0.69 1.57 
Consumer demand 0.23 0.39 0.39 
Investment demand 2.01 1.47 3.10 
Government demand 0.29 -0.01 0.17 
Exports demand 4.95 2.99 7.01 
Imports demand 5.38 3.25 7.62 
Unemployment -0.12 -0.34 0.01 
Real wage 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Figure 5.3 illustrates this point. A new equilibrium is found by shifting the balancing square up 
and to the right along the production transformation curve and consumption possibility curve. If 
predicted growth of production and consumption holds true, both curves will move outwards, as 
shown by the dotted arcs. Since output is expected to grow more than in Scenario 1, the 
production transformation curve will shift out more.  Equilibrium consumption and production 
are denoted by points 
C  and P  respectively. 
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Figure 5.3. Scenario 2 
 
The model estimates a small increase in welfare: in the central case it is 0.09% of GDP or 0.4% 
of consumption; this comes from a minor decrease in unemployment and an increase of 
consumption. It is worth noting that sub-scenarios with lower (3%) and higher (7%) improvement 
in export access bring a matching increase in foreign trade (around 3% and 7% respectively), but 
welfare shows a different pattern and in both cases it is higher than in the core sub-scenario. A 
peak increase in welfare happens in the least favourable sub-scenario: by 0.9% of consumption; 
in the optimistic sub-scenario it is almost 0.7%. One possible explanation is that when exports do 
not expand so much in the least favourable case, the economy does develop and production 
increases, but there is no considerable shifting to foreign trade. Rather, there is a progress in the 
domestic market and consumption. The optimistic sub-scenario shows a greater increase in both 
output and foreign trade, but increase of consumption is the same as in the least favourable case. 
This, coupled with a small increase in unemployment, brings a lower enlargement of welfare. 
Among the most important sectors of the Ukrainian economy, only transport and 
telecommunications show a decline in production: in the central case there is a 1.8% and 3.6% 
decrease respectively. Metallurgy gains the most from better market access, and increases 
production by 5%. Textiles and chemicals expand by 4.8% and 4.6% respectively. Amid the 
service sectors, financial intermediation will grow the most: by nearly 9.5%. The least favourable 
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and optimistic sub-scenarios mirror core one from two sides, and show respectively a lower and 
higher increase of output and trade. 
Table 5.6. Results of the Model, Impact by Sectors, Scenario 2; % change from benchmark 
  
Improved market access, 
5% 
Improved market access, 
3% 
Improved market access, 
7% 
  Output Exports Imports Output Exports Imports Output Exports Imports 
Agriculture 1.12 4.65 -0.75 0.46 2.86 -0.83 0.48 6.41 -2.60 
Coal mining 2.12 4.48 0.98 1.56 2.86 0.92 4.02 6.73 2.71 
Food-processing 1.29 5.08 -0.72 0.38 3.06 -1.06 1.74 7.12 -1.09 
Textile and leather 4.82 5.02 4.64 2.71 3.04 2.43 6.46 7.08 5.92 
Chemical industry 4.60 5.02 4.27 2.98 3.00 2.97 7.03 7.00 7.05 
Metallurgy 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
Machinery 3.50 5.11 2.41 1.77 3.09 0.87 4.99 7.14 3.54 
Construction 1.00 5.01 -0.94 0.86 3.23 -0.30 1.39 7.25 -1.42 
Transport -1.75 3.18 -5.46 -0.91 2.21 -3.28 -2.32 5.53 -8.11 
Post and 
telecommunications -3.63 1.41 -6.12 -2.56 0.74 -4.22 -3.77 3.32 -7.22 
Financial 
intermediation 9.43 9.58 9.36 5.28 5.43 5.21 14.30 13.44 14.74 
Exports to key trade regions are expanding close to the modelled exogenous increase rate. On the 
imports side, Ukraine will be trading relatively more with Rest of the World group of countries 
(8% imports increase in the central case) and EU25 (6% increase).  
Table 5.7. Changes in Foreign Trade by Regions, Scenario 2, % change from benchmark 
  
Improves market 
access, 5% 
Improved market 
access, 3% 
Improved market 
access, 7% 
  Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Russia 4.43 4.83 2.78 2.73 6.38 5.75 
CIS 5.28 5.02 3.18 2.57 7.35 5.67 
EU25 5.15 5.98 3.04 3.35 7.22 8.05 
Asia 5.03 4.43 3.01 2.46 7.10 5.78 
ROW 5.10 8.16 3.11 6.09 7.26 16.54 
The sensitivity analysis shows that varying substitution and transformation elasticities do not 
change the central values of output, exports and imports very much. By contrast, welfare 
experiences significant swings around its central value of a 0.43% increase: from 0.33% growth 
to 1.69%. This is the result of high reliance of welfare and underlying consumption on whether 
Ukraine shifts to the foreign sector or develops the domestic market.    
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Table 5.8. Sensitivity Analysis, Scenario 2 
  
Parameter value 
Variable value, % change 
from benchmark 
Parameter Lower Level Upper Lower Level Upper 
  GDP 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 1.08 1.20 1.18 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 1.28 1.20 1.12 
  Exports 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 5.03 4.95 4.87 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 4.93 4.95 5.00 
  Imports 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 5.47 5.38 5.29 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 5.36 5.38 5.43 
  Welfare, % of consumption 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 0.98 0.43 1.69 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 0.33 0.43 0.82 
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Scenario 3. Improvement of investment climate 
Foreign investments will increase the productivity of Ukrainian firms and bring better allocation 
of resources. In the central sub-scenario, output increases by a significant 6.1% along with 5.3% 
consumption growth. Exports and imports increase as well, but less than in previous scenarios 
and less than GDP growth: exports grow by 3.4%, imports by 3.7%. Even if a modest 1% 
increase in investment inflow is modelled, predicted output and consumption expansion 
outperform the results of the first two scenarios. In the case of an optimistic assumption about 
investment growth rate, GDP impressively expands by nearly 11% and household consumption 
by 9%.  
Therefore, in this case, the Ukrainian economy develops not so much through foreign trade, but 
through domestic improvement in efficiency.  
Table 5.9. Results of the Model, Scenario 3; % change from benchmark 
  
Increased 
investment, 3% 
growth for 5 
years 
Increased 
investment, 1% 
growth for 5 
years 
Increased 
investment, 5% 
growth for 5 years 
Welfare, % of GDP 2.01 0.69 3.18 
Welfare, % of consumption 9.57 3.25 15.26 
Gross domestic production 6.11 1.95 10.59 
Consumer demand 5.33 1.78 8.83 
Investment demand 2.47 0.72 4.49 
Government demand 3.72 1.16 7.20 
Exports demand 3.40 0.95 6.46 
Imports demand 3.69 1.03 7.02 
Unemployment -4.88 -1.68 -7.60 
Real wage 0.05 0.02 0.08 
As shown in Figure 5.4, there will be upgrading in all four quadrants. Reflecting growth of 
output, household consumption and foreign trade, the balancing square will expand outwards in 
all directions. Since output and consumption are growing by a faster pace than exports and 
imports, quadrant I of the balance of trade will see less expansion than domestic production and 
consumption. There will be an outward movement of the consumption possibility curve from the 
initial point to new equilibrium 
C  and production transformation curve to point 
P (the latter 
will move out further than the former).  
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Figure 5.4. Scenario 3 
 
There is a significant increase in household welfare: 2% of GDP or 9.6% of consumption in the 
central sub-scenario. If the optimistic sub-scenario holds true, welfare can increase by as much as 
15% of consumption. Better allocation of resources and growth of production cause a massive 
decrease of unemployment, by almost 5% in the core sub-scenario and some improvement in real 
wages.  
All sectors of Ukrainian economy enjoy growth of output. Sectors which are commonly feared to 
lose from WTO accession are actually enjoying higher output as a result of investment inflow and 
consequent increased efficiency. These sectors are coal mining, agriculture and food-processing. 
In the central scenario, coal mining wins the most and expands its output by 5.2%. Food-
processing follows with a 5.07% increase of output and agriculture grows by 3.6%. Metallurgy 
and the textile industry are also enlarged by roughly 3%.  
The model points at the vital importance of investment and better allocation of resources for 
agriculture: if a 5% increase of investment inflow is assumed, agriculture becomes a leader of 
growth amid the non-service sectors, showing a 10% increase of output. It is worth noting that it 
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is the only sector to contract exports. Instead, growing domestic output and imports are directed 
at saturation of the Ukrainian market.     
Telecommunications and the financial sector are leaders among services. Financial intermediation 
expands by almost one-third and telecommunications by 13%. Transport also demonstrates 
significant growth rate of 6% to keep up with the enlarged economy.  
Table 5.10. Results of the Model, Impact by Sectors, Scenario 3; % change from 
benchmark 
 
Increased investment, 3% 
growth for 5 years 
Increased investment, 1% 
growth for 5 years 
Increased investment, 5% 
growth for 5 years 
  Output Exports Imports Output Exports Imports Output Exports Imports 
Agriculture 3.60 -3.60 7.71 1.14 -1.52 2.61 10.60 -2.71 18.52 
Coal mining 5.20 5.47 5.06 1.43 1.51 1.40 8.32 9.31 7.83 
Food-processing 5.07 2.17 6.69 1.75 0.59 2.39 7.60 4.64 9.25 
Textile and leather 2.89 2.00 3.69 0.73 0.43 1.01 5.25 3.94 6.43 
Chemical industry 1.33 2.12 0.69 0.03 0.48 -0.33 3.76 4.71 2.99 
Metallurgy 3.02 3.01 3.04 0.89 0.88 0.90 6.08 6.10 6.05 
Machinery 2.47 4.11 1.35 0.09 1.05 -0.57 5.14 7.38 3.62 
Construction 1.19 3.56 0.03 0.26 0.99 -0.10 2.70 6.44 0.87 
Transport 5.97 4.27 7.29 1.82 1.16 2.34 10.77 7.59 13.28 
Post and 
telecommunications 12.92 7.62 15.74 4.51 2.62 5.49 22.38 12.68 27.68 
Financial 
intermediation 27.08 23.46 28.92 7.97 7.38 8.26 47.71 38.90 52.30 
Ukraine is starting to export relatively more to Russia compared with other regions, but imports 
from Russia and other CIS countries are not growing as much as imports from other trade 
partners of Ukraine. Imports from EU25, Asian and ROW countries are growing considerably 
more, compared with Russia and the rest of CIS. This may indicate a more efficient trade 
structure: major items of incoming trade with CIS are energy resources and materials with low 
degree of procession, whilst imports from other regions, first of all from the EU, have a high 
proportion of machinery and other goods, which allows for an increase in productivity.        
Table 5.11. Changes in Foreign Trade by Regions, Scenario 3, % change from benchmark 
  
Increased 
investment, 3% 
growth for 5 years 
Increased 
investment, 1% 
growth for 5 
years 
Increased 
investment, 5% 
growth for 5 
years 
  Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Russia 4.06 2.16 1.16 0.73 7.29 4.89 
CIS 3.16 0.37 0.88 0.15 6.13 2.90 
EU25 3.32 6.85 0.93 2.15 6.36 10.68 
Asia 3.41 5.76 0.95 1.48 6.59 9.66 
ROW 2.84 4.73 0.77 1.06 5.69 8.88 
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Changing elasticities do not significantly affect key variables, except for one case. If the initial 
value of substitution elasticity of the Armington function is increased, exports and imports growth 
rates more than double. 
Table 5.12. Sensitivity Analyses, Scenario 3  
  
Parameter value 
Variable value, % change 
from benchmark 
Parameter Lower Level Upper Lower Level Upper 
  GDP 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 6.01 6.11 7.25 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 6.14 6.11 6.05 
  Exports 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 3.91 3.40 7.50 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 4.06 3.40 4.03 
  Imports 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 4.24 3.69 8.15 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 4.41 3.69 4.37 
  Welfare, % of consumption 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 8.98 9.57 12.67 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 9.30 9.57 9.08 
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Scenario 4. Combined effect 
This scenario embraces all other options, and the model shows that the new equilibrium is a 
mixture of previous ones. GDP is predicted to grow quite considerably: by 6.6% in the core sub-
scenario; ranging from 2.5% in the least favourable to 11.6% in optimistic sub-scenarios. 
Although output grows more, compared with the previous scenario (6.6% against 6.1% in the 
central case), consumption increase is lower: 4.9% versus 5.3% in the preceding scenario. It can 
be explained by the fact that Scenario 4 includes all scenarios with different simulations behind 
them: Scenario 1 models lower import tariffs, hence it stimulates imports (and exports, which 
must balance trade). Scenario 2 has a similar effect, but acts from the exports side. Scenario 3 
mainly increases output and consumption in the domestic market. Thus, in Scenario 4 there is 
growth of output principally as a result of Scenario 3, but there is also growth of foreign trade as a 
result of Scenarios 1 and 2. Hence, there are more incentives to trade with foreign countries, 
compared with domestic sales. The model shows that foreign trade is expanding quite 
considerably: exports are growing by 5.6% and imports by 6.1%.    
Table 5.13. Results of the Model, Scenario 4; % change from benchmark 
 
Improved 
market access 
5%; increased 
investment 3% 
Improved 
market access 
3%; increased 
investment 1% 
Improved market 
access 7%; 
increased 
investment 5% 
Welfare, % of GDP 1.83 0.78 3.66 
Welfare, % of consumption 8.77 3.71 17.53 
Gross domestic production 6.57 2.49 11.60 
Consumer demand 4.86 1.94 9.96 
Investment demand 4.11 2.67 7.08 
Government demand 0.17 -3.80 3.82 
Exports demand 5.63 3.05 7.38 
Imports demand 6.12 3.32 8.02 
Unemployment -3.60 -1.44 -8.16 
Real wage 0.04 0.02 0.08 
 
The solid square in Figure 5.5 shows a new equilibrium. As in the previous case, the new 
equilibrium square expands in all directions, but to a different extent than in Scenario 3. Foreign 
trade sees fairly the same growth as output, so the new equilibrium square is spread quite the 
same to quadrant I and quadrant III. Since output grows by 6.6% and consumption by 4.9%, the 
production possibility curve shifts outwards more than the consumption possibility curve.  
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Figure 5.5. Scenario 4 
 
Welfare of households is also growing to a less extent than in Scenario 3:  by 1.8% of GDP or 
8.8% of consumption. This is explained by a lower level of domestic consumption and a 
relatively less significant drop in unemployment: by 3.6% compared with 4.9% in Scenario 3. 
At sectoral level, the only industry which experiences stagnation (in the central sub-scenario) or 
decline (in the least optimistic sub-scenario) in output is food processing. If the core sub-scenario 
holds true, production of this sector is virtually not changing, or as the model shows is growing 
by 0.09%. The least favourable case predicts a drop of output by slightly more than 1%; although 
the optimistic sub-scenario predicts 3.6% growth. At the same time, this sector is significantly 
increasing imports (around 40% in all sub-scenarios) and it could mean that although the level of 
production is lower, consumers can gain from a larger variety of food products.  
In this scenario, agriculture becomes a leader of output growth among non-services sectors, and 
increases its production by 7.4% in the central sub-scenario. It is worth noting that, although 
exports of agricultural production do not grow substantially in either sub-scenario, imports do 
increase quite considerably, which also can point at a larger utility of households owing to the 
  
  
  
  
 
P   
 
C   
I  Balance of Trade   
0 P   
0 C   
E   
M   
D D   
S D   
I II Domestic  M arket   
II  Consumption   
IV   Production   
   
 119 
diversity of agricultural products available for domestic consumption.  
The textile industry is the second-largest grower, with almost 6% increase of output. Important 
sectors of Ukrainian economy such as the chemical industry and metallurgy grow by a decent 
5.8% and 5% respectively. At the services side, financial intermediation has impressive growth of 
nearly 20%, followed by such service sectors as telecommunications, with 15% expansion, and 
transport, with 8.7% growth. 
Table 5.14. Results of the Model, Impact by Sectors, Scenario 4; % change from 
benchmark 
  
Improved market access 
5%; increased investment 
3% 
Improved market access 
3%; increased investment 
1% 
Improved market access 
7%; increased investment 
5% 
  Output Exports Imports Output Exports Imports Output Exports Imports 
Agriculture 7.35 1.30 23.68 1.18 1.50 12.79 14.49 1.83 36.17 
Coal mining 4.88 7.58 3.59 2.36 4.46 1.34 8.49 11.47 7.06 
Food-processing 0.09 5.11 40.55 -1.12 3.09 39.41 3.59 7.08 46.74 
Textile and leather 5.83 4.89 12.82 2.49 3.07 7.86 7.77 6.89 14.81 
Chemical industry 5.75 4.97 9.42 4.57 2.94 8.95 11.37 6.83 18.45 
Metallurgy 5.00 5.00 6.85 3.00 3.00 4.82 7.00 7.00 8.89 
Machinery 3.81 5.08 8.24 1.55 3.10 5.67 5.51 7.11 9.80 
Construction 2.86 6.54 1.07 2.43 4.26 1.53 5.67 9.07 4.01 
Transport 8.70 6.88 10.13 3.91 3.97 3.86 13.17 8.52 16.86 
Post and 
telecommunications 15.35 10.98 17.66 5.89 6.07 5.80 20.37 11.46 25.22 
Financial 
intermediation 19.73 19.80 19.70 10.22 9.88 10.39 21.07 21.97 20.62 
The direction of trade flows between Ukraine and its partners is predicted to face some 
reorientation. Exports to CIS countries are growing by fairly the same pace as to other trade 
regions. On the other hand, imports from Russia and other CIS countries contract, whilst imports 
from other trade regions expand by between 12.5% and 14.5%. Major expansion is occurring at 
imports of chemical products and machinery.  
Table 5.15. Changes in Foreign Trade by Regions, Scenario 4, % change from benchmark 
  
Improved market 
access 5%; 
increased 
investment 3% 
Improved market 
access 3%; 
increased 
investment 1% 
Improved market 
access 7%; 
increased 
investment 5% 
  Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Russia 6.00 -1.13 3.29 -2.72 7.97 -1.75 
CIS 5.31 -2.19 2.96 -4.10 7.02 -4.80 
EU25 5.83 12.63 2.99 8.24 7.45 16.77 
Asia 5.73 13.13 3.29 8.95 7.86 16.97 
ROW 4.95 14.56 2.73 11.46 6.39 21.71 
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As can be seen from Table 5.16, in Scenario 4 changing the elasticity’s parameter values does not 
bring significant modification to the key variables under scrutiny. 
Table 5.16. Sensitivity Analyses, Scenario 4 
  
Parameter value 
Variable value, % change 
from benchmark 
Parameter Lower Level Upper Lower Level Upper 
  GDP 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 6.57 6.94 6.52 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 6.79 6.94 6.79 
  Exports 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 5.63 5.50 5.40 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 5.36 5.50 5.42 
  Imports 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 6.12 5.98 5.87 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 5.82 5.98 5.88 
  Welfare, % of consumption 
Substitution elasticity of 
Armington function 1.5 2 2.5 8.77 9.87 8.68 
Transformation elasticity 
of CET function -3 -4 -5 9.96 9.87 9.77 
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Chapter 6 
Concluding Remarks 
This research scrutinises the accession of a transition country to the World Trade Organization on 
the evidence of Ukraine. Quantitative results are obtained by building a Computable General 
Equilibrium model in the mathematical programming language General Algebraic Modelling 
System (GAMS). The model is static with perfect competition and Constant Returns to Scale. The 
economy of Ukraine is disaggregated into 38 sectors and there are five trade regions.  
Four scenarios are simulated: 1) import tariffs reform; 2) improvement of exports access; 3) 
improvement of investment climate and 4) the scenario that combines previous three, or a full 
WTO accession. The first scenario is modelled by changing import tariffs according to the WTO 
tariff schedule; the second one assumes an increase of exports to selected trade regions; the third 
one presumes growth of investment with a certain rate for five years and is calculated through the 
recursive dynamics technique. In order to achieve better flexibility, scenarios 2, 3 and 4 have 3 
sub-scenarios, each with different rates of exports access improvement and investment inflow. 
Scenarios with 3% market access improvement and 1% investment increase are denoted as “least 
favourable”; “core” or “central scenarios” stands for a 5% market access expansion and 3% 
investment growth; 7% market access increase and 5% investment growth are called “optimistic 
scenarios”. 
In the case of full WTO accession scenario, the model predicts that welfare of households will 
increase significantly: in the central sub-scenario by nearly 8.8% of consumption or 1.8% of 
GDP. Output will increase by more than 6.5%, while exports and imports will grow by 5.6% and 
6.1% correspondingly. Unemployment is expected to fall by 3.6%. 
In order to understand how these results are obtained, it is worth studying the results of scenarios 
separately and comparing them.    
In the first scenario, tariff reform according to the WTO schedule does not bring significant 
changes either to production or to welfare of households. Lower import tariff barriers stimulate 
inflow of imports, which grow by 3%. In order to restore a trade balance, exports increase by 
2.8%. GDP and households consumption both rise by an insignificant 0.5% which can be broadly 
considered as “no change” at all. These figures point at shifting to more trade with foreign 
countries, but without noticeable effect on domestic production and consumption. As a result, 
household welfare does not change considerably: the model shows welfare growth of 0.17% of 
GDP or 0.8% of consumption. 
 The improvement of export access allows Ukrainian producers to increase the volume of some 
exports to those regions which applied antidumping and countervailing measures to these 
products before. Thus, outgoing trade will grow, and the model predicts an increase of almost 5% 
of exports in the central sub-scenario. Imports are growing as well, since more intermediate goods 
are needed and a trade balance has to be kept. As in the previous scenario, this does not have 
significant influence on production: GDP grows by 1.2%. The story here is similar to the one with 
tariff reform, but first of all comes from the exports side; second, it has an even smaller effect on 
household consumption and welfare. Consumption is growing by a negligible 0.2%, while 
welfare is growing by 0.09% of GDP or 0.4% of consumption. Although production expands 
more compared with preceding case, welfare and domestic consumption is twice as small which 
comes from higher reorientation of producers to foreign markets at the expense of the domestic 
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market. 
Modelling the improvement of the investment climate shows a large expansion of the economy 
and an increase in household welfare. Investment brings better allocation of resources and GDP 
grows by more than 6% in the central sub-scenario. The foreign sector expands as well, but by a 
comparatively smaller amount: exports grow by 3.4% and imports by 3.7%. Greater output 
without redistribution of sales to foreign countries means greater domestic consumption: it 
increases by 5.3%. Coupled with an almost 5% drop in unemployment and some real wage 
growth, this allows for household welfare to increase by a remarkable 2% of GDP or 9.6% of 
consumption. 
 Thus, it can be seen that the results of modelling Scenario 4 incorporate the outcomes of the 
three scenarios described above. Stimulation of foreign trade comes from modelling scenarios 1 
and 2 and results in the highest exports and imports growth among all four cases. Improvement of 
investment climate and better efficiency lead to a considerable increase of GDP, also higher than 
in any of the other three scenarios. Parameters such as household consumption growth, drop of 
unemployment rate and household welfare improvement are a mixture of those factors. They 
show less progress than from modelling Scenario 3, but are much larger than from simulating 
scenarios 1 and 2.  
 Another appealing aspect is to analyze how different sectors will react to modelled shocks. It is 
worthwhile breaking major sectors of the Ukrainian economy into three major groups: 1) 
agriculture and food-processing; 2) sectors which are considered to be a backbone of economy, 
namely metallurgy, the chemical industry and machinery; 3) service sectors, specifically: 
transport, telecommunications and financial intermediation. 
Agriculture, and even more so, food-processing have quite high initial import tariffs, which have 
to be lowered considerably. Thus, Scenario 1 results in a significant increase of agricultural and 
food products imports: by 10% and 40% respectively. At the same time, there is either a small 
drop or stagnation of output in these sectors. In Scenario 2, improvement of export access allows 
these two sectors to increase exports by roughly 5% each in the central sub-scenario, with a rather 
small increase of output (around 1%) and drop of imports (about 0.7%). Augmentation of 
investment climate brings better efficiency and both sectors increase their production: food 
processing leads with 5% growth, whilst agriculture expands by 3.6%. Exports are growing as 
well, by 6.7% and 7.7% respectively. Remarkably, agriculture is contracting exports by a figure 
similar to its output growth: 3.6%. The combined scenario shows different development paths for 
the industries under consideration. In Scenario 4, agriculture becomes a leader of growth among 
non-service sectors with a 7.4% increase; imports are also significantly increased by 24%. 
Imports of food products boost by almost the same amount as in Scenario 1 (41%), but 
investment inflow cannot compensate for higher competition, and output of food-processing 
industry is not changing. 
Among the key industrial sectors, metallurgy is predicted to be a stable although not record-
breaking winner, while the chemical industry and machinery show more modest results. In 
Scenario 1, metallurgy’s output increases by 2.7% in the central sub-scenario. Machinery grows 
by 1%, whilst the chemical sector does not change its output. Respectively, foreign trade turnover 
of these sectors changes in a similar way, which can be connected to the initial tariff structure: a 
larger decrease for metallurgy and machinery and a relatively smaller one for the chemical sector.  
In Scenario 2, the core sub-scenario, exports of all three industries grow by roughly 5%. Again, 
metallurgy is a leader of growth with a 5% output boost, followed by the chemical industry 
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(4.6%) and machinery (3.5%). Production growth corresponds to the volume of exports markets, 
to which Ukrainian producers will get better access. For the metallurgy, machinery and chemical 
sectors, improvement of investment climate proved to be relatively not as important a source of 
growth as for, say, agriculture and food-processing. Although the production of core industrial 
sectors increases, it does so to a lesser extent compared with the scenario with increased export 
access. Finally, full WTO accession scenario brings quite optimistic prospects for these three 
industries: enjoying combined effects of better exports access and investment inflow, the 
chemical industry increases its output by 5.6%, followed by metallurgy (5%) and machinery 
(3.8%). 
When it comes to services sectors, financial intermediation is clearly a winner in all four 
scenarios. Its growth rates are increasing from scenario 1 to 3: 5.7% in Scenario 1; 9.4% in 
Scenario 2; a remarkable 27% in Scenario 3. Scenario 4 brings more balanced growth of nearly 
20%. Imports and exports of financial services repeat the growth path of output in corresponding 
scenarios on an almost one-to-one basis. This suggests that the financial sector will be an 
important player in servicing both domestic and international transactions. Transport and 
telecommunications demonstrate a different picture from that of the financial sector, but are 
similar between themselves. In scenarios 1 and 2, these sectors are showing either signs of 
stagnation or some decline. By contrast, improvement of the investment climate proves to be a 
very important factor in developing these infrastructure sectors: in scenarios 3 and 4, transport 
grows by 6% and 8.7% respectively, while telecommunications grow by 13% and 15%. 
From an examination of the distribution of trade flows across the partners of Ukraine, one can see 
two different cases concerning exports and imports. Exports are growing quite uniformly to all 
major trade partners of Ukraine. By contrast, imports from Russia and the rest of the CIS 
countries underperform, compared with imports from EU25, Asian and ROW countries. In the 
case of a full WTO accession scenario, imports from Russia and the rest of the CIS countries 
decline by 1% and 2.2% respectively. On the other hand, imports from other trade partners grow 
by 12.5% – 14.5%. This can signify a more efficient and energy-saving structure of economy, 
since major items of imports from former USSR countries are energy resources. On top of this, 
imports from well-developed partners like the EU to great extent are machinery and other goods, 
which allow in increase in productivity.        
One important factor highlighted by modelling Ukraine’s accession to the WTO is the importance 
of investment for sustainable economic development. The model shows that, although such 
aspects as amendment of tariff schedule or improvement of exports access do promote foreign 
trade, they have limited, if any, effect on other parameters. Expansion of foreign trade does not 
lead to a significant increase in production, but rather reallocates sales from the domestic market 
to foreign markets. Household consumption does not see much growth either and welfare changes 
only slightly. By contrast, if the inflow of investment is modelled, the picture changes drastically. 
Being able to increase efficiency, producers expand their output and are capable of spreading out 
both foreign and domestic sales. There is a drop in unemployment rate, while consumption and 
household welfare increase. Thus, it is crucial for Ukraine to concentrate not only on promotion 
of foreign trade, but on the development of an attractive investment climate as well. 
There are several policy implications which can be made. 
 First of all, there are broad concerns among Ukrainian policy-makers, producers and the general 
public regarding a possible drop of output in certain sectors which will face higher imports and 
competition after WTO accession. Most anxiety is related to the agriculture and food-processing 
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industries. This CGE study confirms that such a point of view is not ungrounded. Changing the 
tariff schedule to the one agreed with the WTO members does significantly increase imports and 
leads to a decline or stagnation of output in these industries. At the same time, the model shows 
that investment can be a very important positive factor, allowing the turning of WTO accession 
into favouring agriculture and food-processing. Thus, Ukraine should make the most out of 
opportunities granted by “green” and “blue boxes”, and create an encouraging investment 
environment.  
Scenario 2 shows that improvement of export access will be favourable for those industries which 
suffered from restrictions prior to WTO accession. It is true that WTO membership gives clear 
rules of dealing with antidumping and countervailing suits, but improvement of export access 
does not come automatically. It is a matter of country and producers to use this opportunity by 
organizing a highly qualified legal framework. 
Scenario 3 demonstrates the strong potential of increasing investment inflow. Again, this will not 
come after the WTO accession as granted. In order to obtain investments, Ukraine should form a 
favourable investment climate. This can be done through the creation of transparent regulations, 
establishing political and macroeconomic stability, and fighting high inflation and corruption.    
             
It would be an interesting exercise to compare the results of this model with those of other known 
studies of this topic for Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan. Unfortunately, direct comparison is not 
possible, since models are either built for different countries, use a different base year for their 
database or incorporate different functional specification. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a 
rough comparison and see whether results are of the same direction and similar magnitude.  
The model for Ukraine constructed by Pavel et al. (2004) is dissimilar to this model in several 
ways. To mention some of them, it has a different base year (2001 in that of Pavel et al. and 2002 
in this model), different aggregation of sectors, trade regions and households. There are two 
similar policy experiments in both models: tariff reform and improved market access. 
In the case of Pavel et al., tariff reform brings a small and positive effect on output (1.3% growth) 
and welfare (1.2% of consumption). This model also shows some output and welfare growth, but 
of a smaller scale: GDP grows by 0.55%, welfare of households by 0.8%. In the second 
comparable scenario, improvement of market access, the similarity in welfare change is quite 
close: in the model of Pavel et al., welfare grows by 0.3%, while in this model it is 0.4%. Output 
expansion numbers are more different: 0.3% in the model of Pavel et al. and 1.2% in model of 
this research.   Since the results of the CGE simulations should be viewed as pointing to the 
general trend, those figures show quite high convergence.  
A study of Russia’s accession to the WTO by Jensen et al. (2004) is interesting owing to the 
similar usage of the recursive dynamics approach to quantify improvement of an investment 
climate. The study for Russia shows that investment will have a major impact and will account 
for two-thirds of total gains from WTO accession in the long run. This model also demonstrates 
the importance of investment.         
 
The model which was built for this research is not a rigid product, and there are many extensions 
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which can be done depending on purpose of study. 
First of all, this model has a standard general equilibrium framework and assumes perfect 
competition and Constant Returns to Scale. One possible extension is to introduce for some 
industries monopolistic behaviour and Increasing Returns to Scale. This will make it possible to 
reflect the actual structure of economy better and to obtain more realistic results. In the case of 
imperfect competition, welfare of households is expected to be higher as a result of gains from a 
larger variety of consumed goods and services. In order to make this extension, the software code 
has to be changed in parts, describing production functions. 
Another potential fundamental extension is the introduction of dynamics and intertemporal 
optimization. This model is static; although it employs the recursive dynamic method, capturing 
intertemporal behaviour would open the door to a much wider variety of modelling opportunities. 
This augmentation also requires alteration of the code, but on a much greater scale compared with 
introducing monopolistic competition, since behaviour of all agents in the model is changing.    
There are also several other extensions which do not require significant changes in the model 
structure, but rather data work or additional research outside the model. For instance, it is possible 
to estimate non-tariffs barriers in Ukraine and to widen the analysis from manufactured goods to 
service sectors as well. A technique which is used for this purpose is conducting a large-scale 
survey among producers (among thousands of respondents) considering their perception of non-
tariff barriers. Using the results of such a survey, it is possible to quantify non-tariff barriers and 
introduce them to the model in a similar way as import tariffs. Another opportunity is to make 
some data disaggregation in order to concentrate on some specific topics. For example, it is 
possible to disaggregate households by income level or education, or to break down aggregation 
of certain sectors of economy to study them in greater depth. To accomplish this, additional data 
on the economic agent or sector are required.     
On May 16
th
, 2008 Ukraine became a 152
nd
 member of the WTO, 15 years after the application 
was made. Now the ball is in Ukraine’s court and it is the responsibility of Ukraine to use it 
wisely. 
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Table A.1. WTO Commitments of Transition Countries 
 
Country Year of 
accession 
Commitments concerning 
agricultural products 
Commitments concerning non-
agricultural products 
Total Aggregated 
Measurement of Support to 
agriculture 
Export 
agriculture 
subsidies Import tariff 
rate, % 
Transition 
period 
Import tariff 
rate, % 
Transition 
period 
Bulgaria 1996 34.9 6 years 12.6 15 years 5% of agricultural production;  Nil since year 
2000 
Mongolia 1997 18.4 No 20.0 No 10% of agricultural production Nil 
Latvia 1999 33.6 9 years 9.3 9 years 5% of agricultural production Nil 
Estonia 1999 17.7 5 years 6.6 6 years 5% of agricultural production Nil 
Lithuania 2001 15.6 8 years 8.2 4 years 5% of agricultural production Nil 
Georgia 2000 12.1 5 years 5.8  5 years 10% of agricultural production Nil 
Moldova 2001 12.4 4 years 5.7 4 years 10% of agricultural production Nil 
Kyrgyzstan 1998 11.7 No 6.7 7 years 5% of agricultural production Nil 
Albania 2000 10.6 7 years 6.0 9 years 10% of agricultural production Nil 
Croatia 2000 10.4 5 years 5.0 5 years 5% of agricultural production Nil 
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Table A.2. Example of Social Accounting Matrix 
 
 Activities Commodities Factors Enterprises Households Government 
Capital 
Account 
ROW Total 
Activities  Gross output       Total sales 
Commodities 
Intermediate 
demand 
   
Household 
consumption 
Government 
consumption 
Investment Exports 
Aggregate 
demand 
Factors Value added       
Factor service 
exports 
Factor income 
Enterprises   Gross profits   Transfers   
Enterprise 
income 
Households   Wages 
Distributed 
profits 
 Transfers  
Foreign 
remittances 
Household 
income 
Government Indirect taxes Tariffs Factor taxes Enterprise taxes Direct taxes    
Government 
revenues 
Capital 
Account 
   
Retained 
earnings 
Household 
savings 
Government 
savings 
 
Cap. trans. from 
abroad 
Savings 
ROW  Imports 
Factor service 
imports 
 
Transfers 
abroad 
Transfers 
abroad 
Capital transfers 
abroad 
 
Foreign 
exchange 
payments 
Total Total costs 
Aggregate 
supply 
Factor 
expenditures 
Enterprise 
expenditures 
Household 
expenditures 
Government 
expenditures 
Investment 
Foreign 
exchange 
receipts 
 
 
 
   
 141 
Table A.3. CGE Studies of the Doha Round 
 
Publications Data Baseline Model Description Measures Liberalized Simulation Scenarios 
Anderson, Martin 
and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2005) 
GTAP 
Database 
version 6 
2015, extrapolated from 2001  LINKAGE 
model 
 25 sectors  
 27 regions 
 recursive 
dynamic model 
 Constant 
returns to scale and 
perfect competition 
 Agriculture 
- Tariffs 
- Export subsidies 
- Domestic subsidies 
(cut by 28% for the US, 
18% for Norway, 16% 
for the EU and 10% for 
Australia) 
 Manufacturing 
goods - Tariffs  
(i) elimination of all merchandise trade 
barriers over the 2005-2010 period 
(ii) a progressive reduction formula 
with a marginal agricultural tariff rate 
reduction of 45, 70 and 75 % cuts for 
developed countries; 35, 40, 50, and 
60 % for developing countries for the 
respective bands. No cut for LDCs. 
(iii) adds to Scenario (ii) the 
“Sensitive Products” option (2% of 
agricultural tariff lines for developed 
countries and 4%  for developing 
countries, subject to just a 15% cut) 
(iv) adds to Scenario (iii) a tariff cap 
of 200% for agricultural products 
(v) add to Scenario (ii) liberalization 
of non-agricultural products (50% cut 
of bound rates for developed countries 
and 33% for developing countries) 
(vi) like (v) but developing countries 
also cut bound tariffs by 50%  
Anderson, 
Dimaranan, 
Francois, Hertel, 
Hoekman and 
Martin (2003) 
GTAP 
Database 
version 4 
2005 - extrapolated from 1995 
Standard GTAP trade 
elasticities were doubled given 
the long-term nature of the 
simulations. 
 Standard 
GTAP model 
 4 sectors 
 19 regions  
 Constant 
returns to scale and 
perfect competition  
 Agriculture  
- Tariffs 
 Manufactured 
goods - Tariffs 
Elimination of all tariffs in agricultural 
and manufactured goods 
 
Brown, Deardorff 
and Stern (2003) 
GTAP 
Database 
version 4 
2005 - extrapolated from 1995  Michigan 
model  
 18 sectors 
 20 regions 
 Agriculture 
- Domestic subsidies 
- Export subsidies 
- Tariffs 
(i) 33% reduction in agricultural 
tariffs, production and export subsidies  
(ii) 33% reduction in manufactured 
goods tariffs 
(iii) 33% reduction in services barriers 
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Increasing returns 
and monopolistic 
competition in 
manufactures but 
perfect competition 
and constant returns 
in agriculture 
 Manufactured 
goods 
- Tariffs 
 Services  
- Barriers 
(iv) Scenarios (i)+(ii)+(iii) 
(v) Global free trade in agricultural 
and industrial goods and services 
Cline (2004) GTAP 
Database 
version 5 
1997 but agricultural tariff 
data is updated to 1998 
 Harrison-
Rutherford-Tarr 
model 
 22 sectors 
 25 regions 
 Constant 
returns to scale and 
perfect competition   
 Agriculture 
- Tariffs 
- Export subsidies 
- Input subsidies 
 Manufacturing 
goods 
- Tariffs 
- Textile quotas 
Complete elimination of tariffs applied 
to agriculture and manufactures, 
export subsidies and input subsidies on 
agriculture, and textile quotas 
Francois, van Meijn 
and van Tongeren 
(2003) 
GTAP 
Database 
version 5.2 
1997 
Protection data is modified  
using tariffs in WTO IDB 
and WITS. Services barriers 
are estimated using a gravity 
equation 
 17 sectors 
 16 regions 
 Increasing 
returns and 
monopolistic 
competition in 
manufactures but 
assumes perfect 
competition and 
constant returns in 
agriculture 
 Dynamic  
 Agriculture 
- OECD Domestic 
subsidies 
- Export subsidies 
- Tariffs 
 Manufactured 
goods - Tariffs 
 Services  
- Barrier 
 Trade facilitation 
(i) Linear: 50% reduction in 
agricultural and manufactured tariffs, 
export subsidies, OECD domestic 
support and services barriers. Trading 
costs are reduced by 1.5% 
(ii) Swiss: reduction in agricultural 
and manufactured tariffs is based on 
the Swiss formula with a coefficient of 
25. 50% reduction in OECD domestic 
support, export subsidies and services 
barriers. Trading costs are reduced by 
1.5% 
(iii) Complete liberalization and a 
reduction in trading costs of 3% 
OECD (2003) GTAP 
Database 
version 5 
1997 but protection data 
benchmarked to 1998 using  
data in OECD tariffs  
database 
 Standard 
GTAP model with 
perfect competition 
and constant returns 
to scale 
 10 sectors 
 Agricultural  
- Tariffs 
 Manufactured 
goods 
- Tariffs 
 Trade facilitation 
(i) Linear tariff reduction by all 
regions 
- free trade in agricultural and 
manufactured goods and trade 
facilitation 
- free trade only in manufactured 
goods and trade facilitation 
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 10 regions - 50% reduction in tariffs on 
agricultural and manufactured goods 
and trade facilitation 
(ii) Differential participation in 
liberalization 
- Cuts of 100% and 50% respectively 
in manufactured and agricultural 
tariffs by developed countries only and 
trade facilitation 
- free trade by developed countries; 
50% cut by developing countries; 
trade facilitation 
(iii) Swiss formula 
- Swiss formula coefficient of 25 and 
trade facilitation 
- Swiss formula coefficient of 15 and 
trade facilitation 
- Swiss formula coefficient of 5 and 
trade facilitation 
UNCTAD (2003) GTAP 
Database 
version 5 
1997 
Modified using TRAINS to 
take preferences into  
account 
 Standard 
GTAP model with 
perfect competition 
and constant returns 
to scale 
 6 sectors 
 2 regions 
 Agriculture 
- Tariffs 
- Export subsidies 
(i) 50% reduction in agricultural tariffs 
(ii) Elimination of export subsidies in 
agriculture 
(iii) 50% reduction in processed 
agriculture tariffs (tariff escalation) 
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Table A.4. List of Variables 
 
 
Endogenous: 
iQ    domestic sales composite commodity in sector i  
iQD    gross domestic output 
irQDD    domestic output delivered to home market 
iP     price of composite commodities 
iPD     domestic producer price of commodities 
iPDD     price of domestic output delivered to home market 
iIO     intermediate commodity demand 
iVA   value added demand 
irE    exports 
irM    imports 
irPE    export price of commodities in sector i  delivered to region r in 
national currency 
irPM    import price of commodities in sector i  delivered from region r in 
national currency 
irPWE   world export price 
irPWM    world import price 
ER    exchange rate 
iK     capital demand 
iL     labour demand 
PK    return to capital 
iC     consumer demand for commodities 
iI     investment demand for commodities 
iG     public demand for commodities 
CE     consumer expenditures 
Y     household income 
CPI    consumer price index 
UNEMP    unvoluntary unemployment 
HU     utility level of households 
IU     utility level of financial institutions 
GU     utility level of government 
PLES    price index for welfare calculations 
SI    supernumerary income 
EV    equivalent variation 
CV   compensating variation 
S     total savings 
SH     household savings 
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SF     foreign savings 
GOVR    government revenues 
TRY     income tax revenues 
iTRIM    revenues from indirect and import taxes 
iTRID     indirect tax revenues 
irTRM    import tax revenues 
TRICK    artificial objective function 
 
Exogenous: 
KS    capital supply 
LS   labour supply 
PL     return to labour 
SG    government savings 
KRG     government capital revenues 
TRGH   transfers from government to households 
TRFH    foreign transfers to household in foreign currency 
TRFG   foreign transfers to government in foreign currency 
FR     foreign remittances in foreign currency 
 
Parameters: 
ijio    technical coefficients 
    Frisch parameter in nested HLES utility function 
HLES    marginal utility of household expenditures 
phillips   Phillips parameter 
itid    indirect tax rate 
irtm    tariff rate on imports 
ty   tax rate on income 
ib   share coefficient of value added in output 
F
i    
CES capital-labour substitution elasticities 
F
i    
CES share parameter in the production function of firms 
F
i    
CES efficiency parameter in the production function of firms 
F
i     
CES function exponent 
A
i    
Armington substitution elasticities 
A
i    
Armington share parameter in the production function of 
commodities 
A
i   
Armington efficiency parameter in the production function of 
commodities 
A
i    
Armington function exponent 
T
i    
elasticities of transformation in CET function 
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T
i     
CET share parameter regarding destination of domestic output 
T
i    
shift parameter in the CET function of firm 
T
i     
CET function exponent 
Y
i    
income elasticity of demand for commodity 
HLES
i     
power in nested LES household utility function 
H
i    
subsistence household consumption level 
G
i    
Cobb-Douglas power in government utility function 
I
i  
Cobb-Douglas power in investment institution utility function 
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Table A.5. List of Sectors 
 
1.       Agriculture, hunting 
2.       Forestry 
3.       Fishery 
4.       Mining of coal and peat 
5.       Production of hydrocarbons 
6.       Production of non-energy materials 
7.       Food-processing 
8.       Textile and leather 
9.       Wood working, pulp and paper industry, publishing 
10.       Manufacture of coke products 
11.       Petroleum refinement 
12.       Manufacture of chemicals, rubber and plastic products 
13.       Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
14.       Metallurgy and metal processing 
15.       Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
16.       Other production 
17.       Electric energy 
18.       Gas supply 
19.       Heat supply 
20.       Water supply 
21.       Construction 
22.       Trade 
23.       Hotels and restaurants 
24.       Transport 
25.       Post and telecommunications 
26.       Financial intermediation 
27.       Real estate transactions 
28.       Renting 
29.       Informatisation activities 
30.       Research and development 
31.       Services to legal entities 
32.       Public administration 
33.       Education 
34.       Health care and social assistance 
35.       Sewage, cleaning of streets and refuse disposal 
36.       Social activities 
37.       Recreational, entertainment, cultural and sporting activities 
38.       Other activities 
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Table A.6. Social Accounting Matrix for Ukraine 
 
 Activities Commodities 
Factors of 
production 
Institutions ROW  
 Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services Capital Labor Households Government Investment Exports Total 
Agriculture 23756             
Industry  122271            
Services   93486           
Agriculture    23756 15707 938   21550 1195 2095 7769 73010 
Industry    9090 122271 43620   75431 775 25056 93097 369340 
Services    7307 65091 93486   31805 39569 21427 23526 282211 
Capital    24144 20158 51760       96062 
Labor    5198 29435 67476      373 102482 
Households       89668 102482  30873  4705 227728 
Government    1968 18031 10624 6394  48167   2069 87253 
Savings         50775 14841  -17038 48578 
Imports    1547 98647 14307       114501 
Total    73010 369340 282211 96062 102482 227728 87253 48578 114501  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
